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FOREWORD 
hould Europe have a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)? 
One does not have to be a fervent believer in an ever closer Union to 
realise that a diplomatic toolbox with no instruments to project 
military power when diplomacy and other soft-power levers fail is 
incomplete and ineffective.  
So much for belief. Practice has proved to be far more complicated. 
First, for understandable reasons democracies consider decision-making on 
matters of security and defence to be a core element of their sovereignty. 
After all, the decision might involve sending their men and women in 
uniform into harm’s way. Second, some EU members, given their history or 
geographical position, consider NATO to be the instrument of choice when 
it comes to military (hard) power projection. The absence of any serious 
EU-NATO dialogue is a major stumbling block to any division of labour 
between the two organisations and impacts negatively on the ambition to 
strengthen CSDP. The political stalemate over Cyprus – an EU member – is 
a case in point. CSDP would benefit from policy co-ordination with the 
Alliance and from being able to use NATO assets for its own independent 
operations. 
Apart from the unique strategic cultures of the EU member states, 
framed as the innovative approach explored in this collection of papers, 
other elements should be taken into account when analysing the limited 
success of CSDP. Two of Europe’s leading nations also happen to be 
permanent members of the UN Security Council. When major crises occur, 
the UK and France always have the option to turn to UNSCR deliberations 
and their veto-wielding ‘peers’ the US, Russia and China. Germany, which 
considers CSDP mainly as an integration tool, for reasons explained in this 
volume, will not be inclined to take the lead in launching a serious debate 
among capitals. When the ‘big three’ all have their own arguments to go 
slow and most of their Central and East European colleagues display a 
preference for NATO, the going gets tough for CSDP. 
S
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Yet, the urgency for the EU to become a more serious actor, able to 
use all the tools in its political and military arsenal, is gaining momentum. 
The US ‘pivot’ to Asia (our American friends prefer the word 
‘rebalancing’ because they claim not to pivot away from anybody) is not a 
temporary affair as some Europeans might wish to believe. We have 
recently witnessed the US acting as ‘the reluctant hegemon’, as was the case 
during the NATO operation over Libya where the phrase “the US is 
leading from behind” was first heard. Although the operation was 
considered a success the European allies were incapable of acting without 
substantial support from the United States. In other words: it is an illusion 
to think that an exclusively Europe-led action outside the NATO 
framework would have been a serious military option. 
But it is Europe’s approach to its southern neighbours that is in 
turmoil. Just why the recent successful French military operation in Mali 
did not have an EU stamp is cause for wonder. Fundamental European 
interests were at stake and the action was certainly not at the highest end of 
the military spectrum. The argument that Mali is French-speaking cannot 
be taken seriously. Even if we accept that European capitals have their own 
strategic culture we cannot be but disappointed at the lack of a cohesive 
European approach in a geographical area that runs the risk of exporting 
instability. The EU should not have the ambition to be: ‘le gendarme du 
monde’ but its political, and ultimately its economic interests, are of a global 
nature and make it imperative that a credible security strategy be in place 
to defend those interests – using all available instruments whenever 
necessary. 
The days when, in the eyes of some, NATO should have ‘a right of 
first refusal’ in considering a military operation are long gone. Long gone 
too are the days when the US administration was unwilling to accept any 
form of CSDP for fear of weakening NATO. Under present day 
circumstances it is even a clear US interest to see Europe mature in matters 
of security and defence. 
EU members do not take themselves seriously in matters of security 
and defence, however. And even if they should change their minds and 
succeed in bridging the gap between their national strategic cultures, the 
almost permanent and un-coordinated cuts in defence budgets across the 
EU make it virtually impossible to sustain high-end military operations for 
any considerable period; a malaise that has, unsurprisingly, already 
affected NATO. 
NATIONAL VISIONS OF EU DEFENCE POLICY | iii 
The EU has proven its unique ability to make a difference where it 
concerns soft power projection – a key element in any diplomatic toolbox. 
But the 21st century is a complex and sometimes unfriendly one, where 
diplomacy and soft power instruments will only be credible when a hard 
power follow-up and a co-ordinated security strategy are at hand.  
 European leaders often claim that the European Union can make a 
difference when it comes to peace, justice and stability. By taking new 
initiatives in the domain of CSDP they can prove that they are taking their 
own words seriously. 
 
 Jaap de Hoop Scheffer 
October 2013 
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INTRODUCTION 
MEGAN PRICE AND FEDERICO SANTOPINTO 
eralded as a shining example of progress toward European 
integration in 2003, the European Security Strategy (ESS) has lost 
some of its lustre as it reaches its 10th anniversary. Some critics 
would even say that the strategy is past its shelf-life. Others contend that 
the strategy was deficient from the start; a paper tiger compromise to 
satisfy Brussels bureaucrats, lacking the credibility of a purposeful guiding 
policy. Not all are as derisive, however. Many more even-handed 
commentators acknowledge the strategy’s notable contribution to 
cementing the European project. Yet even the more gracious reviews of the 
ESS are offered in the general context of a parting tribute, if not a eulogy. 
This disenchantment has stirred many to call once more for an 
attempt to articulate a collective EU strategy on defence and security. 
Recent developments in the European policy arena, not least of which the 
Treaty of Lisbon and the creation of the External Action Service, certainly 
facilitate (if not necessitate) a reconsideration of the EU’s tools and the 
expectations built around them. Conversely, global events, namely crises in 
Libya, Mali and Syria, press uncomfortable conclusions about Europe’s 
ability to respond to emergencies in real time. 
Thus 2013 has been, in a way, ‘ordained’ as the year to resume a frank 
debate about the future vision of an EU security strategy, and the Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) it is intended to guide. This 
deliberation is expected to be launched by the European Council in 
December 2013. To guide this discussion down a productive path, it is 
perhaps useful to address assumptions that, in prior attempts, may have 
led to an insufficient strategy. In our view, previous attempts to build a 
common European strategy were flawed from the outset: a presumption 
that common interests could be articulated at the Brussels level and 
resonate in individual state capitals. We suppose that, while well intended, 
this was an overly sanguine approach that contrived interests collectively, 
H
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rather than deriving them from the true driving force of the EU; its member 
states. This project thus aims to invert the analytical approach usually 
applied. Rather than starting the enquiry from the vantage point of 
common European interests to guide CSDP, the research analyses how 
each member state sees CSDP as a mechanism to serve their individual 
national interests. 
In this book, we assert that any attempt to identify a collective EU 
security strategy must be premised on an understanding of what member 
states expect from the CSDP. Motivated by member states’ apparent 
confusion and existential doubts over Europe’s defence policy, the study 
narrows its aperture and brings Europe’s capitals into sharper focus.  
France, a central pillar of the CSDP, stands as a striking example. In 
recent years, attitudes in Paris towards European defence policy have 
appeared complex and, at times, contradictory. Since 2008, France has 
reintegrated the NATO military commandment, revived the Weimar 
triangle with Germany and Poland, advocated for the creation of a 
European HQ, strengthened its UK alliance while giving Germany the cold 
shoulder, and published a new White Paper asking for more EU 
integration. This seemingly mercurial posture toward European defence 
confounds any one-dimensional understanding of France’s relationship to 
CSDP.  
Similar, though perhaps less pronounced, observations could be 
made when reviewing other member states’ vacillation towards CSDP. 
France is certainly not the only country to have been ambiguous on the 
matter. With the possible exception of the UK, it is quite difficult to define 
what member states expect or desire from the CSDP. What role is European 
defence policy to play in their respective national strategies? These are the 
complexities and questions that we pursue in this book. In so doing, we 
hope to contribute to a productive discussion of what may be more 
corporeal underpinnings of a common EU strategy.  
In order to probe more deeply into these questions, five researchers 
have been sent to seven research centres, each based in a prominent 
European capital, for a study period of approximately one month. These 
research missions were undertaken with the central purpose of exploring 
the extent to which CSDP could be or is perceived to be a multilateral 
instrument to serve national interests. The five researchers thus took the 
opportunity to be immersed in the foreign policy worlds of Paris, London, 
Berlin, Rome, Warsaw, Stockholm and Madrid, looking at CSDP through 
national lenses. In order to obtain comparable results, a shared 
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methodology, based on a common protocol, was developed collaboratively 
among the researchers before the seven studies were launched. The 
researchers were then able to lead semi-structured interviews with key 
military, administrative, foreign policy and academic experts and officials. 
They also made use of national policy documents, white papers, national 
security and defence strategies, and other relevant documentation to 
inform their respective analyses. In this way, the observations and analysis 
of each researcher drew upon both the ‘official policy’ and the candid 
political pronouncements of the seven capitals. 
The structure of the book provides a virtual tour through Europe, 
exploring in each visited site attitudes toward international organisations, 
the desired level of strategic autonomy, and the country’s declared or tacit 
geographic and thematic priorities. Along the way, the authors describe 
their observations of the national ‘strategic culture’, or the set of norms, 
beliefs and ideas among elites and decision-makers regarding the 
legitimate use of force.1 The mosaic of opinions, interpretations and 
perceptions are ultimately assembled in the conclusion chapter, which 
seeks to outline both the commonalities and the traceable fault lines and 
tensions stretched across the overall picture. 
The work has been expressly carried out in national capitals in order 
to maintain a strict focus on national perspectives, without the potentially 
distorting influence of the ‘Brussels-mentality’ or rhetoric. Following this 
diverted – but perhaps somewhat more realistic – path, the authors are able 
to offer additional perspectives to lay the groundwork for a robust EU 
strategic debate. In this way, the study aims to more precisely identify 
potential common denominators, misunderstandings and areas of deadlock 
among member states on this issue of CSDP. This insight is relevant to the 
European vision of peace operations through two main avenues. First, it 
seeks to provide a more realistic foundation for deriving (rather than 
contriving) common interests usefully and effectively pursued through the 
CSDP. Secondly, by exposing gaps between member states’ differing 
agendas for CSDP, the study can more accurately focus debate on how to 
bridge or reconcile national interests to better enable the effective use of 
this EU policy instrument.  
One of the more important rifts identified in the survey relates to the 
unique strategic cultures of member states. From the study, it appears that 
                                                   
1 Derived from the work of Christoph O. Meyer. 
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the member states, and in particular France and Germany, have diverging 
visions of what the essence of the CSDP is or should be. As Manuel Muniz 
describes in his chapter on France, not only does this strong military actor 
espouse a more ambitious agenda for CSDP, it also maintains a broader 
scope of acceptable military intervention beyond the borders of Europe. 
This perspective is contrastingly juxtaposed with the idea that CSDP is 
primarily an instrument of European integration, a point of view held by, 
for example, Germany. Christian Wurzer, in his chapter on Germany, 
draws out how history has been embedded in the country’s culture (and its 
governing institutions); a steadfast reluctance to deploy military force 
abroad. Germany therefore underscores the added value of CSDP’s civilian 
power as part of a more comprehensive approach, and characterises the 
enterprise primarily in terms of building European partnerships for 
preventative action.  
The conclusion of the study therefore demonstrates the need to clarify 
what the CSDP is, in its essence, for each member state, before launching a 
serious debate on a united vision a security strategy at the EU level. If 
CSDP is a means, what is the end? This is not to imply a false choice, surely 
several ends may be pursued in coordination. However, this clearly 
requires a graduated level of strategic thinking, arrived at through what 
may be difficult strategic choices.  
This argument is perhaps most clearly made in the chapter on Spain, 
wherein Madrid’s commitment to milieu goals obscures the sharper 
contours of a defined strategy. Other countries present their own 
dilemmas. In his chapter on Italy, Giovanni Faleg explores how an 
amalgam of priorities, including strengthening multilateral comprehensive 
approaches while also relying on external allies to guarantee national 
defence leads to Rome judiciously balancing its role in both CSDP and 
NATO. Paris, as another example, is pressed to clarify the relation it wants 
between the ‘Europe de la defense’ and its ‘souvraineté nationale’. In its own 
case, Germany has to understand that in the context of the US pivot to Asia, 
it should be ready to take more responsibility abroad. Such evolutions 
within a country or its strategic culture do not contradict experience; nor do 
they require generational periods of glacial-pace change. In her chapter on 
Poland, Joanna Dobrowolska-Polak depicts how a country’s posture 
towards integrated European defence can exhibit remarkable shifts in as 
little as five years. Such dynamics emerge from a complex synthesis of 
long-running cultural and historical factors, as well as modern, quick-
shifting economic or political developments. In his chapter on Sweden, 
Alessandro Marrone describes how a history of neutrality, more recent 
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shifts toward non-alignment, and a certain commitment to multilateral and 
value-driven solutions each measure out their influence on the country’s 
participation in CSDP.  
Each of these national discussions must be grasped at an elite level in 
capitals, as well as invigorated through public debate in the countries’ 
media, streets, institutes and universities. In this way, the chapter on the 
UK looks closely at the current flux of the government position toward 
CSDP and the temperature of public debate on EU integration. At times, a 
country may arrive at a crossroads regarding its commitment to the EU 
security and defence apparatus. Such moments of national reflection, 
especially when they arrest such a prominent member state as the UK, are 
bound to weigh heavily on the ambitions and available options for any 
future European strategy.  
Today, the launch of EU missions has dwindled compared to the 
surge witnessed in the previous decade. Meanwhile, the integration process 
in Brussels seems to be grinding down to a technical debate on how to save 
money through the pooling of military capabilities intended to remain 
under tight national control. These negotiations fail to move forward 
political and strategic discussion for developing a coherent CSDP policy 
that both captures the aspirations of and garners robust commitment from 
the contributing member states. As explored in the concluding chapter, 
emerging dialogues regarding permanent structured cooperation (PESCO), 
also outlined in the Treaty of Lisbon, may provide both the platform and 
the impetus to link technical discussions with political-strategic debate and 
dialogue. Clearly, these two discussions must not be distinct from one 
another. Yet, the fact that they so often are may very well be a case of low-
hanging fruit. Technical negotiations about the various tools member states 
can share and collectively deploy may become a distraction from much 
thornier discussions about what member states think the tools assembled 
should be working to build. The underlying assertion here is that it appears 
imperative that consensus on member states’ expectations of CSDP be 
addressed at the national level before taking them to the European level. 
Until a more sophisticated discussion can be had among member states as 
to what ends they envision the CSDP pursuing, continued rambling 
discussions over collective means will amount to the tail wagging the dog.  
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FRANCE: THE FRUSTRATED LEADER 
MANUEL MUNIZ 
Abstract 
In recent years France has seen CSDP fall well below the expectations it 
originally had for it. The European Union’s inability to agree on a new and 
updated security strategy (or White Paper on Defence); the unimpressive 
track record in terms of Battlegroup deployment and capability 
development through pooling and sharing, and the fact that CSDP military 
action receives minimal common funding are among the grievances the 
French have expressed publicly and repeatedly. What has been particularly 
frustrating for France has been the EU’s inability to act in circumstances 
where it thought common European interests were at stake. Examples are 
the crises in Libya in 2011 and in Mali in early 2013. 
Having failed to tailor CSDP to French standards, and in view of its 
inability to execute missions at the higher end of the enforcement spectrum, 
France has explored different avenues in the pursuit of its interests. The 
return to NATO’s integrated military command, despite being an attempt 
to create more political space for CSDP to develop, has allowed further 
doubts about the future of European defence to emerge. The recent 
Lancaster House bilateral agreements with the UK are another example of 
France’s willingness to retain the ability to act outside of the CSDP 
framework if needed. Only a renewed effort to reform EU defence to make 
it more agile and better equipped to take on difficult missions in Africa and 
elsewhere could return it to the centre of French defence policy.  
Overview 
France has been the strongest proponent of a robust European defence 
policy since the end of the Cold War, as demonstrated by its continued 
support for the development of Europe’s defence institutions and through 
active participation in the EU’s defence initiatives. France was fundamental 
to the emergence of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
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in the 1990s, and the largest contributor to its missions, with over 5,500 
personnel deployed between 1999 and 2009.2 It would be fair to say that 
France has been behind all the major developments in EU defence over the 
past few decades. A Europe of Defence is, simply put, unthinkable without 
French participation.  
France’s central role in EU defence policy makes its loss of faith in it 
all the more worrying. Despite calls in France’s national security 
documents for stronger EU defence, the general feeling in foreign policy 
and defence circles is one of disappointment, and, in many cases, 
frustration with European allies. Time and again, be it Chad, Libya or 
recently Mali, France has struggled to get the EU to act decisively. It is 
because of these failures to act, together with a generalised collapse in 
defence capacities across Europe, that France has lost much of its faith in 
the Europe of Defence. Frustration seems to be high regarding German 
attitudes to defence in general and to the Common Security and Defence 
Policy (CSDP) in particular. Germany’s inability to act or even to shoulder 
part of the costs of military action is a common topic of conversation in 
Paris. 
Parallel to this slow erosion of French hopes for EU defence, the 
country has moved in directions if not opposed to then at least divergent 
from CSDP. France’s rapprochement to the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) is a relevant case in point. Although it is disputed in 
Paris that France had ever been distant from the Atlantic Alliance, or that 
rejoining NATO hurt CSDP, it should be recognised that being in its 
integrated military command has some symbolic value at the very least. 
Furthermore, it was perceived by some of France’s allies as an acceptance 
of the possibility that NATO will retain, sine die, its preponderance over 
defence matters in Europe. The Lancaster House Agreements with the UK 
is another example of French pragmatism and a source of confusion for its 
EU partners. This capacity to unabashedly pursue routes outside of the EU 
framework has enabled France to defend its national interests in diverse 
ways but also led many of its allies to question its commitment to European 
defence.  
Perceptions aside, what seems to be the emerging trend in France is 
one of deep frustration with the European defence project. Not a single 
                                                   
2 G. Grevi, D. Helly and D. Keohane (2009) European Security and Defence Policy: The 
First Ten Years, Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies. 
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goal among those set for CSDP in France’s 2008 White Paper has been 
reached, leading to a sensation of collective failure. The 2013 White Paper 
defined the possibility of France relying on an integrated European defence 
to tackle its security challenges as an “illusory option”.3 If one could sum 
up the attitudes in Paris today regarding European defence it would be the 
following excerpt from a report to President Hollande in 2012 by the former 
French Prime Minister, Hubert Védrine:  
“Unless there is a strong reawakening of political determination to 
make Europe a global power, to prevent it from becoming 
powerless, and dependent, all of the arrangements for the Europe 
of Defence will be nothing more than incomplete or lifeless words 
on paper”.4 
Institutional structure and strategic thought 
French strategic planning is quite straightforward compared to that of 
other EU countries. In recent decades France has produced a small number 
of “White Papers on Defence” that reflect the country’s basic threat 
perception and key defence policy directives. Following the model of the 
1972 and 1994 Papers, France undertook to produce a new one in 2008. That 
document was, together with the National Strategy for Oceans and the 
White Paper on French Foreign Policy, the most significant text on strategy 
in France until 2013. In mid-2013 the Hollande government released a new 
White Paper, which supersedes the 2008 one. 
The process of reviewing the 2008 White Paper was put in motion by 
Hollande’s administration in 2012. Alleging significant changes in the 
strategic landscape, the administration started work on the matter by 
producing a preparatory document titled “Document Préparatoire à 
l’Actualisation du Livre Blanc sur la Défense et la Sécurité Nationale”, which is 
                                                   
3 Livre Blanc de Défense et la Sécurité Nationale 2013, Direction de l’information 
légale et administrative, Paris, p. 61.  
4 H. Vedrine (2012), “Report for the President of the French Republic on the 
Consequences of France’s Return to NATO Integrated Military Command, On the 
Future of Transatlantic Relations, and the Outlook for the Europe of Defense”, 
(http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/global-issues/defence-security/french-
defence/international-organization-in/nato/france-and-nato/article/hubert-
vedrine-report-submitted-to). 
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publicly available in both French and English.5The 2013 White Paper on 
Defence was finally released in late April of 2013. Another document of 
reference when it comes to assessing French strategic planning is the 
Military Programme Law (Loi de programmation militaire), which regulates 
both force and defence budget planning and it is intended to cover the 
period 2009-14.After that, a new Military Programme Law will kick in to 
cover the period 2014-19.  
Finally, it should be noted here that when it comes to strategic 
planning, it is the president of the Republic that retains full control of the 
process. Article 15 of the French Constitution establishes that the president 
is the head of the armed forces and as such he “chairs the national defence 
councils and higher committees”.6 It is within the Defence Council that 
decisions are made regarding the country’s defence policy. During the 
writing of the 2008 and 2013 White Papers, Presidents Sarkozy and 
Hollande established an open process with intense involvement of not only 
representatives from the military and the Foreign Affairs Ministry, but also 
the legislative and civil society. That openness led to wide participation in 
both instances, but it is still the case that defence policy in France is very 
much in the hands of the head of state.  
Presidential control of the planning process is accompanied by a 
significant discretionary power when it comes to deciding on the use of 
force. Article 35 of the French Constitution establishes that declarations of 
war shall be authorised by parliament, but the president is allowed to 
initiate military action at his or her own volition, only having to inform 
parliament three days after the fact. Parliament in turn can only vote 
regarding these operations if their duration extends beyond four months, 
giving ample time for the president to decide upon and carry out 
significant military action before parliament is involved. This authority 
means that the French president is one of the leaders at EU Council 
meetings with the greatest freedom for manoeuvre when deciding on 
CSDP issues, including the launching of missions. 
                                                   
5 “The international and strategic evolutions faced by France: Preparatory 
document for the update of the White Paper on Defence and National Security”at: 
(http://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/Doc_preparatoire_LBDSN_UK-2012-
V2_WEB_Protected.pdf). 
6 Constitution of the Fifth Republic, Article 15.  
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France’s strategic interests and strategic culture 
As indicated before, France has a long-established tradition of producing 
White Papers on Defence. It is in these documents that one can find the 
formal, or doctrinal, strategic outlook of the country. Given the focus of this 
study it is perhaps the 2008 Paper, the Preparatory Document for the 2013 
paper, and the 2013 White Paper itself that are of most interest. Looking 
further back would take us to 1994, when the EU played a minimal external 
role and there were no CSDP missions to speak of.  
The 2008 White Paper did not list France’s strategic interests. What it 
did do was describe the strategic landscape inhabited by France, including 
the major threats to the country’s security. The key development addressed 
by the paper was globalisation and its impact on issues of security. As 
indicated by President Sarkozy in the foreword of the document, “the 
traditional distinction between domestic security and foreign security has 
blurred”7 leading the security strategy to “treat defence policy, domestic 
policy, foreign policy and economic policy as part of a whole”8 and to 
provide responses to “all risks and threats that could prove detrimental to 
the life of the nation”.9 It is clear from the 2008 White Paper that France felt 
the world had become more interdependent, unstable, unpredictable and 
complex.  
An analysis of the paper points to various sources of concern for 
France at the time. These sources are perhaps best understood if divided 
into the following four categories:  
1. Strategic uncertainty associated with globalisation 
2. A progressive shift in the strategic centre of gravity towards Asia 
3. The existence of four critical areas for the security of France: the “arc 
of crisis” from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean, sub-Saharan Africa, 
the Near East, and Asia 
4. The developments of new vulnerabilities for the European territory 
(mostly terrorism).  
                                                   
7 The French White Paper on Defence and National Security 2008, Odile Jacob 
Publishing Corporation, New York, p. 9.  
8 Ibid., p. 10.  
9 Ibid., p. 59. 
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Each of the four points above is developed in the 2008 White Paper in 
more or less detail. Figure 1 shows the four trends and the threats 
associated with each in as schematic a form as possible. 
The 2008 White Paper also lists the five strategic functions that 
security and defence forces must fulfil: knowledge and anticipation, 
prevention, deterrence, protection and intervention. Of these five broad 
tasks, it is perhaps intervention that is of greatest interest to us as it is 
precisely when thinking about intervention that France might consider 
CSDP structures. France recognised that intervention would take place 
primarily under a multilateral framework, mainly the UN, EU or NATO. 
Unilateral intervention would only be considered when it is required for the 
“protection of our [French] citizens, the application of bilateral defence 
agreements with certain States, and, finally, possible national response to 
one-off actions against our interests”.10 
  
                                                   
10 Ibid., p. 67. 
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Figure 1. The French White Paper on Defence 2008 - trends and threats 
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Relative Decline of Western Powers 
Fragility of the System of Collective Security 
“Crisis Arc” from 
 Atlantic to Indian Ocean 
North Africa 
The Sahel 
The Horn of Africa 
The Near East 
The Arab Persian Gulf 
Afghanistan and Pakistan 
 Sub-Saharan Africa 
Near East 
Asia 
New Vulnerabilities for Europe  
Terrorism 
Missile Threats 
Cyber Attacks 
Espionage and Strategies of Influence 
Criminal Trafficking 
Natural and Health Risks 
Technological Risks 
Exposure of Citizens Abroad 
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The 2008 paper has served as the key strategic document in France 
for the past five years. The 2012-13 revision left in place almost all of the 
premises and conclusions of the 2008 document; the risks posed by 
globalisation, the need to remain engaged in Asia and the threat posed by 
new forms of war on the European continent are all there. What the 2013 
paper, and its preparatory document pointed out is that there have been 
four major developments that require a rethink of France’s strategic 
priorities. The first is the so-called Arab Spring, which has changed the face 
of the southern Mediterranean and forced France to reconsider its presence 
in the region. The second is the global economic and financial crisis, which 
the preparatory document referred to as the “Great Recession” and which 
has “highlighted the increase in the economic and geostrategic weight of 
major emerging countries”.11 The 2013 White Paper was more explicit 
about this and pointed to the rise of China as a specific development that 
should affect France’s strategic planning.12 The third development is “the 
end of an American strategic sequence”, which refers to the drawing down 
of military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan and, in general terms, to the 
slow closure of the ‘War on Terror’. France also senses that the US pivot to 
Asia has only just begun and is already having an impact on the geographic 
location of military taskforces. The preparatory document pointed out that 
“[m]ilitary taskforces that are deployed in Europe-Atlantic and Asia-Pacific 
are almost on par, and the naval resources are a little higher in the 
Pacific”.13 The fourth and final element of change has been the evolution of 
the jihadist terrorist threat. Indeed, France believes that al-Qaida ‘Central’ 
has fallen in relevance, and that a decentralisation of power to other 
regional organisations, such as al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) or 
Boko Haram in Nigeria, has taken place.  
The French strategic posture has, therefore, changed little since 2008. 
It is fair to say that the main source of concern for France remains what it 
termed the “arc of crisis”, meaning essentially North Africa, the Sahel, the 
Horn of Africa, and the Persian Gulf. It is in this area that it sees its key 
interests at stake in both economic and political terms. Although France is 
                                                   
11 2012 Preparatory Document for the Update of the White Paper on Defence and 
National Security, Secrétariat général de la défense et de la sécurité nationale, p. 8-9 
12 Livre Blanc the de Défense et la Sécurité Nationale 2013, Direction de 
l’information légale et administrative, Paris, p. 27. 
13 2012 Preparatory document for the update of the White Paper on Defence and 
National Security, Secrétariat général de la défense et de la sécurité nationale, p. 47. 
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one of the few European countries to have a truly global strategy that 
speaks of every continent and even calls for a constant engagement in Asia, 
it remains the case that Africa is the most important region for the country 
when speaking of security. What is new in the 2013 White Paper is an 
emphasis on the growing challenges for Europe and the need to be ready to 
tackle them. Indeed, the four developments that led to the redrafting of the 
White Paper are also issues that, in the eyes of France, call for greater 
military strength and collaboration.14 
It is worth pointing out here that beyond taking a broader and more 
ambitious strategic stance than other European nations, France also has a 
more expansive interpretation of when military action is acceptable. If one 
defines strategic culture as the compilation of beliefs and ideas a country 
has regarding the legitimate use of force, then France’s is definitely 
different from that of other European countries, like Germany, Sweden or 
Austria. It is indeed evident to any analyst studying France that the country 
is much more willing to use force than many of its CSDP partners. 
Following Christoph Meyer’s breakdown of strategic culture, France would 
score highly on the scale of “activism in the use of force” with the 
acceptance of a broad role for the armed forces, the practice of giving 
deployed forces an ample mandate, a willingness to act unilaterally, and a 
low domestic threshold to approve the use of force.15 
Unsurprisingly, France wants the EU to act in ways not too dissimilar 
from how it would itself behave. In an interview at the Quai D’Orsay, a 
high-ranking French diplomat said quite clearly, “We are not in the 
business of setting up a crisis management tool. We want a strong and 
capable CSDP”.16 It is doubtful, however, that such an attitude will be 
shared by many of his European colleagues. This gap in attitudes between 
France and its European allies is exacerbated by the fact that France retains 
one of the few strong militaries in Europe, meaning that it not only has the 
willingness but also the capacity to act militarily abroad. As we will see, 
this has set the country on a collision course with weary and weaker allies 
that prefer to invest resources in matters other than defence, and that 
would like to limit the scope of common military action.  
                                                   
14 Livre Blanc the de Défense et la Sécurité Nationale 2013, Direction de 
l’information légale et administrative, Paris, p. 22. 
15 C. Meyer (2006), The Quest for a European Strategic Culture: Changing Norms on 
Security and Defence in the European Union, Palgrave Macmillan. 
16 Interview, French Foreign Ministry, 25 June 2012. 
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French attitudes towards European defence and participation in 
CSDP 
Past French formal strategic documents are very clear about the country’s 
sustained support for European integration. The 2008 White Paper said 
quite explicitly, “France wants to be in the front rank of this drive for 
progressive political unification… (and) will work for a more unified, 
stronger European Union, with a greater presence in the fields of security 
and defence”.17 What is extraordinary, however, is the level of detail into 
which that document went when it came to defining France’s desires for 
EU defence. Here is a list of those objectives:18 
1. Building an intervention capacity of 60,000 men capable of being 
deployed in a distant theatre, with the necessary air and naval 
components, for a year.  
2. Having the capacity to conduct two or three peacekeeping or 
peacemaking operations simultaneously, for a significant duration, 
together with several more minor civil operations, in different 
theatres. This would require: 
a. Making good the currently most obvious shortcomings in 
Europe’s capacity to intervene in distant theatres, mainly by: 
i. Pooling and sharing key capacities like strategic and tactical 
transport aircraft, in-flight refuelling, air mobility capabilities, 
and aero-naval capabilities. Pooling of support activities, in 
particular for jointly built weapons systems.  
ii. Creating more robust means for the civil management of 
crisis, particularly regarding the capacity to provide post- 
conflict support.  
iii. Taking into account the growing role of reserves. 
b. Boosting capabilities for analysis and anticipation. 
c. Enhancing the capacity to plan and conduct European operations, 
mainly by establishing a permanent and autonomous strategic 
planning capability.  
                                                   
17 The French White Paper on Defence and National Security 2008, Odile Jacob 
Publishing Corporation, New York, p. 75. 
18 Ibid., pp. 82-85. 
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3. Overhauling the funding of military operations, effectively ending 
with the ‘costs lie where they fall’ principle, and creating a significant 
budget for the Common Foreign and Security Policy.  
4. Improving the training of EU officers and personnel through joint 
training programmes 
5. Consolidating Europe’s defence industry, and furthering the work of 
the European Defence Agency (EDA).  
 
Other specific proposals and policies France called for in 2008 were 
the enhancement of European cooperation against terrorism and organised 
crime, the development of European civil protection mechanisms, the 
creation of a European cyber defence capacity, further cooperation in the 
management of frontiers, and securing Europe’s strategic supplies. Lastly, 
France proposed in 2008 (and again in 2013) the drafting of a European 
White Paper on Defence and Security as a natural evolution of the 2003 
European Security Strategy.  
By 2012-13, what had come of all of the initiatives called for above? 
When President Hollande called for the drafting of a new White Paper, 
which formal French objectives for European defence had been achieved? 
The European intervention capacity called for by France (identical to the 
Helsinki Headline Goal) remained only an aspiration for the EU. The much 
more modest Battlegroups had been deployed not once, mostly for political 
reasons, and there were (and still are) serious doubts about the 
deployability of some of them, even if the political will was there. Pooling 
of military capabilities in Europe was in its infancy and France had opted 
for bilateral cooperation with the UK at Lancaster House when the time 
came to arrive at wide-ranging agreements. Permanent structured 
cooperation (PESCO), another area where France had high hopes in 2008, 
had yet to be tried for the first time. The funding for military operations 
remained very much unchanged, with the Athena mechanism covering 
around 10% of military missions (if at all) and the rest still being covered by 
those providing the troops, equipment and other mission fundamentals. 
This of course meant that there was a very perverse incentive structure in 
place where countries that assume the political and human risk of putting 
troops on the ground have to face most of the financial cost of the mission. 
Finally, Europe’s defence industry was faced with an important 
opportunity in 2012 when the executive boards of EADS and BAE Systems 
agreed to move forward with a merger that would have led to the creation 
of the world’s largest aeronautics and defence conglomerate. The deal 
FRANCE: THE FRUSTRATED LEADER|17 
collapsed in the face of resistance from EADS’ public shareholders and the 
challenge of moving towards a fully private defence industry.  
So on paper, it looked as if the Europe of Defence had not lived up to 
France’s expectations. The reality on the ground was not much more 
promising. EU missions, particularly those of a military character, had 
remained modest in scale and scope. Although most fulfilled their 
mandate, serious doubts remained about their appeal or their adequacy to 
deal with more significant issues such as avoiding mass violations of 
human rights in Libya or keeping Islamic terrorists from taking over Mali. 
Let us not forget that the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) was full of 
references to how the EU would fight terrorism and promote the respect of 
human rights internationally. Despite such calls, when push came to shove 
the Union failed to react.  
Furthermore, in the cases where the EU acted, the lessons drawn by 
France had not always been positive. EUFOR TChad is one such case, and 
one that has not received sufficient attention from the literature on CSDP. 
The EU’s mission in Chad was a true learning experience for the French 
defence and foreign policy establishment. The force generation process was 
a painful experience from all points of view, ultimately forcing France to 
assume a greater responsibility than it ever wanted. Indeed up to five force 
generation conferences were required, which not only delayed the launch 
of the operation but also exposed the lack of will on the part of other 
European powers to assume part of the burden of the mission. French 
General Jean Philippe Ganascia, later the Force Commander of EUFOR 
TChad, attended the third force generation conference and described it in 
the following terms: “I was very impressed. General Nash [the Operation 
Commander] chaired the session and asked all of the representatives what 
each country would contribute. They kept silent one after the other.”19 One 
needs to remember that France went into these conferences as one of the 
greatest contributors to the mission. Indeed, France had already offered the 
operation headquarters (OHQ) in Mont-Valérien, a French Force 
Commander, a full battalion, logistical support, as well as significant air 
reconnaissance and air support from Épervier, a French mission already 
deployed in Chad. After the failure of the first four force generation 
conferences, Sarkozy was faced with the dilemma of contributing even 
more or seeing the mission abandoned. France ended up supplying about 
                                                   
19 Interview with General Jean Philippe Ganascia, Paris, 25 June 2012. 
18 |MANUEL MUNIZ 
56% of the force and an almost identical amount of the economic resources 
required, which was “not at all the original intention”.20 On top of that, of 
the 4,600 troops requested by the military, member states agreed to provide 
only 3,700, forcing General Bentégeat, Chairman of the European Union’s 
Military Committee (EUMC) at the time, to push ahead, risking the 
effectiveness of the operation, or put the whole endeavour in jeopardy.  
Once the mission was launched it quickly became evident to French 
policymakers that they had lost almost all influence over its scope and 
mandate. General Bentégeat, who before serving as Chairman of the EUMC 
had led the French Armed Forces as Chief of the Defence Staff, said in an 
interview that French “hyper-loyalty” to the EU chain of command and to 
the “EU mandate” was something probably unique to French forces.21 “No 
British Officer would ever do that”,22 he added. This hyper-loyalty was a 
source of concern as it meant that French officers would completely sever 
ties with their former French superiors, reducing the influence of France 
over developments on the ground. In the case of EUFOR TChad, it looks as 
if this hyper-loyalty was compounded by the rigour with which the Force 
Commander on the ground, French General Jean Philippe Ganascia, 
interpreted his mandate. In an interview in Paris, General Ganascia 
referred to this in the following terms: “I did not have a French flag on my 
shoulder…The lesson for France from Chad was that having the head of 
the mission does not provide you with the political lead of the operation.”23 
The truth of the matter is that the mission behaved in a truly 
‘European’ fashion, responding to the wishes of all the member states 
involved. So much so that officers at the French mission Épervier, 
confessed treating French soldiers in EUFOR TChad “as we would foreign 
officers”.24 This was alluded to by General Ganascia, who pointed out that, 
“[w]henever I wanted a plane from Épervier I had to request it from the 
French Commander there. They were not my planes”.25 
Not surprisingly, EUFOR TChad was a disappointment for President 
Déby of Chad, who had been quite keen on having an EU mission 
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21 Interview with General Henri Bentégeat, Paris, 3 July 2012.  
22 Ibid. 
23 Interview with General Jean Philippe Ganascia, Paris, 25 June 2012. 
24 Interview with high-ranking officer at Épervier.  
25 Interview with General Jean Philippe Ganascia, Paris, 25 June 2012. 
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deployed in the country, particularly if it was headed by a Frenchman. In 
the early days of the mission, when only some of the contingent had been 
deployed, N’Djamena was attacked by rebel forces. The Force Commander 
of EUFOR TChad had to decide whether to intervene or to allow events to 
play out without EU intervention. He opted for the latter. As he explained: 
“I had to be strict, we were not to be concerned by the rebels except if they 
attacked the refugee camps in the Eastern part of the country…That was 
the start of the gap that emerged between myself and some of my French 
officers…I still believe that if I had taken a different decision then maybe 
the full force would have never been deployed…I am sure some countries 
would have not sent their troops if they had learnt that our mission was 
supporting the Déby government…”.26 Shortly afterwards Déby said 
publicly that the EU mission was “useless”. 
Despite the above, France seemed overall quite satisfied with the 
arrangement in the specific case of EUFOR TChad, in no minor part 
because it had a separate and autonomous mission in the country that 
could attend to direct French interests. It was evident to the defence 
establishment, however, that if it wanted to pursue national interests in any 
meaningful way it would need to go about things outside of the EU 
framework. The EU was not serious about defence matters, and if it was 
pushed to act it would do so under a tight and inflexible mandate. 
Furthermore, having troops deployed under an EU flag not only provides a 
better image vis-à-vis third parties, but also leads to an almost complete 
loss of influence over the mission for individual member states. If you add 
to this the financing arrangements typical of EU military missions, the 
prospect of being a key stakeholder in one loses a great deal of its appeal.  
Unsurprisingly, the 2013 White Paper on Defence is much less 
optimistic about the future of European defence. Almost from the 
beginning it contains a long list of the shortfalls of CSDP including 
differences in objectives for the common defence, different strategic 
cultures, and different interests.27 It then adds: 
“These differences might by a source of valuable diversity, as each 
member state contributes its experience to the common project. But 
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27 Livre Blanc the de Défense et la Sécurité Nationale 2013, Direction de 
l’information légale et administrative, Paris, p. 17. 
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these can also be a source of distrust, and can render illusory any 
idea of rapid integration.”28 
The inability of Europe to integrate is explicitly addressed in the 2013 
document in the following way: “Europe does not yet seem willing to 
assume a greater responsibility in securing the European continent and the 
world, despite the encouragement of the US. On the contrary, many 
European states fall below the bar of a defence spending of 1% of GDP”.29 
France is clearly sceptical about the capacity of Europe to integrate and to 
make defence matters a priority.  
The only truly new initiative regarding European defence in the 2013 
White Paper is perhaps the launch of a deep strategic discussion within the 
Union about the future of CSDP. Although one might be tempted to equate 
this to the (unsuccessful) call in 2008 for a European White Paper on 
Defence, it seems that this time round the French are concerned not so 
much with starting a discussion that would “evolve naturally from the 2003 
European Security Strategy”,30 but rather with a prior conversation about 
what the Union really wants CSDP to be. This ‘preliminary’ debate should 
lead, quite simply, to a “clearer definition of the Union’s strategic interests 
and objectives”.31 France seems to be convinced that differences in attitudes 
and desires for CSDP are so broad that they need to be discussed rather 
than tiptoed over. Another indication of this understanding comes only a 
few pages later when the White Paper states France’s predisposition for a 
discussion about the importance of the various EU geographic “visions” or 
perceptions. It addresses there the all-important matter of needing to strike 
an east-south balance between countries that consider the eastern EU 
border as the key to the Union’s security and those, like France, that want 
to have a sustained Mediterranean (and, more broadly, African) 
engagement.32 Whether that debate will be initiated is of course hard to tell, 
but with CSDP being highly dependent on political capital and with the 
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Publishing Corporation, New York, p. 91. 
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financial crisis absorbing all of this at present, it is doubtful it will get off 
the ground any time soon.  
Naturally, therefore, the 2013 paper contains only vague calls for 
further integration but numerous references to the need for France to retain 
its ‘sovereignty’, which in the context of the paper means its capacity to act 
autonomously in defence matters or, as the text itself says, “for France to 
decide its future”. This desire to retain the ability to go it alone is perhaps 
best seen in the Chapter 5 of the 2013 White Paper titled “On France’s 
Engagement in the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union”. Right on its 
first page it is stated that France should discard three paths of action as 
purely fanciful: a purely unilateral defence policy, delegating all security 
responsibilities to the US and NATO, and waiting for a united European 
defence to emerge.33 These ideas seem to be very much in line with the 
opinion expressed by policymakers in France about the need for the 
country to remain realistic and, despite its desires for further European 
integration, to remain ready for unilateral action. 
France’s current defence policy and European implications  
Today France finds itself at a crossroads. It has seen most of its initiatives 
regarding CSDP flounder and has drawn major lessons (and not all 
positive) from European military action around the world. The experience 
in Africa has been particularly painful, as detailed above. This is all the 
more relevant when one takes into account that Africa is precisely the 
region where France believes it should act more forcefully.  
Frustration is particularly high when it comes to Germany and its 
attitude towards CSDP. This not only has to do with the country’s long-
running support of NATO but, above all, with its reluctance to act in 
Africa. As General Bentégeat explained, “Germany has always been the 
strongest opponent to any EU action in Africa. The reason is very simple: 
when it comes to intervention in Africa, Germany is very suspicious of 
what they see as French, British, Portuguese or Belgian post-colonial 
interests”.34 This is not a minor problem, as France tends to find itself alone 
precisely in the region of the world where it would most value the support 
of its allies.  
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The experience in Mali in 2013 seems to demonstrate this. Europeans 
were once again asked to act in Africa, a region they themselves had 
described as being of importance. This fact was confirmed by Alvaro de 
Vasconcelos in a recent interview in Paris when he said, “[t]he European 
Union is a regional actor and that region includes Africa”.35 Missions 
beyond Africa, like the one in Aceh (Indonesia), were described by the 
former Director of the EU Institute for Strategic Studies as “a diplomatic 
coup on the part of Solana”36 as they took the Union well beyond its natural 
area of operations. The objective of a mission in Mali, on the other hand, 
was clear: stop the advance of Islamic jihadists and prevent the country 
from becoming a safe haven for terrorists. That was a clear objective that 
fell within the broader concept of the fight against terrorism. One only 
needs to go to page three of the European Security Strategy (ESS) to find 
terrorism defined as a key threat to European security; it is actually the 
very first “key threat” identified by the ESS. 
However, when the Malian president called for help to contain the 
advance of the rebels, all the EU was willing to put on the table was a 
mission to train the Malian security forces that would take time to deploy, 
and that would only be effective (if at all) in the improbable scenario that 
the Malian government survived the offensive underway. It was finally 
France that decided to act rapidly and to go it alone, with modest help from 
others. The current defence minister of France expressed his views on the 
mission in the following terms: 
“The President of Mali requested our help on the 10th of January 
[2013]. The decision to intervene was taken on the 11th at 12:30; I 
was there. Our forces began to arrive at 17:00 that day. What 
would you have done? Consult the 27 [member states]? All of that 
is blah blah blah from the opposition. 150 years will have to pass 
before the Europe of Defence has the capacity to act swiftly. Europe 
would need a united government, a European parliament and a 
common military authority. I do not know if we will ever see that” 
(author’s emphasis).37 
This lack of faith in a strong European defence policy is now 
commonplace among the French defence establishment. For an area of 
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policy where member states are of fundamental importance and where 
political capital is paramount, this is a bad omen.  
It is also important to reference here France’s return to NATO’s 
integrated military command and its impact on transatlantic relations and 
European defence. The move clearly achieved its stated objective of 
reducing tensions across the Atlantic and easing the way for a further 
development of CSDP. Joseph Nye referred to this in an interview in the 
following terms: 
“In the 1990s, there was a certain degree of suspicion in the US 
about European defence. The US was, if not negative, at least 
sceptical about EU missions… My impression is that this has 
changed considerably. The Americans now want the Europeans to 
do more, there is no longer the worry of France undercutting 
NATO. Sarkozy’s return to the integrated structure made a big 
difference there”.38 
Nonetheless, this very move also had an impact on France’s allies and 
on perceptions of CSDP. General Bentégeat expressed quite clearly that 
“[i]t is true that France’s approach has been more NATO-minded since its 
return to the Alliance’s integrated structure and that has a negative impact 
on CSDP”.39 The 2013 White Paper reflected this trend in that it dealt with 
NATO much more extensively than its 2008 predecessor. But of course 
other member states display the same confusing attitude towards NATO 
and CSDP. Indeed, striking a balance between NATO and CSDP seems to 
be a hard task for almost all members of both institutions. Most seem to 
prefer NATO as the framework to undertake hard military operations, such 
as the one in Libya in the summer of 2011. As Zaki Laidi put it: “When it 
comes to combat operations those EU member states that are willing to go 
forward with the use of force will probably prefer to do it under NATO.”40 
Some in the literature have even pointed out that after the inability to act 
together in Libya and the overall weakening of CSDP, EU partners should 
opt for a strong component within NATO.41 
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To put it bluntly, it is unclear today how NATO and CSDP are meant 
to interact and co-exist. One must interpret France’s rapprochement with 
NATO in the context of ambiguity and doubt about defence responsibilities 
in Europe. And in such a setting any action on the part of France that 
implies a reconsideration of the balance between NATO and CSDP in 
favour of the former is bound to weaken the ‘Europe of Defence’. Indeed, 
France’s capacity to lead on that front is diminished by what some allies 
perceive as its willingness to concede to NATO’s preponderance over 
European defence matters, as indicated by a Spanish naval officer with 
abundant experience in EU defence: 
“Until 2008, the most pro-European were the French. Suddenly 
from that date onwards we seem to have lost the captain of 
European defence. No one seems to be pushing it forward but 
there are many trying to impede its progress”.42 
Finally, one should mention the significant and widespread cuts that 
are affecting defence establishments across Europe. Other chapters in this 
book have touched upon this matter extensively but it is important to point 
out that France sees itself, and perhaps the UK, as the only European 
country still capable of deploying force and using it effectively beyond its 
borders. Cuts in some countries are so severe that they no longer represent 
simply a threat to specific capabilities but rather to the capacity of those 
countries to perform basic defence functions, let alone the ability to sustain 
expeditionary operations of the kind 21st century security threats will 
require. Some member states, such as Spain or Belgium, spend as much as 
75% of their defence budget on salaries, making their militaries what some 
people term “unusually well-armed pension funds”. For France, this is a 
major source of concern and yet another argument for finding allies beyond 
the structures of CSDP, for example in NATO, or to try the bilateral route 
as it did for the Lancaster House Agreement with the UK.  
Conclusions  
There is a clear feeling of a turning of the tide in France. Its long-held 
support for CSDP is as weak as it has ever been. There is a large disparity 
between the high aspirations of the 2008 White Paper and the abstract and 
energetic calls for more integration of its 2013 successor. France is now 
willing to discard the European option if it believes it will require a tough 
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fight. In the future, we are bound to see more and more French military 
action outside of the EU framework and under a NATO, UN or French flag. 
Perhaps unilateral action, ad hoc coalitions or the NATO framework will be 
the most attractive for more kinetic operations, while the UN might be 
more attractive for peacekeeping operations. What seems evident is that the 
EU looks less and less attractive as an option for Paris.  
We seem to have reached this point due to a combination of factors. 
The first is quite evidently the lack of consensus in Europe regarding what 
CSDP should look like. France is perhaps the member state that most wants 
CSDP to be able to undertake almost all forms of military intervention. 
Others, like Germany, are much more reluctant to take on certain 
operations. Furthermore, there are significant differences regarding action 
in Africa and some member states are quite simply not willing to act in the 
region. When the German chancellor agreed to support EU action in Congo 
by providing EUFOR DRC with its operational headquarters, the news was 
received in Berlin with shock. Some described the news as a “bombshell”, 
with most in the political establishment expressing dismay at how the 
Belgians and the French had managed to trick the German government into 
supporting a mission in “their post-colonial sphere of influence”.43Such 
shock is all the more revealing when one takes into account that both EU 
military missions in Congo – Artemis and EUFOR DRC – were essentially 
requested by the UN and not by any particular member state.  
A second factor has been the slow pace of reform at EU institutions. 
Clearly France’s hopes for CSDP in 2008 were not at all fulfilled. They were 
probably set for failure, given disagreements over the scope and shape of 
CSDP, but it is hard to explain why the EU failed even to achieve the goals 
it had agreed upon, such as the Headline Goal of having two Battlegroups 
ready at any time. The inability to live up to previous commitments is now 
an all-too-familiar characteristic of CSDP. 
CSDP’s incapacity to launch new and ambitious missions constitutes 
a third factor in France’s frustration with the Europe of Defence. Cases 
where France would have liked the EU to act include Libya in 2011 and 
Mali in 2013. Furthermore, France’s experience of CSDP missions has not 
been particularly promising. Overall it is fair to say that given the cost, 
complexity and, ultimately, diminished ambition of EU missions, France 
                                                   
43 Interview with General Henri Bentégeat, Paris, 3 July 2012. 
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will likely think twice before choosing that route rather than going it alone 
or perhaps opting for some other multilateral framework.  
Finally, it should be mentioned that over the past few years France 
has witnessed a general downscaling of it allies’ military capabilities. 
Austerity and a long-running preference for social instead of military 
spending has meant that many in Europe are quite simply not capable of 
acting militarily abroad. This has now become a major issue in general and 
in particular for France, which prides itself in taking defence seriously and 
in providing it with sufficient resources.  
However, France has not been a passive actor in the past two 
decades. It has interacted with CSDP and adapted to its shortfalls with 
agility. First of all, France has pursued other paths than EU defence with 
little reluctance. It acted unilaterally when it needed to, with Mali being the 
last case, or in conjunction with capable allies like the UK when it was 
appropriate, as in Libya. It moved towards a stronger integration in NATO 
as a means of keeping as many options open as possible for the pursuit of 
French national interests. France has in turn displayed a certain reluctance 
to lose sovereignty in the field of defence. The fact that EUFOR TChad was 
seen as a worrying case of French hyper-loyalty to the EU mandate only 
reinforces this point. If EU defence is ever going to develop fully, we need 
member states to be perfectly satisfied with having their officers abide by 
an EU mandate.  
What seems unrealistic, however, is to ask for any more commitment 
on the part of France. It is still today a willing partner within CSDP and it is 
quite probable that it would support initiatives in Africa if they were 
brought forward by committed partners. What is doubtful is if it will invest 
as much as it has in the past in attempting to lead CSDP. French formal 
strategic documents will only reflect this shift in attitude slowly and 
moderately. This has to do with the country’s sense of leadership in this 
field and, to a certain extent, a long-lasting inertia. In this time of change, 
however, one should be much more attentive to French action rather than 
French discourse. Actions will speak for themselves and on that front, the 
message is quite clear: if CSDP does not get its act together, France will 
pursue other routes and leave the Europe of Defence to one side. 
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A GERMAN VISION OF CSDP:  
“IT’S TAKING PART THAT COUNTS” 
CHRISTIAN WURZER  
Abstract 
Germany sees itself as one of the promoters of Common Security and 
Defence Policy, despite its historical reluctance to engage in the use of force 
and strategic thinking. Firm constraints are therefore placed on the use of 
force, such as legal barriers and a strong parliamentary role, resulting in 
lengthy, compromise-shaped procedures that can lead to the perception of 
Germany as being slow or unassertive. 
However, Germany is willing to further participate in CSDP, even in 
missions that are not in its core interest. This correlates with the marked 
German preference for multilateral action. CSDP is thus not only perceived 
as another framework for military engagement, but also has a purpose in 
deepening cooperation and EU integration. Being part of a broader EU-
approach including the whole range of civilian, military, political, 
diplomatic and economic measures within Common Foreign and Security 
Policy reflects Germany’s aspiration for a comprehensive approach rather 
than other frameworks of international engagement.  
The regional focus for Germany in CSDP correlates with its overall 
foreign policy orientation; focusing on the EU’s eastern neighbourhood and 
the Balkans, Afghanistan and the security of trade routes and, to a lesser 
degree, the southern shores of the Mediterranean and Africa as a whole. 
Overview 
Germany likes to think of itself as one of the driving forces behind 
European integration. In truth, it was the German-French axis that often 
took the lead in pushing the European project forward. This is also the case 
for security and defence, where Germany took a leading role in the 
development of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) which, 
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then named ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy), came into being 
under the German EU-presidency in 1999.  
In recent years, with the European financial crisis the most pressing 
issue for policymakers in Europe and Germany, CSDP slipped down the 
list of priorities. Still, there remains a German interest in CSDP and if 
security issues re-emerge then Germany might become a promoter in this 
policy field once again. Ongoing political actions in the Weimar triangle 
and the Weimar plus group44 provide evidence of this.  
Germany has been one of the largest contributors of troops to CSDP 
missions45 and, until the withdrawal of the German contingent of EUFOR 
Althea in September 2012,46 participated in every mission yet deployed, 
together with France – the only other EU member state to do so. 
Consequently, Germany’s participation in CSDP missions can be seen as 
constant and proof of its commitment to a common security policy of the 
EU.  
From a German perspective, the comprehensive nature of CSDP, with 
its civilian and military means, gives it an advantage over other forms of 
multinational engagement, particularly NATO, which lacks sizeable 
civilian instruments. Nevertheless, NATO remains the preferred 
framework for any robust military engagement that Germany might 
participate in. The CSDP is clearly not seen as an alternative to NATO, but 
rather as complementary to it, with the ability to deploy the whole range of 
civilian, military, political, diplomatic and economic measures within the 
broader framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). 
This correlates with the German claim on the utilisation of a comprehensive 
approach (‘vernetzte Sicherheit’ or ‘networked security’), first set out in the 
White Paper on German Security Policy (2006),47 calling for inter-agency 
                                                   
44 The Weimar Plus Group extends the Weimar Triangle consisting of France, 
Germany and Poland to Italy and Spain. It is designed as a ministerial-level forum 
to prepare EU summits. 
45 In the first ten years of CSDP Germany was the second largest contributor of 
personnel, with only France shouldering a larger share, cf. Giovanni Grevi, Damien 
Helly & Daniel Keohane (eds) (2009), European Security and Defence Policy, The First 
10 Years (1999-2009), EU Institute for Security Studies. 
46 The German withdrawal from EUFOR Althea does not necessarily imply a 
change in German policy. See below. 
47 “White Paper (2006) on German Security Policy and the Future of the 
Bundeswehr”, Federal Ministry of Defence. 
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cooperation and a coordinated approach of political, diplomatic, civilian, 
economic, developmental, intelligence, police and military means.48 
Germany also views the CSDP as a vehicle for achieving further 
cooperation and integration among EU member states. From a German 
perspective, the CSDP can therefore (at least partially) be seen as an end in 
itself; a tool for further European integration and cooperation. In fact, this 
view of the CSDP appears to be much more important for Germany than 
using the CSDP to strengthen the EU’s military capabilities independent 
from NATO.  
 Strategic culture 
For historical reasons, Germany today has a strategic culture that is much 
more reluctant to use military force than other European countries, such as 
the UK or France. The institutional structure used for decision-making on 
the deployment of military means reflects this through its compulsory legal 
restrictions, as specified by the Fundamental Law and the Law on 
Parliamentarian Participation (Parlamentsbeteiligungsgesetz – ParlBG).49 In 
general, German decision-makers and the German people have a deep-
rooted self-restriction on the use of force, as a result of the experiences of 
“two brief excursions into world politics, commonly known as the First and 
Second World Wars”.50 Based on this experience, and on the splitting of the 
country into East and West Germany, a strategic culture emerged that 
rejected strategic thinking altogether. Instead, Germany assumed the role of 
a “civilian power”.51 
For these reasons, Germany’s armed forces, the Bundeswehr, were 
subject to strong constitutional restrictions determined by the Fundamental 
Law. These restrictions prevented the army from deployment in out-of-area 
operations and can be seen as the expression of ‘never again’ – a guiding 
                                                   
48 Fred Tanner, Nayef R.F. al-Rodhan and Sunjay Chandiramani (2009), “Security 
Strategies Today: Trends and Perspectives”, Geneva Papers No. 9, Geneva Center 
for Security Policy, Geneva, p. 1. 
49Parlamentsbeteiligungsgesetz (2005), (http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/parlbg/ 
BJNR077500005.html). 
50 Interview with Walther Stützle, Berlin, 18 October 2012. 
51 The Concept of a Civilian Power was first developed by Hans W. Maull in 1990. 
cf. Hanns W. Maull (1990), “Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers”, 
Foreign Affairs 69:5, pp. 91-106. 
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principle of German foreign policy (and also a means to distinguish the 
Federal Republic’s policies from those of Nazi Germany).52 This remained 
the case until German reunification and the regaining of full and 
unrestricted German sovereignty in 1990. However, this new, unified, 
normal state of Germany was accompanied by a growing need to rethink 
its place in security policy, driven by demand from partners and allies in 
EU and NATO for stronger German engagement.53 
Subsequent restrictions were softened54 and the Bundeswehr’s very 
first deployment in a combat mission took place in 1995, during the NATO 
air campaign in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The legal precondition was the 
1994 decision55 of the Constitutional court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) that 
the German military can be deployed in operational missions, with the 
approval of Parliament (Bundestag). Generally speaking, German 
parliamentary control over military operations is highly developed, with 
the Bundestag exerting far-reaching power over military deployment, as 
determined in the Parlamentsbeteiligungsgesetz.  
This law determines that parliamentary consent has to be given in 
advance of any out-of-area operation (ParlBG §1) where German troops 
might be involved in armed conflict (§2). Only in cases of imminent danger, 
i.e. of life and limb, can parliamentary consent be given after the beginning 
of an operation, but subsequent permission must be sought immediately 
(§5). Further, the government is obliged to give the Bundestag extensive 
information on a regular basis about already approved, ongoing operations 
(§6). In addition, the Parliament can always revoke its approval (§8). 
Regardless of this gradual relaxation of German military policy since 
1990, the general public, as well as policymakers, remain sceptical and still 
                                                   
52 Hanns W. Maull (2006), “Die prekäre Kontinuität, Deutsche Außenpolitik 
zwischen Pfadabhängigkeit und Anpassungsdruck”, in Manfred G. Schmidt and 
Reimut Zohlnhöfer, Regieren in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Innen- und 
Außenpolitik seit 1949, Wiesbaden, p. 413 ff. 
53 Jan Techau (2011), “No Strategy, Please, We're German – The Eight Elements 
That Shaped German Strategic Culture”, NDC Forum Paper, 69-93 NATO Defence 
College, p. 88. 
54 John S. Duffield (1994), “German Security Policy after Unification: Sources of 
Continuity and Restraint”, Contemporary Security Policy No. 15(3), pp. 170–198. 
55 “Decision, 2 BvE 3/92, 2 BvE 5/93, 2 BvE 7/93, 2 BvE 8/93, 12 July 1994”, 
Constitutional Court, 1994. 
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perceive the unilateral use of force as virtually unthinkable.56 This extends 
to all political parties in the Parliament, representing virtually the whole 
political spectrum. 
The second guiding principle of German strategic culture, expressing 
the requirement of a multinational approach and mission (preferably by the 
United Nations) for the use of German military means, might therefore be 
described as ‘never alone’. Together with the afore-mentioned principle of 
‘never again’ it marks the two most basic guidelines of the Federal 
Republic’s national identity concerning the use of force.57 
However, a tendency towards stronger emphasis on the principle 
‘never alone’, along with a simultaneous ‘relativisation’ of the restrictions 
on the use of force can be observed since German reunification.58 This also 
finds its expression in the 2009 coalition agreement, where it is stated that 
Germany’s preferred tools for preventing and overcoming international 
crisis are diplomatic and political ones, with military means only used in 
the framework of the UN, NATO, the EU and under legitimisation of 
international law.59 
As stated above, the ‘natural’ restraint, as well as the legal and 
political restrictions of Germany towards the use of force has undergone a 
gradual relaxation since German reunification. The zenith was reached in 
2002 with the first deployment of German troops to Afghanistan. Since that 
time, the process has gone into partial reverse. Yet the lessons learned from 
Afghanistan can be seen as justifying renewed German scepticism about 
power projection by military means.60 On the other hand, the Balkan wars 
encouraged the perception among the wider international community of 
Germany also having a responsibility to protect universal values, 
particularly in its immediate neighbourhood. This came into conflict with 
the endemic German scepticism about the use of force and resulted in 
                                                   
56 There was also consensus among interviewees.  
An exception on unilateral use of force might only be made for the protection of 
German citizens, such as in a situation of imminent danger (e.g. Operation 
Dragonfly (Operation Libelle) to evacuate civilians from Tirana, Albania in March 
1997). 
57 Maull (2006). 
58 Interview with Hanns W. Maull, Berlin, 19 October 2012. 
59 Coalition agreement between CDU, CSU and FDP, 2009, p. 123. 
60 Interview with Hanns W. Maull, Berlin, 19 October 2012. 
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several de facto compulsory preconditions governing the use of military 
means.61 
First and foremost, any deployment has to be permitted by the 
Bundestag, which is a legal precondition. Second, German participation is 
always part of a multinational approach, with a UN-Mandate being a 
political condicio sine qua non.62 Concerning the framework under which a 
mission might take place, NATO is the preferred organisation when 
robust63 military means are required,64 purely because NATO capabilities 
and military structures are already in place and working. However, under 
circumstances in which focus does not lie (primarily) on military means, 
the EU – with its broader toolbox of political, diplomatic and economic 
means – might provide advantages from a German perspective, while a UN 
mission might be preferential when international legitimacy is required. 
Generally speaking, German priorities for whichever multilateral 
framework a mission is carried out are decided on a case-by-case basis, 
depending on the mission’s needs, with no preference for the EU or 
NATO.65 Germany often puts significant emphasis on building 
partnerships in advance of possible action, especially among European 
partners within the EU or NATO. In the case of France, which is the most 
preferred partner, Germany would probably even relax its own policy 
goals to achieve cooperation. For example, the significant German 
participation in the 2006 EUFOR RD Congo operation is widely perceived 
as a strong concession towards France.66 This tendency to build 
partnerships strongly correlates with the constant that Germany tries to 
                                                   
61 “Abschlussbericht des DFG-geförderten Projekts »Europäische Außenpolitik im 
dynamischen Mehrebenensystem«”,University of Trier, 2002. [Final Report of the DFG-
sponsored Project “European foreign policy in a dynamic multi-level governance system”]. 
62 There is an ongoing discussion, if a UN-mandate might also be a legal 
precondition set by the constitution. cf. Ibid. 
63 The term robust is used to deliberately emphasise the distinction between a 
deployment of military means in a mission where combat operations are possible 
or even expected – as in a combat mission, compared to a military mission where 
fighting is unlikely.  
64 Unanimous consent was given by all interviewees. 
65 Interviews, Berlin, 22 October and 27 November2012. 
66 Interviews with Walter Stützle and Federal Foreign Office Officials, Berlin, 18, 22 
and 24 October 2012. 
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avoid acting unilaterally wherever possible. Last but not least, Germany 
precludes the preventive or pre-emptive use of force altogether.67 
Moreover, lessons learned from completed and ongoing missions 
have influenced Germany’s approach to any possible engagement in future 
missions. A clear view of how to achieve an exit strategy and manageable 
risks, as well as the implementation of benchmarks, represent the most 
relevant variables for Germany in the decision-making process.68 Any 
perpetuation of missions that have failed to achieve their goals, or are 
scarcely to be expected to do so – as was the impression of EU SSR Guinea 
Bissau and to some degree of the various missions in the DR Congo69 – is to 
be prevented. The same may be said of avoiding possible mission creep, as 
experienced in Afghanistan.70 
Finally, Germany has a clear preference for using non-military means 
whenever possible; using force as a last resort only if it promises success. 
Notwithstanding this restrained approach of the Federal Republic, in a 
continuum of European states Germany would probably be found 
somewhere mid-table, clearly more reluctant than France or Britain, but 
more active than some smaller states that lack capabilities and are therefore 
broadly inactive.  
In association with the German preference for non-military means, 
Germany developed a Comprehensive Approach (CA) known as 
‘networked security’ (Vernetzte Sicherheit). First mentioned in the 2006 
White paper on “German Security Policy and the Future of the 
Bundeswehr”,71 this called for an “all-embracing approach [...] developed 
in networked security structures based on a comprehensive national and 
global security rationale”.72 The concept evolved in the following years, 
with the establishment of an inter-ministerial steering group73 and joint 
                                                   
67 Techau (2011), p. 73 ff.  
68 Interviews with Federal Foreign Office Officials, Berlin, October 22 and 24 2012.  
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid. cf. also Etzioni, Amitai (2011), “The Afghanistan conflict: mission creep and 
its discontents”, Middle East Quarterly 18(2), pp. 3-15. 
71 “White Paper 2006 on German Security Policy and the Future of the 
Bundeswehr”, Federal Ministry of Defence, 2006, p. 22 f. 
72 Ibid., p. 22. 
73 Ibid., p. 23. 
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training courses involving a broad range of actors.74 The CA was firmly 
established in German security policy within the 2011 Defence Policy 
Guidelines (Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien) – although the concept’s title 
is never mentioned therein.75 Today’s discussion therefore no longer 
revolves around the question of whether a CA is needed but how it can be 
achieved, under which framework and for which aims.76 However, 
‘networked security’ is somewhat hampered by the fact that a core concept 
has never been developed. This has led to the development of a variety of 
individual approaches by participating actors and has subsequently 
resulted in a lack of leadership, with the German CA remaining a vague all-
purpose concept77 leaving the impression of “a number of actors working 
on a single subject without overall coordination, but still calling it a 
comprehensive approach.”78 Notwithstanding these difficulties, networked 
security is well-established in Germany, while still undergoing a steady 
process of development and further elaboration as work in progress.79 
Institutional structure 
On an institutional level, the above-mentioned parliamentary prerogative 
of the German Bundestag concerning the use of force is quite distinct and 
set in the Parlamentsbeteiligungsgesetz. Nevertheless, the leadership for the 
actual policy lies within the administration, whereby the office of the 
Federal Chancellor possesses policy-making powers on the guiding policy 
                                                   
74 An example of a joint training course would be “Common Effort” organised by 
the German and Dutch Ministries of Foreign affairs and including civilian and 
military actors, as well as international organisations and NGOs. See Luc van de 
Goor & Claudia Major (2012), “How to make the comprehensive approach work. 
Preparation at home is key to effective crisis management in the field”, CRU Policy 
Brief, Clingendael Conflict Research Unit. 
75 “Defence Policy Guidelines”, Federal Ministry of Defence, 2011, p. 5. 
76 Heiko Borchert & Ralph Thiele (2012), “Vernetzte Sicherheit: Grundlagen, 
Zwischenbilanz und Entwicklungspotenzial”, Zeitschrift für Außen und 
Sicherheitspolitik, No. 5/2012, p. 2. 
77 Ibid., p. 4. 
78 Interview with Defence Ministry Official, Berlin, November2012. 
79 “Thesenpapier zur Anhörung des Unterausschusses »Zivile Krisenprävention 
und vernetzte Sicherheit«”, Center for International Peace Operations, 2012, p. 1 
[“Position Paper on the subcommittee hearing “Civil Crisis Prevention and 
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principles, while the specific ministries enjoy autonomy in their respective 
policy field and are not formally bound to the chancellery.80 Of course, the 
informal political power exerted by the chancellor, who is usually also 
party leader, must not be underestimated. It can be subject to limitation, 
however, especially in the case of coalition governments, which are 
common in Germany.  
Coordination between the parliament and administration mainly 
takes place in a formalised institutional way, as determined by the 
respective legislature. Probably more important is the interaction and 
coordination that takes place on an informal basis between 
parliamentarians and representatives of the administration. This happens 
from the level of ministers downwards to bureaucrats of various levels, 
who meet parliamentarians of the concerned committees or their 
chairpersons.81 Regarding foreign and European policy, there are frequent 
interactions – including monthly briefings of the foreign committee by the 
Foreign Office’s political director. On special occasions meetings also occur 
at a high level, for example between the foreign minister and the 
chairpersons of the foreign and security committee.82 Interaction also 
happens within political parties, such as between parliamentarians and 
their respective party members in the administration. 
Within the ministries, the leadership on foreign and European affairs 
lies within the Federal Foreign Office. In the special case of CSDP, the 
Foreign Office also coordinates other ministries, especially the Ministry of 
Defence and the Ministry of the Interior, which exert control over most 
personnel qualified for international missions. This coordination role of the 
Foreign Office does not imply any instruction-capability towards other 
ministries, except when personnel is deployed to a German delegation 
abroad and under the supervision of Foreign Office personnel. In the case 
of CSDP, most personnel deployed to Brussels are under the supervision of 
the PSC (Political and Security Committee) ambassador.  
Generally speaking, there is a strong culture of compromise in 
German politics. This results from the very nature of the country as a 
federal state, with a strong position of the states and a federal government 
that is a coalition. Further, there is a strong tradition of corporatism. 
                                                   
80 Fundamental Law, Article 65.  
81 Interview with Gerd Tebbe, Berlin, 26 November 2012. 
82 Ibid. 
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Compromise is therefore inherent in the political system. The hierarchy is 
also much flatter than in a presidential system. Together with the 
abovementioned ministerial autonomy, this results in a strong position of 
bureaucracies regarding day-to-day politics. Therefore, one could state that 
German policy-making is more shaped by a ‘bottom up’ approach.83 This 
also goes for foreign policy, which is prepared extensively inside the 
ministerial bureaucracy before it is brought to the political level.84 
From an outside perspective, German policy-making is often seen as 
slow or unassertive. This impression must be put into perspective and 
should take into account the above-mentioned constants of the German 
political system. The inherent need for compromise between political 
stakeholders; the established processes of lengthy preparations inside 
bureaucracies prior to decisions; the autonomy of federal ministries and 
consequent need for coordination within the administration as well as 
within the political parties of the common coalition governments, 
significantly lengthen decision-making processes. This appears even more 
striking when a parallel is drawn to countries with a full or semi-
presidential system of government, resulting in a distinct hierarchy and 
thus faster decision-making processes – e.g. France.  
Strategic interests 
Determining strategic interests from a German perspective is difficult due 
to the historical experience mentioned above; the German policy 
community thus appears to struggle to formulate strategic interests.85 
Compared to other European countries there is a lack of strategic 
orientation and strategic thinking; interests often only become apparent 
when a situation or threat has already arisen and demands action. 
Conventional threats present no current danger for German territorial 
integrity or for the democratic foundation of the state. Germany is 
“encircled by friends” as former Defence Minister Volker Rühe put it. This 
may partially explain the lack of strategic thinking. Remaining threats 
perceived for German security interests are of a more abstract nature, such 
as climate change or threats resulting from the recent financial crisis that 
impact not only upon Germany, but on the European Union as a whole. 
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A GERMAN VISION OF CSDP: “IT’S TAKING PART THAT COUNTS”| 37 
Moreover, such threats are hardly to be tackled by means of foreign and 
security policy, either German or European.  
A latent awareness of strategic interests is hardly distinguishable 
among German policymakers. But to some degree the predominant concept 
of further European integration as crucial to German interests is still 
shaping German political discourse. Therefore, one particular region can be 
clearly determined as in Germany’s strategic interest: Europe. 
Post-war Germany passed through a complete break in its strategic 
culture – almost entirely renouncing strategic thinking. Multilateralism 
became the new cornerstone of German foreign policy and – to some extent 
– German identity.86 Furthermore, Germany also changed the core concept 
of the country. It renounced the concept of a nation-state (not least given 
the two coexisting German states), replacing it with the idea of European 
unification, therefore embedding Germany peacefully in the centre of 
Europe.87 This core lasts until today, although Germany has acted with 
more self-confidence in recent years, resulting in the impression of Berlin 
being less engaged in the EU.  
Despite the growing self-confidence, the main driving force and goal 
for Germany is stability in Europe. This force culminates in an interest of 
further European integration which is assumed to lead to increased 
stability within the EU. The establishment of a European stability 
architecture is also a German interest. This includes the European 
periphery, the Balkans in the south-east; the Eastern neighbourhood, 
mainly Russia and – to a lesser degree – the southern shore of the 
Mediterranean.  
With stability as the main priority, the geographic proximity of the 
Balkans and a considerable number of expatriate Yugoslav population,88 it 
becomes clear why Germany first overcame its natural restraint during its 
deployment in the Balkans, taking a more active role during the violent 
split in the 90s and beyond. The Balkans remain important for Germany, 
though the amount of progress made concerning the stabilisation of the 
region has enabled a reduction in efforts put into the region. 
                                                   
86 Techau (2011), p. 84. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Eva Gross (2007), “European Union Foreign Policy towards the Balkans”, in 
Nicola Casarini and Constanza Musu (eds), European Foreign Policy in an evolving 
International System, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
38 |CHRISTIAN WURZER 
In its aim to obtain stability within Europe, Germany also recognises 
Russia as an actor that must be engaged to reach this goal. This insight 
found its expression back in the Cold War, when Germany had to perceive 
Russia not only as a threat towards Western European countries, but also 
as a necessary partner to achieve stability in Europe. A fact that led to the 
Helsinki Accords. As a follow-up, German efforts towards a socio-political 
transformation of Eastern European countries into politically stable, 
democratic, market- economies can be perceived after the end of the 
European division. With respect to Russia, this policy has clearly failed. 
Nevertheless, Russia remains a cornerstone for stability in Europe in 
economic as well as security terms and is therefore a focal point for German 
foreign policy.  
Compared to other EU-members, Germany has directed more efforts 
towards the eastern neighbourhood of the EU, while leaving the policy 
towards the countries of the southern and eastern shores of the 
Mediterranean mostly to coastal EU members, notably Italy and France. 
With most eastern neighbour states joining the Union in 2004 and 2007 and 
the Mediterranean region becoming more important for the EU (migration, 
the Arab uprisings, etc.), German foreign policy today also focuses on the 
southern shore of the Mediterranean, North Africa and to some extent also 
Sub-Saharan Africa.89 
Beyond the question of stability in Europe and its neighbourhood, 
Germany also has interests at the global level, especially concerning trade, 
which are crucial for Germany as the second largest exporting nation after 
China. Generally speaking, beyond the regional level, German foreign 
policy is determined mainly by economic aspects with security 
considerations playing only a minor part.90 Being a ‘giant in exports’ and a 
‘dwarf in resources’91 makes the German economy highly dependent on 
free, reliable and safe global trade. This also finds its expression in a strong 
German commitment towards EUNAVFOR Atalanta and German troops 
account for 23% of the mission’s strength. The security of trade routes is at 
the centre of German strategic interests, as well as stability in and access to 
potential markets for German goods on a global level.92 
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Stable relations and strategic partnerships with regional powers, 
called “new powers in shaping globalisation” (Gestaltungsmächte) by the 
government Strategy Paper “Shaping Globalisation – Expanding 
Partnerships – Sharing Responsibility”,93 are a priority of German foreign 
policy. Although this concept covers a wide range of policy fields, 
including security aspects, the actual relations between Germany and these 
‘new powers’ are mainly economic in nature, with a much less pronounced 
security component that still needs specification and often suffers from 
weak commitment.94 
Furthermore, there are several political strategies towards continents, 
regions and countries of specific German interest (e.g. Asia, Africa, East 
Asia, South Asia, and Afghanistan). However, concerning security these 
too need further specification and development, as they appear to amount 
to little more than empty phrases today (maybe with the exception of 
Afghanistan)95 and reflect the fact that an overall long-term global security 
strategy appears to be lacking. 
Participation in CSDP 
As mentioned above, until the withdrawal from EUFOR Althea, Germany 
took part in every CSDP Mission deployed. We have identified 
participation as one of the guiding principles of German policy towards 
CSDP; it was often more important than the specific purpose of a mission. 
Despite the German approach of taking part in every mission, several focal 
points of German engagement can be correlated with the (few) areas of 
strategic interest mentioned above, namely the Balkans, Caucasus and also 
Afghanistan.  
To begin with, Germany puts a focus on Afghanistan, where the 
overwhelming majority of German personnel – 4,753, or more than 75%96 – 
in international peace operations is stationed. In EUPOL Afghanistan, 
                                                   
93 “Shaping Globalization – Expanding Partnerships – Sharing Responsibility A 
strategy paper by the German Government”, Federal Government, 2012. 
94 Interview with German Diplomat, Berlin, October 2012. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Besides EUPOL where Germany participated with 40 personnel in 2012, the 
numbers include UNAMA (5), and ISAF (4.708). cf. “Internationales und deutsches 
Personal in Friedenseinätzen 2012”, Center for International Peace Operations, 
2012. 
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German commitment is a result of the operation’s history. Germany took 
the lead in training the Afghan National Police with a German police-
training mission, the ‘German Police Project Office’ (GPPO), set up in 
Afghanistan. Due to limitations in German personnel and funding, 
Germany took the initiative on lobbying for a European mission. In this 
way Germany managed, as it were, to ‘Europeanise’97 the GPPO into 
EUPOL Afghanistan.98 
As stated, an important region for German foreign policy is the 
Balkans, because of the significant expat Balkan population living in 
Germany and the deep-seated German desire for peace and stability in 
Europe’s periphery. Germany therefore not only participated in all EU 
missions set up in the region, but also managed to place a German as Head 
of Mission or Force Commander – at least once – in every single mission in 
the region.  
 
German Heads of EU-Mission at the Balkans 
EUFOR ALTHEA Hans-Jochen Witthauer (Force Commander) (12/06-12/07)  
EULEX Kosovo Bernd Borchardt (02/13-ongoing) 
EUBAM Udo Burkholder (05/10-ongoing) 
EUPM/BiH Stefan Feller (11/08-06/12) 
CONCORDIA/FYROM Rainer Feist 
EUPAT Jürgen Scholz 
PROXIMA/FYROM Jürgen Scholz (12/04-12/05) 
                                                   
97 As Germany was not able, or willing, to enlarge its personnel and financial 
commitment as demanded by its NATO Allies, Germany promoted the 
establishment of a larger EU-Mission to satisfy demands, especially from the US, to 
avoid criticism of Germany’s commitment. 
98 Ronja Kempin and Stefan Steinicke (2009), “EUPOL Afghanistan: Europas ziviles 
Engagement am Rande des Glaubwürdigkeitsverlustes”, in Muriel Asseburg and 
Ronja Kempin, Die EU als strategischer Akteur in der Sicherheits und 
Verteidigungspolitik? Eine systematische Bestandsaufnahme von ESVP-Missionen und -
Operationen, Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 150 ff. and “Council Joint 
Action 2007/369/CFSP of 30 May 2007 on Establishment of the European Union 
Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan)”, Council of the European 
Union, 2007. 
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It therefore appears inconsistent that Germany withdrew its 
contribution to EUFOR Althea in 2012. This withdrawal marks the first 
time ever that Germany is not participating in all ongoing EU-operations. 
This pullout might be an exceptional case, however, and should not be seen 
as a change of German approach towards universal participation in CSDP-
operations.99 As it is Germany’s position that further military presence is no 
longer necessary for the stabilisation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Germany 
brought a possible termination of the mission up for discussion among EU 
member states. As no consensus was reached, Germany – consistent with 
its position – subsequently pulled out unilaterally. Thus, this reduction of 
German involvement should not be seen as a sign for reduced commitment 
towards the Balkans or EU-Missions in general. 100 Germany still puts 
significant efforts into the less stable parts of the Balkan region, namely 
Kosovo, where Germany also takes part in OSCE, UN and NATO-led 
Missions with extensive German deployment, second only to deployment 
in Afghanistan.101 
Outside Europe and its immediate periphery, Germany also allocates 
the largest contingent in EUNAVFOR Atalanta off the African shore, in a 
bid to ensure open and secure trade routes. Germany was therefore a 
driving force behind the creation of the mission.102 The German navy has 
participated from the very beginning with one to four combat vessels. The 
country has also given a long-term commitment to deploying two frigates 
at a time.103 
                                                   
99 Interviews with Federal Foreign Office Officials, Berlin, 22 and 24 October 2012. 
100 Ibid. 
101 In terms of numbers, the German contribution to international missions in 
Kosovo 2012 adds up to a total of 849 personnel. cf. “Internationales und deutsches 
Personal in Friedenseinätzen 2012”, Center for International Peace Operations, 
2012. 
102 Annette Weber (2009), “Die Marineoperation der EU im Golf von Aden (EU 
NAVFOR Atalanta): Vorbei am Problem – die Piraterie nimmt zu, die Ursachen 
bleiben”, in Muriel Asseburg and Ronja Kempin, Die EU als strategischer Akteur in 
der Sicherheits und Verteidigungspolitik? Eine systematische Bestandsaufnahme von 
ESVP-Missionen und -Operationen, Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, p. 78. 
[“EU Naval Operation in the Gulf of Aden (EU NAVFOR Atalanta): Problem 
Unsolved, Piracy Increasing, Causes Remain.” in “The EU as a Strategic Actor in 
the Realm of Security and Defence? A Systematic Assessment of ESDP Missions 
and Operations”]. 
103 Ibid. 
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The significant engagement towards the security of trade routes off 
the Somali coast does not mean that Africa is a main priority for German 
foreign and security policy, however.104 
Despite Germany’s robust participation in EUFOR RD Congo 
(Germany provided the operational headquarters as well as about one-
third of the troops deployed), this also holds true for that region and 
should be seen more as an exception to existing German priorities. The 
strong participation resulted more from a bilateral plea for stronger 
German participation, urged by France, at the time of the mission setup. 
Further, Germany was not completely satisfied with the Mission and (also 
for domestic reasons) was unwilling to extend the mandate’s duration.105 In 
fact, it seems that German policymakers were quite happy to end a mission 
they had been somehow forced into.106 
Further, when it comes to missions in French-speaking countries, 
Germany also faces some problems of a technical nature, because in 
Germany there are patently few French-speaking experts and trainers (e.g. 
policemen) to deploy. Moreover, it is also harder to persuade civilian 
experts to participate in missions as far away as Sub-Saharan Africa than it 
is to send personnel to regions closer to Germany, e.g. the Balkans.107 In the 
case of the police force this is aggravated by the need to explain to German 
states – which exert authority over the majority of police-staff – the added 
value of a foreign assignment.108 
Nevertheless, continued instability in several parts of Africa is 
reflected in a general tendency within CSDP towards Africa. This is best 
                                                   
104 Interview with Federal Foreign Office Official, Berlin, 24 October 2012. 
105 Denis M. Tull (2009), “EUFOR RD Congo: ein Erfolg aber kein Erfolgsmodell”, 
in Muriel Asseburg and Ronja Kempin (eds), Die EU als strategischer Akteur in der 
Sicherheits und Verteidigungspolitik? Eine systematische Bestandsaufnahme von ESVP-
Missionen und -Operationen, Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, p. 58. 
[“EUFOR RD Congo: A Success, But Not a Model” in “The EU as a Strategic Actor 
in the Realm of Security and Defence? A Systematic Assessment of ESDP Missions 
and Operations”]. 
106 Interview with former high-ranking government official Berlin, October 2012. 
107 A similar problem arises for Germany with EUCAP NESTOR, where 
participation is complicated, as the necessary experts are civilians in Germany, 
who are both rare and hard to convince to participate in a mission based in 
Somalia. cf. Interview with Federal Foreign Office Official, Berlin, 22 October 2012. 
108 Ibid. 
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illustrated by the fact that during the last five years, six new missions were 
set up on African soil, or offshore, amounting to a total of eight missions 
versus only seven non-African missions; the latest one being EUJUST LEX-
Iraq dating from 2005. Germany is aware of this drift towards Africa and 
will most likely contribute to future EU-missions there.109 In the most 
recently decided mission, EUTM Mali, Germany is participating with 68 
personnel. Together with their support for the “African-led International 
Support Mission to Mali” (AFISMA) of current 90 soldiers, German troops 
in Mali and the region amount to 158;110 the largest German contingent on 
African soil.  
View of the CSDP 
In retrospect, the German view of the completed missions is overall a 
positive one, though the mission goals were not too ambitious. There are 
also lessons learned, however, especially from the experience in Guinea 
Bissau, Congo and Afghanistan, in particular concerning exit strategies 
when a mission cannot achieve its goals. Germany therefore began pressing 
for a definition of clear goals and red lines about how to end a mission 
prior to deployment in new missions. The feeling that it is essential to have 
a mission, no matter what,111 as in the early days of CSDP, no longer holds 
for the German approach. As a matter of fact, the Federal Republic is today 
more reticent about new CSDP missions and the use of force per se. 
Lessons learned from Afghanistan have been particularly decisive for 
policymakers, and for the general public, making it harder to communicate 
and politically justify CSDP missions to the latter. Justifying mission costs 
at a time of financial crisis and spending cuts is also difficult.112 
From a German perspective, the CSDP is currently not the 
preferential framework when a robust mission is needed; NATO would be 
the means of German choice. A possible exception might be an operation in 
the European periphery, or under circumstances when NATO – due to US-
                                                   
109 Interviews with Federal Foreign Office Officials, Berlin, 22and 24 October 2012. 
110 Effective April 10. 2013. cf. “Einsatzzahlen – Die Stärke der deutschen 
Einsatzkontingente” [Deployment numbers – Strength of German contingents] 
(http://www.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/bwde/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzP
y8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pPKUVL3UzLzixNSSKiirpKoqMSMnNU-
_INtREQD2RLYK/). 
111 Interview with Federal Foreign Office Official, Berlin, 22 October 2012.  
112 Ibid.  
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restrictions – cannot, or will not take action deemed necessary, for example 
regarding the Middle East conflict.113 Although this is still theoretical, the 
ongoing US pivot towards the Pacific might also increase the expectations 
and need for a more independent European security policy, taking over 
more responsibilities, especially in its periphery, during the next decade(s). 
Germany shares this opinion and as Foreign Minister Westerwelle put it, 
“[The] time has come for Europe to take more responsibility for its own 
security”.114 
Notwithstanding this probable future development, for the moment 
Germany perceives the role of the CSDP more as part of a civilian, 
preventive and multilateral crisis management structure. This also 
corresponds with the nature of the 27 EU-operations launched by the 
member states so far, of which 8 missions were military, 18 civilian and one 
combined civil-military mission, none yet being a combat mission.  
Concerning military means, a lack of capabilities and/or willingness 
of the EU to conduct robust missions can still be detected, although the 
European Security Strategy (ESS) identified a “need to develop a strategic 
culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary robust intervention” 
in 2003.115 Nevertheless, robust missions have not been conducted (yet). 
Military means are deployed to some extent under an EU framework. 
However, unlike NATO and its principal military approach, the EU 
framework provides wider scope to tackle varying challenges with 
different institutions and structures, like the European External Action 
Service (EEAS) and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This 
is in line with the ESS referring to “the full spectrum of instruments for 
crisis management and conflict prevention […], including political, 
diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and development activities”,116 all of 
which the EU has at its disposal.  
Germany sees this as an advantage over other forms and frameworks 
of multilateral engagement. This broader approach, using the whole 
toolbox of military, civilian, political and economic means is seen as widely 
                                                   
113 Ibid.  
114 Transcript: Speech of Foreign Minister Westerwelle at the opening of the Berlin 
Foreign Policy Forum, Berlin, 23 October 2012 (www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/ 
Infoservice/Presse/Reden/2012/121023-B__Berl_Forum_Aussenpol.html).  
115 European Security Strategy, p. 11. 
116 Ibid., p. 11. 
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correlating with the German security policy.117 An integration of these 
various means, such as those Germany claims for itself in the concept of 
‘Networked security’, is seen positively and worth striving for.  
At the moment, Germany gives the impression of neither hindering 
nor promoting the CSDP, as it concentrates on the financial crisis. 
However, when the CSDP comes up again on the agenda it seems that 
Germany will push once more for further integration. In line with this are 
remarks by Foreign Minister Westerwelle calling for more coherence in the 
CFSP and the possibility of deeper integration of those countries willing 
and able to do so – similar to the Monetary Union, or the Schengen area – 
on the way to a ‘political union’.118 
Conclusions 
Since the establishment of the then ESDP, experience has shown that 
Germany is committed to a European approach in security policy. It is the 
only country, besides France, that has participated in every single EU 
Mission, both civilian and military. Moreover, it was the second largest 
contributor of troops during the first ten years of CSDP.119 
Nevertheless, security policy has been left largely unattended by 
Germany in recent years as the dominant political topic was the eurozone 
financial crisis. Also, German foreign and security policy suffers from one 
of the deep-rooted German peculiarities: a lack of strategic thinking and 
orientation. Admittedly, Germany often comes up with the goal of a 
stronger, more united, more integrated Europe, in line with repeated calls 
for stronger supranational institutions that are rooted in multilateralism. 
Germany has embraced this multilateralism as an identity-building concept 
after its historical experiences with nationalism, the most extreme form of 
which Nazism.  
                                                   
117 Claudia Major (2012), “Ziviles Krisenmanagement in der Europäischen Union. 
Stand und Optionen zur Weiterentwicklung der Gemeinsamen Sicherheits- und 
Verteidigungspolitik” Berlin, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, p. 10. [Civil Crisis 
Management in the European Union. State and options for further development of the 
Common Security and Defence Policy]. 
118 cf. Speech at the opening of the “Berlin Foreign Policy Forum”, Berlin, 23 
October 2012. 
119 Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly and Daniel Keohane (eds) (2009), European 
Security and Defence Policy, The First 10 Years (1999-2009), EU Institute for Security 
Studies. 
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Notwithstanding this, it appears that beyond European integration 
and a safe and peaceful environment to facilitate global trade, Germany 
lacks a long-term strategic vision. Ultimately, this also translated into a lack 
of strategic vision for Europe or the further development and elaboration of 
the CSDP, beyond the rather empty mantra call for ‘more Europe’ and 
deeper integration. Given the position of other member states, ranging 
from reluctance to refusal – above all by the United Kingdom – this goal is 
far from certain.  
And yet there are good reasons for stronger cooperation among 
European states, namely the pressure on all military budgets as a result of 
the financial crisis in Europe. Pooling and sharing scarce resources could be 
an alternative, but it is running behind its potential. Cooperation will also 
be needed regarding the foreseeable rise in demand for more European 
responsibility in security matters, given the US-pivot towards the Pacific.  
For Germany, a core purpose of the CSDP is the further advancement 
of European integration – which serves as some kind of ‘universal remedy’. 
It is therefore virtually certain that Germany will remain committed 
to the CSDP and probably also remain one of the leaders pushing forward 
integration, as well as the further elaboration of the non-military 
components of CFSP. This contribution will extend to both civilian and 
military means. Germany will nevertheless remain reluctant to deploy 
military means, given the restraints on the use of force firmly established in 
German strategic culture.  
A centrepiece of German efforts towards the further elaboration of 
the CSDP can be expected in the additional specification of a European 
Comprehensive Approach of all means that are at hand, “including 
political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and development 
activities”,120 similar to its national efforts towards the concept of 
‘Networked Security’. Not least because this broad positioning of European 
foreign policy is seen as a major advantage.  
 
                                                   
120 European Security Strategy, p. 11. 
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ITALY’S ‘THIRD WAY’ TO EUROPEAN 
DEFENCE 
GIOVANNI FALEG 
Abstract 
Drawing on fieldwork research in Rome, this chapter analyses the CSDP 
from the perspective of the Italian national interest and how the key 
elements of this interest overlap with security co-operation at the CSDP 
level.  
The empirical findings provide new and important insights into the 
evolution of Italian strategic interests and culture in the first decade of this 
century. Against the backdrop of a changing global security landscape, 
Italy’s strategic posture displays a widening gap between the persistence of 
some traditional elements (e.g. the allegiance to the Atlantic Alliance and 
the enthusiasm towards deeper EU security integration) and the emergence 
of new shared beliefs about the use of force in response to adaptation 
pressures: for instance, a stronger emphasis on the integration of civilian 
and military tools to face peace-building challenges; and the push for more 
pooling and sharing of military assets.  
The methodology used is based on 15 semi-structured interviews 
with Italian stakeholders in the field of foreign and security policy, as well 
as on the review and content analysis of relevant secondary sources and 
material available. 
 
Introduction 
Since the late 1990s Italy’s strategic posture has reflected the emergence of 
new shared beliefs about the use of force in response to adaptation 
pressures. An emphasis on the integration of civilian and military tools for 
crisis management to meet peace-building challenges, or the push for more 
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pooling and sharing of military assets have entered the national discourse 
on security. At the same time, the search for a compromise between the 
allegiance to the Atlantic Alliance and enthusiasm for deeper EU security 
integration continues to determine the orientation of Italy’s security 
behaviour, including the participation in and perceptions of the EU’s 
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).  
This chapter aims to shed light on Italy’s contribution to the CSDP. It 
argues that whereas a stronger emphasis on the consolidation of the EU’s 
security architecture and capacities has characterised Italy’s political 
discourse over the past two years, the practice of Italy’s foreign and 
security policy shows a much more balanced stance and a willingness to 
avoid escalating tensions between the Atlantic and Europeanist sides of 
European security. This has resulted in Italy’s reluctance to distance itself 
from NATO, as illustrated by the search for complementarities between the 
European Defence Agency (EDA) and NATO’s pooling and sharing 
initiatives. At the same time, however, the Lisbon Treaty’s call for a holistic 
approach to crisis management operations is pushing Italian policy-makers 
to play a greater and more visible role in setting the agenda for the 
institutional and operational consolidation of the EU’s comprehensive 
approach.121 
This chapter is structured as follows. The first section briefly outlines 
the main features of Italy’s contribution to CSDP. The second section 
introduces the country’s security architecture and the key institutions 
shaping Italy’s strategic preferences. The third section identifies Italy’s 
strategic objectives and inserts the CSDP into this ‘defence map’. The fourth 
section outlines Italy’s participation in CSDP missions, capacity or 
institution-building and explains why and how selected examples have 
been instrumental in pursuing Italy’s national interests. Finally, the 
conclusion considers the nexus between Italy’s national interest and the 
‘vision’ of the future of the CSDP.   
                                                   
121 The “EU comprehensive approach” is defined as Civil-Military Coordination 
(CMCO), meaning “the need for effective co-ordination of the actions of all 
relevant EU actors involved in the planning and subsequent implementation of 
EU's response to the crisis”. Cf. Council of the European Union (2003), Civil-
Military Coordination, Doc. 14457/03, Brussels, 7 November 2003, p. 2.  
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Overview 
Italy’s participation in the CSDP, like that of any other EU member state, 
must be understood in the wider context of the country’s foreign policy 
and, specifically, of its engagement in multilateral peace operations, only a 
limited part of which is carried out through the EU framework. As a 
middle power with global trade and economic interests but limited political 
and military assets, Italy has traditionally (since 1945) relied on 
multilateralism as a means to achieve its strategic objectives.122 Italian 
diplomats often refer to the politica della sedia (chair policy) as a guiding 
principle of Italy’s foreign policy in multilateral fora from the very 
foundation of the Italian nation back in the late 19th century.123 According to 
the ‘chair policy’, the constant involvement in intergovernmental summits, 
presence at meetings and conferences has always been considered as 
priority by Italy’s political élites as a means to influence decisions and 
counter-balance the country’s well-known structural weaknesses: material 
(relative weakness of its economic or military power vis-à-vis other 
nations) and political (highly unstable institutional system) alike. A logical 
corollary of this approach is the feeling of frustration that arises whenever 
Rome is left out of the constitution of directoires.124 
Italy’s participation in multilateral peace operations, whether in the 
United Nations (UN), NATO or EU frameworks, proceeds from the same 
logic: on the one hand, a structural weakness preventing Italy from solely 
ensuring stability and security in its neighbourhood or other strategic 
theatres; on the other, the awareness that active participation increases the 
capacity to control decisions or processes in areas and issues considered to 
be of national interest and benefit to the country’s international credibility 
(multilateralism as a ‘code of conduct’). Besides this ‘core’, or structural 
rationale driving Italy’s multilateral stance, the following intervening 
factors account for the strong emphasis on multilateral institutions and 
ensuing participation in peace operations. First, the post-Cold War 
                                                   
122 S. Forte and A. Marrone (2012), “L’Italia e le missioni internazionali”, 
Documenti IAI No. 12, p. 28.   
123 S. Romano (2004), “Verità storiche e sgarbi all’Italia”, Il Corriere della Sera, 6 June 
(http://www.corriere.it/Primo_Piano/Politica/2004/06_Giugno/06/romano.sht
ml).  
124 R.N. Gardner (2005), Mission Italy: On the Front Lines of the Cold War, Rowman & 
Littlefield.  
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paradigmatic shift towards a comprehensive approach125 to security and 
peacekeeping, which produced a change of mindset within the military. 
Second, the consequential need to increase interoperability and 
harmonisation across armed forces by means of operational learning by 
doing. Third, alliance politics and the reliance on NATO’s collective 
defence system for matters of national security and the relationship with 
the United States, which imposes commitments in terms of contributions, 
burden sharing and capacity building. Fourth and finally, the legitimacy of 
the UN as guarantor of global peace, coupled with the willingness to gain a 
more active and prominent role in the UN system to avoid being dragged 
onto the sidelines (cf. the debate on the reform of the UN Security Council) 
or loose international credibility.   
Against this backdrop, what makes the Italian perspective on CSDP 
compelling from an academic point of view is the existence of a balancing 
will (resulting in a balanced act) between the Atlanticist and Integrationist 
drivers of Italy’s foreign and security policy. Since Italy’s inclusion in the 
Western bloc after 1945, both the reliance on the transatlantic defence 
system and the inclusion in the ‘leading pack’ of European integration, 
including its defence volet since 1999, are considered as vital to national 
interests.126 
With these general drivers in mind, the specific interest in 
contributing to the CSDP is fostered by the following factors. First, the 
CSDP’s range of action, because, since the beginning, the EU’s operational 
outreach has covered geographical areas regarded as in Italy’s vital interest 
(in particular, the Western Balkans and, more recently, the Horn of Africa 
and Sahel regions). Second is the relevance of community and 
intergovernmental initiatives shaping the progressive formation of a 
                                                   
125 The way Italian policy-makers and military staff understand the comprehensive 
approach is consistent with, but not identical to the EU definition: comprehensive 
or integrated approach (Approccio Integrato) refers to “a comprehensive, inter-
ministerial and inter-institutional vision of Italy’s crisis response, originating in the 
awareness that the military response alone cannot guarantee a successful outcome 
in the long-term”. Cf. Italian Ministry of Defence: 
http://www.difesa.it/SMD_/CaSMD/eventi/Pagine/internazionali.aspx.  
126 G.Quille, G.Gasparini, R. Menotti and N. Pirozzi (2006), Developing EU civil 
military co-ordination: the role of the new civilian military cell, Joint report by ISIS 
Europe and CeMiSS, Brussels, International Security Information Service, Stephen 
Pullinger.  
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European defence market for Italy’s national defence industry. Defence 
market integration is a main concern for several stakeholders, from the 
Ministry of Defence (as a key client), to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
the industrial base. Third, Italy’s propensity to engage in low-spectrum, 
low-risk and non-offensive, small humanitarian and state-building types of 
intervention (for which, it must be said, there is a growing external demand 
due to instability in the European neighbourhood)127 matches up with the 
features of EU missions to date, characterised by the prominence of civilian 
over military deployments and the rising importance of the comprehensive 
approach. In this regard, not only has the EU acquired a unique, and 
almost unrivalled, expertise in the provision of a holistic approach to crisis 
management, but it usually employs its missions with an explicit UN 
mandate, hence providing Italian decision-makers with the legitimacy and 
sense of correctness that is required to make a security intervention 
acceptable domestically, especially in times of tough austerity measures. 
Fourth, Italy joins and supports CSDP activities for the sake of the survival 
and advancement of the European integration process. As any other sector 
of EU affairs, integrative stimuli are seen as the only way ahead given the 
development of a multipolar world, the emergence of new actors, shifting 
security governance and the presence of multi-dimensional threats.    
From a quantitative standpoint, over the first five years of 
deployments (2003-2009), Italy has been among the top contributors to 
CSDP missions, in line with its commitment to other multilateral peace 
operations. Out of a total of 132 missions that Italy launched or joined since 
the end of World War II until 2012, 96 have been within international 
organisations and 23 under the EU framework.128 Concerning military 
operations, Italy amounted to 14% of the total EU and ranked second in the 
list of the top ten contributors to the CSDP, behind France and ahead of 
Germany, Spain, the UK and Poland. The largest contingent was deployed 
in EUFOR Althea (15% of troops).129 Italy also occupied a prominent 
                                                   
127 Cf. European Union (2011), A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood: A 
review of European Neighbourhood Policy, Joint Communication by the High 
Representative of The Union For Foreign Affairs And Security Policy and the 
European Commission, Ref. COM(2011) 303, Brussels, 25/05/2011.  
128 F. Di Camilloand and P. Tessari (2013), “Italian Missions Abroad: National 
Interests and Procedural Practice”, IAI Working Paper No. 13, February, p. 2. 
129 Operation conducted between 2003 and 2009: cf. K. Soder (2010), “EU military 
crisis management: an assessment of member states’ contributions and positions”, 
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position as regards civilian missions, being the second largest contributor 
(after France) with a total of 272 (out of 2600) units engaged in a wide range 
of tasks such as police training, rule of law, border control and justice 
reform.130 Qualitatively, it is important to note that Italy’s contribution to 
civilian crisis management is not limited to deployments. The country has 
invested considerably in training for civilian components of peace support 
operations, including CSDP, with a very proactive role in the EU-wide 
process of harmonisation and standardisation of training courses (e.g. 
ETG/ENTRi).131 To this purpose, centres of excellence such as the 
International Training Programme on Conflict Management (ITPCM) run 
by the Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna and the Centre of Excellence for 
Stability Police Units (CoESPU) were established in the mid-2000s.132 
On that account, the table below provides up-to-date (from April 
2012 to March 2013) information on the country’s contribution to EU 
deployments and the breakdown of EU missions:  
Table 1. Italy’s contribution to the CSDP: personnel statistics (April 2012 to 
March 2013)133 
EUNAVFOR SOMALIA (MIL) 215 
EUTM SOMALIA (MIL) 2 
EUPOL RD CONGO (CIV) 0 
EUSEC RD CONGO (MIL) 2 
EUJUST LEX IRAQ (CIV) 3 
                                                                                                                                 
Draft for the meeting of the COST Action IS0805 “New Challenges of Peacekeeping 
and the European Union's Role in Multilateral Crisis Management”, May, p. 7 
(http://www.peacekeeping-cost-is0805.eu/siteweb/images/ACTIVITIES/ 
Publications/100331%20-%20%20Article%20Soder.pdf).  
130 Missions conducted between 2003 and 2009, cf. V.N. Miranda (2010), Report of 
the workshop “Italy’s participation in EU civilian missions. Critical aspects and 
future perspectives”, in N. Pirozzi (ed), “L’Italia nelle missioni civili dell’UE. 
Criticità e prospettive”, Quaderni IAI, February, p. 174.   
131 European Group on Training (EGT) and European New Training Initiative for 
Civilian Crisis Management (ENTRi).  
132 B. Nicoletti (2010), “Setting EU training standards for civilian crisis 
management: The Italian contribution”, Italian Foreign Policy, March.  
133 Source: CSDP Map (http://www.csdpmap.eu/mission-personnel).   
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EUPOL AFGHANISTAN (CIV) 4 
EUBAM RAFAH (CIV) 1 
EUPOL COPPS (CIV) 2 
EUFOR ALTHEA (MIL) 5 
EUBAM MOLDOVA / UKRAINE (CIV) 3 
EUBAM BiH (CIV) 6 
EULEX KOSOVO (CIV) 56 
EUMM GEORGIA (CIV) 6 
EUTM MALI (MIL)134 24 
 
Based on this general overview, the next section will introduce the 
Italian perceptions of the CSDP by taking into consideration the strategic 
culture and institutional structure.  
Italy and the use of force: strategic culture and institutional 
structures 
Italy’s security architecture is built upon the following pillars: i) the armed 
forces, characterised by a relatively solid structure and effective apparatus 
but weakened by a lack of investment and scarce financial resources; ii) the 
defence industry, dominated by the Finmeccanica Group, and other private 
stakeholders, namely major corporations having a stake in influencing 
foreign and security policy to gain access to foreign markets or operate in 
unstable countries (e.g. Eni, Enel); iii) the broader security sector, which 
includes military and civilian police (Carabinieri, Guardia Costiera, Polizia 
Doganale) and is bureaucratically scattered across different ministries 
(Defence, Interior, Justice etc.);135 iv) the key political institutions retaining 
control over the use of military force, according to Art. 87, namely: the 
President of the Republic, who heads the armed forces as President of the 
                                                   
134 Source: Italian Ministry of Defence’s website 
(http://www.difesa.it/OperazioniMilitari/op_intern_corso/MaliEUTM/Pagine/
ContributoNazionale.aspx).  
135 The total of private and public security personnel in Italy is huge, 474,166, 
numbering more security forces than other big EU member states such as Germany 
(426,500), France (409,000) and the UK (391,000), see M. Nones and S. Silvestri 
(2009), European security and the role of Italy, Istituto Affari Internazionali,Rome.  
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Supreme Council of Defence and declares the state of war,136 the 
Parliament137 and the Supreme Council of Defence138 (Consiglio Supremo 
della Difesa), composed of the Prime Minister and Ministers responsible for 
Foreign Affairs, Interior, Economy and Finance, Defence, Economic 
Development, and the Chief of the Defence Staff.139 
These actors make up the internal political-operational machinery 
that is responsible for executing Italy’s security policy,140 responding to 
exogenous inputs through cooperative/conflictual interaction among 
actors.141 From a procedural standpoint, the Italian legal order does not 
provide ad hoc legislation on the deployment of armed forces in 
international missions.142 Whereas Art. 87 sets out parliamentary control 
over the state of war, such legal provision has never been strictly applied 
when deciding upon the deployment of missions, namely as part of 
multilateral initiatives, because these are not acts of war in legal terms.143 
This has resulted in the government taking decisions and responsibility 
about Italy’s participation in international operations, mostly through law 
decree, and the parliament exerting political control – hence not a formal 
                                                   
136 Art. 87 of the Italian Constitution: “Il Presidente della Repubblica ha il comando delle 
Forze armate, presiede il Consiglio supremo di difesa costituito secondo la legge, dichiara lo 
stato di guerra deliberato dalle Camere”.  
137 Ibid.  
138 On the relationship between the President of the Republic and the Supreme 
Council of Defence, cf. M. Arpino (2011), “Il Presidente e le Forze Armate”, 
Affarinternazionali, 16 September 
(http://www.affarinternazionali.it/articolo.asp?ID=1857).  
139 Cf. bills n. 624/1950 and 25/1997.  
140 C.M. Santoro (1991), La politica estera di una media potenza: l’Italia dall’Unità ad 
oggi, Bologna: Il Mulino. Di Camillo and Tessari (2013) differentiate between the 
political-strategic level (the constitutional bodies, such as the Supreme Defence 
Council, responsible for political guidance and control), the political-military level 
(the Defence Minister) and the strategic-military level (the Chief of Defence Staff, 
responsible for planning, deployment and use of armed forces), cf. Di Camillo and 
Tessari (2013), p. 4. 
141 Cf. organisational accounts of foreign policy making: R. Putnam (1988), 
“Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games”, International 
Organization, Vol. 42, pp. 427-460. 
142 Di Camillo and Tessari (2013), p. 3.  
143 Ibid., p. 5.  
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authorisation – before or after the deployment.144 According to some 
authors, lack of a significant parliamentary debate negatively affects the 
identification of the national interest in specific cases.145 
Besides external structural changes, the institutional evolution of 
Italy’s security and defence policy also affects Italy’s stance towards the use 
of force and its attitude towards peace operations. This is particularly true 
for two branches of the executive (the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs) holding control over military/civilian/financial 
resources and capabilities. Accordingly, it is worthwhile in the following 
two sub-sections to briefly outline the structural features of Italian 
diplomacy and military and outline the pattern of cooperation and 
confrontation between the two institutions.   
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs after the 2010 reform 
The conduct of a country’s foreign affairs and, as a consequence, the way it 
frames its strategic priorities is influenced not just by pressures from the 
outside, but also by the changes occurring within the decision-making 
structure. The reorganisation of the Italian diplomatic machinery through 
the bill 133/2008, which entered into force on 19 May 2010, constitutes a 
major bureaucratic overhaul affecting Italy’s foreign policy. This reform 
aims at resetting the conceptual layers of Italy’s diplomacy so as to 
emphasise three pillars of international action (which, therefore, 
complement the “three circles”, cf. next section): international security, 
Europe, and the “country-system” (sistema-paese). The latter can be defined 
as the inner functioning and dynamics of domestic governance affecting the 
definition of the national interest.146 
As a consequence of the reform, the previous division between 
thematic and geographical directorates has been replaced by a new, less 
sectoral matrix based on a smaller number of DGs arranged according to 
thematic macro areas reflecting the main priorities of Italy’s foreign policy: 
Political Affairs and Security, Globalisation, Promotion of the country-
                                                   
144 Cf. N. Ronzitti (2008), “Il diritto applicabile alle Forze Armate italiane all’estero: 
problemi e prospettive”, Contributi di istituti di ricerca specializzati, No. 90, April; N. 
Ronzitti (2011), “Impegno crescente dell’Italia: il conflitto in Libia e il ruolo del 
parlamento”, Affarinternazionali, 2 May.  
145 Di Camillo and Tessari (2013).  
146 Cf. also C. Jean (2010), Italiani e forze armate, Franco Angeli, p. 129.  
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system, plus two pre-existing DGs (Migration/Italians abroad and 
development co-operation). Compared to the previous structure, a clear 
division is established between the systemic vision of the Directors General 
and the sectoral expertise and outlook of the Deputy Directors, so as to 
foster an effective division of tasks and an ever smoother internal 
coordination and cooperation. In this picture, the role of the ambassadors 
has also been revised so as to introduce more autonomy and managerial 
tasks to foster an expansion of the delegations’ own resources, activities 
and effectiveness.  
The Ministry of Defence since 2000: increasing interoperability to face 
complex threats 
The Ministry of Defence has also undergone some key structural 
transformations, in addition to the wider process of redefining the role of 
the military vis-à-vis political élites and society. Adjustment pressures 
triggered by the end of the Cold War compelled the Italian military to 
adapt its structures to a new security environment, both as a means to 
better defend national interests and comply with new strategic 
requirements agreed within the Atlantic Alliance (cf. NATO strategic 
concept, agreed upon at the Rome Summit in 1991). Since the late-1980s / 
early-1990s, the reform process (called “modello Spadolini/Rognoni”) of 
the armed forces (with the new quantitative goal set at 190.000 units) led to 
the redefinition of Italy’s military means. This redefinition came in the shift 
from conscription recruitment to voluntary service, the transformation 
from static, territorial defence to a dynamic and flexible power projection 
capacity to meet new operational requirements in distant theatres, the 
integration and interoperability between armed forces (cf. lessons learned 
from UNIFIL Lebanon) and gender integration – including at the 
operational level.147 The last point was particularly significant as it involved 
the reorganisation of the Chiefs of Staff (vertici military),148with the Head of 
the Military Staff (Capo di Stato Maggiore della Difesa) placed hierarchically 
above the three chiefs of the armed forces, complemented by the overall 
rationalisation of the chain of command and a significant reduction and 
simplification of the bureaucracy.  
                                                   
147 V. Briani (ed.) (2012), La revisione dello strumento militare italiano, Osservatorio di 
Politica Internazionale, Approfondimenti, No. 63, November.  
148 Cf. Legge No. 25, 18 February 1997.  
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As defence experts have noted,149 the reform of the armed forces 
according to the Spadolini/Rognoni model has only partly achieved the 
expected results. One of the crucial hampering factors has been the drastic 
reduction of the military budget since 2006, aggravated by heavier cuts as a 
result of the recent eurozone crisis. The reform project, unveiled in 
February 2012 by Minister of Defence Giampaolo Di Paola, aims at 
overcoming these shortfalls by rebalancing (financial and human) resources 
while at the same time increasing the efficiency of the military. The reform 
complements Italy’s stance towards pooling and sharing initiatives, 
especially at the EU level: the strategic priority for a slimmer army would 
in fact be to seek close cooperation with European allies and integrate 
swiftly into more deeply interconnected and interoperable European 
military forces.150 
The key points of the reform include changes in the organisation of 
the Ministry of Defence (different division of tasks between operational and 
administrative structures and the directorates general); enhanced 
communication and coordination between armed forces through re-
shaping the organisational procedures in the technical-administrative area; 
a reduction of civilian personnel (amounting to circa 10.000 units); a 
revision of the modernisation programmes for armaments; and more 
flexibility in the defence budget.  
In spite of this reform impetus, the main limitation of Italy’s defence 
structures lies in the absence of – or disconnection with – a clear assessment 
of the country’s strategic goals. As Briani (2012) correctly observed, the Di 
Paola reform risks being inhibited by the lack of a supporting doctrine 
outlining the targets for Italy’s defence policy, as the last White Paper (Libro 
Bianco) dates back to 2001-2002 and no reflection has been carried out in the 
meantime, despite changes occurring on the global stage.    
The main tenets of Italy’s strategic culture 
Against this backdrop, let us now turn to the main tenets of Italy’s strategic 
culture in the post-bipolar international system (1989-present) and identify 
the way the CSDP fits into this map. Strategic culture is understood here as 
the compilation of beliefs and ideas a country has regarding the use of 
                                                   
149 Briani (2012). 
150 D. Scarabelli (2012), Creating a New Italian Army: More Weapons, Fewer Men, 
Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, May, p. 7.  
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force. Such ideas originate and evolve as a result of the combination of 
external pressures (e.g. changes in the structure of the international system) 
and internal responses by policy-makers and security actors who are part 
of the ‘security black box’ (the security policy community). These come to 
define the institutional confidence and processes to manage and deploy 
military force as part of the accepted range of legitimate and effective 
policy instruments.151 
The consequences of the fall of fascism and the defeat in World War II 
were arguably a primary cause of uncertainty in the conduct of Italy’s 
foreign and security affairs since 1947.152 The construction of a new political 
system after WWII resulted, in its foreign and security policy aspect, in a 
troublesome relationship not only between the military and civil society, 
but also, and perhaps most important, between public opinion and political 
élites whenever the notion of ‘national interest’ cropped up in the debate. 
Such a troubled relationship is a key constitutive element of Italy’s strategic 
culture. According to Shonfield,153 Italy tends to consider itself as a small 
power: Italian political élites behave in a way that shows their lack of 
confidence towards the domestic consensus that could provide the 
legitimacy to support Italy’s interests in the international arena. Sartori154 
accounts for the traditional “sheepishness” of Italy’s foreign policy as a 
function of its “pluralist polarised” political system: the lack of domestic 
consensus being due to the presence of one or more anti-systemic parties 
(e.g. the Italian Communist Party), amounting to 30-40% of the electorate 
and systematically opposing the government’s conduct of foreign and 
security policy. As a result, Italy would hide behind its allies when major 
decisions concerning the national interest were at stake (see, for instance, 
the politics of mediation and equidistance towards the Mediterranean in 
                                                   
151 P. Cornish and G. Edwards (2001), “Beyond the EU/NATO dichotomy: the 
beginnings of a European strategic culture”, International Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 3, pp. 
587-603.  
152 Cf. L.V. Ferraris (1996), Manuale della politica estera italiana: 1947-1993,Rome: 
Laterza.  
153 In C.M. Santoro (1988), L’Italia e il Mediterraneo. Questioni di politica estera, Milan: 
Franco Angeli, p. 30.  
154 G. Sartori (1982), “Il pluralismo polarizzato: critiche e repliche”, Rivista Italiana 
di Scienza Politica, April, pp. 3-44.  
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the 50s-60s – Suez Crisis and Six-Day War).155 Some of these features 
persisted with the shift from the First (1948-1994) to the Second Republic 
(1994-present).  
Santoro156 categorises Italy’s foreign and security policy since World 
War II, and hence its approach to the use of force, in three phases. The first 
(1949-1958) is marked by the inclusion of Italy in the Western system, the 
choices influenced by the need to achieve economic reconstruction after the 
war (cf. Italy’s interest in joining the European integration process), and the 
consolidation of structures instrumental to pursuing the national interest. 
In this regard, a tension emerged between Italy’s submission to a system of 
influence and hegemony dominated by the US, and the uncertainty about 
the country’s role in a bipolar order, namely in terms of margin for 
manoeuvre within the constraint exerted by Alliance obligations. The 
second phase goes from 1959 and 1979 and is marked by a strategy of “low 
profile”, characterised by a general lack of initiative and willingness to 
passively react to external events, partly resulting from the uncertainty 
described above. The third phase (1979-mid-1990s) occurs as major 
systemic changes and a new morphology of security affairs alter state 
actors’ strategic and geopolitical perspectives and, as a consequence, the 
military and non-military means to defend the national interest, 
particularly in the Mediterranean. Italy develops and deploys, in this 
phase, a new range of actions to meet the new structural constraints, 
namely a renewed emphasis and more active role in multilateral/bilateral 
diplomacy and political and military initiatives through the participation in 
peace operations with other international organisations.157 
Italy’s participation in peace operations is perhaps the most 
important novelty in the country’s strategic posture since 1945, with critical 
political and strategic implications. The fall of the Berlin Wall and Italy’s 
participation in international missions made it possible to create a ‘security 
culture’ that struggled to emerge beforehand. This is also thanks to a 
                                                   
155Annuario di Politica Internazionale 1967-1971, Istituto per gli Studi di Politica 
Internazionale, p. 438.  
156 C.M. Santoro (1991), La politica estera di una media potenza: l’Italia dall’Unità ad 
oggi,Bologna: Il Mulino.  
157 Cf. pioneering interventions in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in the 1980s, the Girasole 
Operation in the Sicily Canal in 1986-87, envoy of officials to maintain the ceasefire 
between Iran and Iraq (1988) and, last but definitely not least, the participation to 
the Gulf War in 1990-91.  
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process of ‘lessons learned’ (e.g. publication of the second Libro Bianco in 
1985, drafted by Minister of Defence Giovanni Spadolini, whose leadership 
left a critical mark on the reform) pointing out weaknesses and problems to 
be fixed in order to enable the Italian military instrument to meet new 
security challenges such as terrorism, asymmetric warfare, or piracy. The 
internal reform of the Ministry of Defence came as a result of these lessons 
learned process (cf. previous section). Externally, the armed forces have 
found a new raison d’être, while a window of opportunity has opened to 
create an enlarged space for action and reformulate the relationship with 
public opinion (e.g. emergence of the paradigm of the ‘good soldier’ or 
Italy’s engagement in promoting peace overseas). This behaviour is linked 
to Italy’s constant need to obtain external legitimacy to balance a general 
discomfort towards the openly declared use of force. This need is in turn 
the result of both the country’s troubled political history in the first half of 
the 20th century and structural weaknesses dating back to the very 
foundation of the Italian nation. The issue of legitimacy is codified in 
Article 11 of the Italian Constitution.158 
Concerning the broader strategic and security trends of Italy’s foreign 
policy since the Cold War, they can be summarised as follows:  
1. Persistence of the duality between pro-NATO and pro-European 
posture in Italy’s official documents and diplomatic action shared by 
political parties across the whole political spectrum. That being said, 
different governments have privileged one or the other stance. For 
instance, the centre-right coalition led by Silvio Berlusconi adopted a 
markedly pro-NATO policy, which to a certain extent proved to be to 
the detriment of Italy’s role in EU defence. Conversely, centre-left 
governments have distinctly favoured a pro-European stance 
(especially when part of broad coalitions including left-wing and 
former Communist parties, such as the Prodi government);  
2. Growing support for military interventions, compared to the red 
pacifism of the Cold War years, although pacifist rhetoric remains 
significant and still shapes policy debate. As a result, Italy’s military 
operations are usually presented as ‘humanitarian’ and kept on a low 
                                                   
158 “Italy rejects war as an instrument of aggression against the freedom of other 
peoples and as a means for the settlement of international disputes. Italy agrees, on 
conditions of equality with other states, to the limitations of sovereignty that may 
be necessary to a world order ensuring peace and justice among the Nations. Italy 
promotes and encourages international organisations furthering such ends”. 
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profile  (e.g. 1997 Operation Alba in Albania) and the substance or 
duration of the commitment can be easily reconsidered, especially in 
the aftermath of an event producing casualties among military or 
civilians (e.g. attacks at Nasiriyah);  
3. As a consequence of point 2, there is a strong tendency to participate 
in missions with non-combat and non-expeditionary components, or, 
when military action is required, upon endorsement of the UN or 
another multilateral framework (e.g. Operation Unified Protector in 
Libya and involvement of NATO);  
4. The so-called “three circles”, which define the area of interventions 
considered in Italy’s primary interests and consisting of the Maghreb, 
Afghanistan, the Western Balkans, the Middle East, the Horn of 
Africa and the Gulf.  
Italy’s national interests in a changing world: Is the CSDP ‘fit for 
purpose’?   
The end of the ‘low profile’ phase and the renewed activism of Italy on the 
international scene from the mid-1990s provided Italian political élites with 
a new push to further define (and implement) the strategic objectives. 
According to former NATO Deputy Secretary General Ambassador Minuto 
Rizzo, the turning point was in 1994, when Italy operationally supported 
NATO’s intervention in the Bosnian war through air strikes in coordination 
with the UN.159 From that moment onward, Italy has participated actively 
in international missions, very rarely refusing to provide its support or 
assistance to international efforts in the field of crisis management. Italy’s 
public opinion has remained apprehensive of the possibility that Italian 
soldiers may die in the field, and are not always supportive of openly 
pushing for the use of force. In this picture, the participation in missions 
continued to be, and to a certain extent still is, justified and legitimated as 
internationally bound (“vincolo internazionale”), that is, under the terms of  
Italy’s commitment to abide by alliance or security cooperation 
responsibilities.  
Having assessed the change of attitude towards the participation in 
international missions as a main feature of foreign and security policy, 
Italy’s strategic objectives have remained more or less stable over the past 
20 years. This implies sticking to the geopolitics of the three circles, the 
                                                   
159 Interview with Alessandro Minuto Rizzo, Rome, 24 October 2012.  
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search for a third way between Europeanists (France) and Atlanticists (UK) 
as concerns the design of EU security cooperation and integration, and 
some diversions, such as the markedly pro-US stance during the second 
Berlusconi cabinets II and III (2001-2006) and the pro-Israeli bias favoured 
by former Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Gianfranco Fini (2001-2005).   
Exogenous factors – the transition towards a multipolar world, and 
upheaval in Europe’s and Italy’s southern neighbourhood – pushed Italian 
policy-makers to redefine the geographic and thematic areas of strategic 
interest. Fieldwork interviews with multiple stakeholders carried out in 
October 2012 in Rome led to the findings summarised below:  
1. Geographical areas of strategic interest 
Answers to the question “What are Italy’s priority areas – that is, 
places where the national interest is at stake and where therefore 
intervention by means of force is desirable, sought or necessary, even 
as a last resort?”, were similar, with no significant variation among 
interviewees’ understanding of Italy’s national interest. The areas 
below are listed according to the importance assigned by 
interviewees: 
 Mediterranean 
 Russia 
 United States – transatlantic relations 
 Horn of Africa 
 Balkans 
 Sahel 
It must be noted that the Sahel figures as a new entry and is due to 
both the expansion of al-Qaeda in that region and, most importantly, 
the possible repercussions that might have on Libya’s fragile 
reconstruction.  
2. Thematic areas of interest 
Regarding thematic areas of national interest, the questions put to 
interviewees aimed to unpack those areas more closely related to EU 
defence. The following answers are not in order of priority:  
 Defence industry (associated with solutions to overcome defence 
budget cuts: cf. pooling & sharing); 
 EU military and civilian capacity building, including training 
programmes, as well as EU mentoring and monitoring missions 
in third countries;  
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 CSDP Institutions and structures for crisis management response 
(e.g. EEAS);  
 Comprehensive approach and integration of defence capacities.  
More generally, it should be noted that since the early 2010s Italy’s 
national interest has become intrinsically linked to the gap between 
Europe’s weaknesses and the transition towards what is fast becoming a 
multi-polar balance of power. To tackle these challenges effectively, a 
medium power such as Italy firmly supports deeper integration in the EU 
and the consolidation of the instruments for economic and fiscal 
governance (e.g. the Fiscal Compact). This approach is intended to cope 
with austerity constraints, but also to pursue a more consistent and solid 
political union, able to maintain standards of living in Europe and bring 
stability to areas or regions outside it. 
Italy and the CSDP: More than this?  
We conclude this chapter by analysing how the post-Lisbon CSDP fits into 
the mapping of Italy’s current strategic culture and national interest.  
First, it is important to note that participation in the CSDP is not 
limited to missions. As with any other policy field, security entails not just 
operational commitments, but also institutional processes (creation of new 
structures for crisis management or reform of existing ones) and capacity-
building (such as the Headline Goal process), both to be associated with a 
specific vision of the shape and tasks of CSDP. In that respect, Italy’s role in 
the CSDP since its creation has been characterised by strong support for the 
creation of integrated civil-military structures for crisis management. This 
has been demonstrated, for instance, in the case of the Civil-Military Cell160 
or Italy’s proactive engagement in the reform of the EEAS crisis structures 
for the planning and conduct of crisis management, in view of the 2013 
European Council’s session on Defence.161 The Italian MFA and MoD 
consider the EU comprehensive approach a priority to bring coherence and 
effectiveness in CSDP initiatives from the planning phase all the way down 
to the theatres of operation.162 These concerns are reflected in a document 
titled “More Europe”, jointly drafted by the Italian MFA and MoD in 
                                                   
160 Quille et al. (2006).  
161 Interview, 11 October 2012.  
162 Interview, 18 October 2012.  
64 |GIOVANNI FALEG 
autumn 2012.163 The paper delineates Italy’s commitment to the 
advancement of the security and defence dimensions of EU integration 
through the enhancement of military structures, operations and 
capacities.164 The document served as a basis for the discussions leading to 
the 15 November 2012 Paris Declaration of the Weimar Plus group (France, 
Germany, Poland, Spain and Italy).165 
Italy’s rationale for supporting a CSDP based on comprehensive 
structures and procedures can be accounted for on two endogenous levels, 
a technical and a political one. First, as far as the technical motivation is 
concerned, Italy’s emphasis on the comprehensive approach results from 
the progress made over the past ten years by the Italian military. This 
progress has been towards creating better synergies and integration among 
the three components of the armed forces, to cope with changed 
operational needs (cf. first section). Italy welcomes a holistic CSDP because 
it fits in well with its own multidimensional and integrated tools for crisis 
management – whereas a hardcore-military or purely civilian CSDP would 
not be in line with the MoD agenda.  
Secondly, this attitude proceeds from a diplomatic and political 
balancing act, the choice to find a ‘third way’, or mediation between the 
French vision (a militarily integrated Europe) and the UK’s pro-Atlantic 
stance (refusal of any duplication or decoupling of European defence and 
soft or civilian understanding of the CSDP). Italy’s strategic culture and 
preferences are somewhat in the middle ground, although it must be said 
that over the past four years the discourse has turned markedly toward the 
EU. Beyond this rhetoric, however, Italy’s foreign and security policy 
remains well balanced between the two organisations. As one official put it, 
Italy uses the same assets for both NATO and the EU, which makes 
coordination and effective synchronisation of multilateral efforts across 
these two actors desirable, in order to avoid mismanagement and waste of 
                                                   
163 Interview, 17 October 2012.  
164 Cf. also Speech of Minister of Defence Giampaolo di Paola to the Italian 
Parliament, 6 December 2012 
(http://www.difesa.it/Primo_Piano/Pagine/Difesa_europea.aspx).  
165 Outcome of the Meeting of the Foreign Affairs Ministers and Ministers of 
Defence of France, Germany, Italy, Poland and Spain Paris, 15 November 2012 
(http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/IMG/pdf/121114_Outcome_proposal_Final_
cle821c1b.pdf).  
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resources.166 A clear consequence is that Italy rejects the notion of a neat 
divide between a soft-power CSDP and a hard-power NATO as advocated 
by other countries.    
Against this backdrop, interviews confirm that under the leadership 
of Minister of Defence Di Paola, Italy’s CSDP agenda has moved in the 
direction of more assertive political action aimed at achieving a higher 
degree of Europeanisation in the defence sector. This is seen in three 
respects: i) capabilities (pooling and sharing), ii) structures (command and 
control) and iii) interoperability (at the operational level).167 This is also an 
explicit message contained in the agenda “More Europe” (cf. above), which 
was reportedly inspired by the experience gained through Italy’s 
participation in previous multilateral operations (UNIFIL) and by the 
structure of the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), 
considered more suitable to deal with multidimensional and integrated 
requirements than the current design of the EEAS.168 
As far as Italy’s attitude towards CSDP missions and, in general, the 
participation to the EU’s operational efforts overseas, interviews show that 
a clear trend in the Italian governments’ foreign policies has been one of 
restraining from blocking the launch of EU missions when Italy’s national 
interest was not at stake and playing this cooperative behaviour as 
diplomatic leverage when deciding on missions in areas where the national 
interest is affected. All interviewees (hence both representatives of 
government agencies and corporate actors) agree that the Horn of Africa, 
the Western Balkans, the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA) and 
the Sahel are regions where Italy’s concerns are more significant.169 They 
also concur that when deciding to intervene in these areas, there is no “a 
priori” choice between the EU and NATO; quite the opposite, Italy’s official 
stance is to find complementarities between the two (cf. Horn of Africa, 
where maritime control and capacity building are implemented through a 
partnership between NATO and EU missions). And, if a choice is needed, it 
is decided on the basis of appropriateness (e.g. privilege NATO in those 
cases where established planning and conduct structures are required, cf. 
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Libya).170 Some, however, criticise the fact that Italian administrations have 
been unable, thus far, to push EU partners to prioritise the Mediterranean 
basin as the core ‘business’ for CSDP, and EU foreign policy in general. The 
Neighbourhood policy, for instance, has mostly gone East, whereas Italy’s 
interests are southward.171  Furthermore, Italy’s lack of strategic and 
political leadership in the case of the Libyan intervention is seen as an échec, 
both before (diplomatic efforts to avoid military intervention) and after the 
campaign (cf. Italy has for a long time supported the establishment of an 
SSR mission in Libya, without getting the Council and EU partners to agree 
on anything concrete). This criticism and the claim that Italy could “do 
more” with regards the strategic direction of the CSDP is perhaps too 
harsh. Sahel makes a good case. Italy has, since the beginning, stressed the 
need for a strategic approach to EU security policies in the Sahel region. It 
has drawn particular attention to the synergies between the EU, the 
Maghreb and the Sahel, a triangle seen as a matter of national security by 
Italian policy-makers.172 Initially very careful about the ‘defence’ 
dimension, and having strong reservations about putting boots on the 
ground, Italy’s attitude eventually changed to strongly advocating for a 
substantial EU commitment to capacity building, training, mentoring, 
which now constitutes the cornerstone of the Strategy for the Sahel173 and 
related missions such as EUCAP Sahel or EUTM Mali.174 The EU 
stabilisation and post-conflict interventions in the Balkans (Macedonia, 
Bosnia, Kosovo), and in particular CSDP’s ‘test’ missions to learn by doing 
have also received wide support in Rome.  
Two final aspects of Italy’s role in the CSDP worth spending a couple 
of lines on are the reform of EEAS structures for crisis management and the 
issue of pooling and sharing of military capabilities. These aspects are as 
important as missions and geopolitical considerations insofar as they 
                                                   
170 Ibid.  
171 Interview, 17 October 2012.  
172 Interview, 22 October 2012.  
173 European External Action Service (2011), Strategy for Security and Development in 
the Sahel(http://www.eeas.europa.eu/africa/docs/sahel_strategy_en.pdf).  
174 Asked why activities such as capacity building, training and mentoring occupy 
such an important role in EU missions, an Italian diplomat answered quite bluntly 
that “these solutions make a consensus among 27 member states possible – it 
would be much harder in the case of traditional military interventions (read 
Battlegroups deployment)”.  
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significantly determine the shape and future effectiveness of CSDP and are 
currently on top of member states’ agendas in view of the December 2013 
summit.  
Let us start from the problem of structures. Interviews with officials 
at the Italian MoD and high ranking diplomats in the MFA reveal that the 
Italian government would be in favour of a revision of the institutional 
structures in charge of developing a comprehensive approach-based 
security policy. As the Paris Declaration states: 
“The European Union should be willing and able to shoulder its 
responsibilities in areas where its security interests and values are 
at stake (…) The ongoing reform of the crisis management 
procedures and the forthcoming EEAS review should enable the 
EU to act timely and effectively on the whole spectrum of crisis 
management actions (…) We are convinced that the EU must set 
up, within a framework yet to be defined, true civilian-military 
structures to plan and conduct missions and operations and build 
a higher degree of synergy between the EEAS and the Commission 
in order to ensure their success”.175 
In a nutshell, it means that current structures (the Crisis Management 
and Planning Directorate above all) are not judged by Italian policy-makers 
to be sufficiently reliable to implement a comprehensive approach in the 
way an integrated command and control structure could do.   
Concerning pooling and sharing, Italian policy-makers are balanced. 
On the declaratory level, all interviewees recognise the need to rationalise 
defence spending and see initiatives under the EDA as the most 
appropriate means to achieve this goal. When going into detail, there seems 
to be no clear or shared understanding about how to frame pooling and 
sharing in the EU (islands of cooperation, permanent structured 
cooperation, and the increased role of the Commission), besides the 
commonsensical awareness that carrying out P&S projects among all 28 
member states is nearly impossible. Similarly, there seems to be no 
apparent common preference for NATO Smart Defence programmes and 
EU/EDA pooling and sharing, but the awareness that complementarity 
between the two is crucial to the success of industrial development in 
European defence.   
                                                   
175 Cf. Paris Declaration (2012).  
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Conclusion 
For a country that published its last version of the White Paper more than 
ten years ago, Italy has a relatively clear vision of its role within the CSDP 
framework. Its vision for the future of the CSDP is spelled out in the 2013 
“More Europe” initiative designed to convince European and Atlantic 
partners that a stronger European defence would make it easier to fulfil the 
obligations coming from the Atlantic Alliance. Italy’s vision of European 
defence includes a strong emphasis on the comprehensive approach, 
featuring the integration and coordination of civilian and military 
structures for the planning and conduct of crisis management. Italy seeks a 
balanced division of labour between NATO and the EU as regards the use 
of military force in complex theatres and, in particular, in terms of capacity-
building (complementarity between EU-pooling and sharing and NATO-
Smart Defence), from R&D to procurement and investments in high tech 
and dual use production. Most importantly, Italy acts as a ‘moderator’, 
seeking a third way between hard-liners, Europeanist member states 
willing to establish a military core to move forward with defence 
integration (e.g. France) and Atlanticists looking to the EU as an 
organisation that could provide a ‘soft-power’ value added to complement 
NATO’s provision of hard security (e.g. the United Kingdom).  
Beyond that official rhetoric, however, a critical overview of Italy’s 
involvement in European security shows that that more could be expected 
by the fourth largest military in the EU, both in terms of contribution to 
missions and overall support for defence integration efforts. Furthermore, 
the practical implications of Italy’s third way, and the way this balanced 
approach can serve the refinement of Europe’s security architecture, are far 
from evident, given the country’s political and diplomatic record thus far. 
This is especially true in those areas where the national interest is at stake, 
as shown by the EU inaction in Libya and Mali and, more generally, the 
lack of prioritisation – and impact – of the EU’s strategic interests in the 
southern Mediterranean. In this sense, more Italy could plausibly serve as 
an impetus to achieve more Europe.  
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Abstract 
Poland stands as a new, active and responsible CSDP stakeholder. In the 
last five years, the Polish government has transformed the country’s 
approach to the Common Security and Defence Policy and decided to 
increase the country’s engagement in CSDP development, with a view to 
creating effective common defence and strengthening Europe’s capabilities 
in crisis management operations.  
Prior to its accession to the EU and in the early years of its 
membership, Poland was extremely sceptical about the idea of developing 
Europe’s defence capabilities, which were presented as an alternative to 
NATO’s manner of ensuring security in the region. Due to changes in the 
Polish security environment and a concurrent refocusing of US foreign 
policy priorities, which could have impacted NATO’s role in transatlantic 
area, Poland recognised the need to develop and strengthen an alternative 
security system to NATO. The Polish government appreciated the 
opportunity to cooperate within the CSDP framework and began to engage 
in building Europe’s defence and security capabilities, aspiring to a leading 
role in its development.  
The purpose of this chapter is to define the role of the EU Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in ensuring the security of the Polish 
state and its citizens; to identify the most likely evolution of Poland’s 
activity within the CSDP, and to specify the type of actions that Poland 
might undertake while implementing the provisions of the policy.   
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Introduction 
Poland is a relatively new member of western integration structures. 
Throughout the Cold War, the country was part of the Eastern Bloc and its 
organisations – the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance (CMEA). In 1989, the Polish state started to undergo a systemic 
transformation. Poland gained its independence from the Soviet Union and 
contributed to the collapse of the communist bloc, with the dissolution of 
the Warsaw Pact and the CMEA. 
During the transformation period, the structure of Poland’s foreign 
policy – including the goals and methods for ensuring national security – 
underwent major changes. Poland adopted new principles upon which its 
policies were based and by which the main issues were defined. 
Subsequent governments were equally focused on pursuing the main goals 
of Poland’s foreign and security policy and establishing a place for the 
nation in political and economic organisations, and in transatlantic 
alliances. In 1999 and 2004, Poland fulfilled the most important goals of its 
policy by joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the 
European Union (EU), respectively. During the accession processes, the 
government had to adjust its national security policy to the general 
approach and strategy of the two organisations. Over the years of its NATO 
and EU membership, Poland has made efforts to influence the content and 
shape of the two organisations’ security policies and to shift its role from 
user of the common security system to active participant in the process of 
enhancing effective security within the alliance structure. 
The purpose of this study is to define the role of the EU Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in ensuring the security of the Polish 
state and its citizens, to identify the most likely evolution of Poland’s 
activity within CSDP, and to specify the type of actions that Poland might 
undertake while implementing the provisions of the policy. 
Fulfilling these aims requires the delineation of the key assumptions 
and main characteristics of Poland’s national strategic culture and the 
identification of strategic national interests. It is also necessary to analyse 
Poland’s approach to CSDP thus far, and to consider the scope of Poland’s 
involvement in actions ensuring peace and security in the world (mainly 
peacekeeping operations and stabilisation missions), which are one of the 
EU member states’ undertakings within CSDP. 
POLAND: AN ACTIVE NEOPHYTE AT THE EU COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY | 71 
National strategic culture  
Polish security interests are based on the assumption that there is a need to 
build a cohesive Western security system consisting of complementary 
organisations, namely the EU and NATO, in which the US – Europe’s 
transatlantic partner – plays a stabilising role. Poland is in favour of an 
integrated approach to shaping the security of European countries. Such an 
approach implies viewing transatlantic area security comprehensively and 
striving to develop effective military capabilities of European countries 
within CSDP, implemented both within the framework of the EU and of 
NATO. To ensure Poland’s security, it is essential to preserve and 
strengthen the defence potential of both NATO and the EU, while 
efficiently reacting to contemporary asymmetric threats. For this reason, 
Poland is calling for close cooperation between the two organisations, as 
well the formation of ‘dual purpose’ armed forces trained both to defend 
member state territories and to react in crisis areas. 
Evolution of Poland's strategic security assumptions  
After the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, Poland and other Central and 
Eastern European countries were left without any treaties of alliance. By 
1999, Poland was in a so-called ‘security void’. Due to the country’s 
historical experiences, Polish governments accorded the highest priority to 
ensuring national security against external threats and decided do this 
mainly through integration with western political, military and economic 
structures (i.e. NATO and the EU), and by establishing regional and local 
initiatives to stabilise security (e.g. the Weimar Triangle, the Central 
European Initiative, the Visegrád Group and the Council of the Baltic Sea 
States).  
The main reasons Poland strove for integration with Western 
structures were to ensure the inviolability of its territory and to secure its 
sovereignty.176 Since joining NATO in 1999, Poland has therefore largely 
been in favour of reinforcing the obligations that lie at the foundation of the 
alliance and has lobbied for enhancing the defence capabilities of member 
                                                   
176 Założenia Polskiej Polityki Bezpieczeństwa, Raport Komitetu Obrony Kraju 
[Assumptions of Polish Security Policy, Report of the Committee of National 
Defence], 2 November 1992; Polityka Bezpieczeństwa i Strategia Obronna 
Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, Raport Komitetu Obrony Kraju [Security Policy and Defence 
Strategy of Poland, Report of the Committee of National Defence], 2 November 1992. 
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states. According to the latest National Security Strategy of the Republic of 
Poland, 
“it is in Poland’s interest to see the North Atlantic Alliance remain 
as an instrument of collective defence of member states, while at 
the same time adapting its civilian and military capabilities to 
counteract new threats”.177 
When Poland joined the Western integration structures, it saw NATO 
as the chief guarantee of security. The EU was considered less important in 
establishing guarantees within the traditional (political and military) 
dimensions of security. Alongside the intensification in the development of 
the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, followed by CSDP, and in 
parallel with the changes taking place in the international arena, Poland 
began to recognise the potentially important role of EU security guarantees. 
The process was reinforced when EU member states adopted the Lisbon 
Treaty and its mutual assistance clause (Article 42.7).  
Changes in how the involvement of the US was judged worldwide 
played an important role in the way Poland saw NATO and the EU as 
providers of security guarantees in Europe. During the Cold War and in the 
first decade of systemic transition, Poland saw the US military presence in 
Europe as a guarantee of stability and considered this transatlantic 
partnership to be a key element in establishing the security of European 
countries. Changes in US policy after the 11 September 2001 terrorist 
attacks – including the increase of its involvement in the Middle East, but 
also in the Asia and Pacific region – led Poland to conclude that US 
intervention in these key regions could use up so much of their capacity 
(and will for international engagement) that European countries (including 
Poland), if in danger, might not receive the support they had expected. 
“Whether the United States will be able to come to our aid in every 
situation is uncertain”.178 At the same time, it was observed that the US 
‘war on terror’ had led to cooperation with Russia, about which Polish 
diplomats were sceptical (especially in the early years of the 21st century) 
and in which they perceived a threat of the post-Soviet area falling under 
Russia’s ‘counter-terrorist’ control. Poland also feared the long-term effects 
                                                   
177 Council of Ministers of the Republic of Poland (2007), Narodowa Strategia 
Bezpieczeństwa Polski [National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland], p. 7. 
178 R. Sikorski (2011), “The Minister of Foreign Affairs on Polish Foreign Policy for 
2011”, MFA 2011 Annual Address, p. 11. 
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of taking Russian interests into account – more often than necessary, from 
Poland’s point of view – during NATO debates on security. Also, US 
intervention in Iraq as part of its war on terrorism, though supported by 
Poland, actually led to a redefining of Polish policy values. The divisions in 
NATO caused by the intervention, as well as German-French opposition to 
the action, revealed the divergence in interests of the two transatlantic 
partners, and were interpreted as a threat to alliance cohesion, which is so 
important for Poland. ‘Alliance cohesion’ and ‘meeting treaty obligations’ 
to the US were the main reasons for Poland becoming involved in the 
operations in Iraq. The same reasons were given when supporting the idea 
to deploy a missile defence system in Europe.  
The change in US foreign policy under Barack Obama’s 
administration, chiefly an improvement in relations with France and 
Germany and the relinquishment of plans for deploying a missile defence 
system, spurred Poland to reflect on the desirability of its reliance on the 
US as the overriding NATO ally. Poland modified its perceptions of the US 
and started to see it as a main ally, but one of many in NATO.  
Currently, Poland’s security is still based on three pillars: active 
participation in NATO (as the main guarantee of territorial defence), 
developing the EU’s capacity for effective defence and crisis response, as 
well as a strategic partnership with the USA (according to the Polish 
government, the US “will remain a crucial actor in the area of international 
security”179). The weight attached to each pillar has changed, though. 
Use of armed forces out-of-area  
Changes in the international environment have resulted in changes in 
Poland’s national strategic culture, as has the evolution of key principles of 
this culture. As a member of alliance structures, Poland initially planned to 
use force in situations defined in casusfoederis (the Washington Treaty) and 
was sceptical about out-of-area operations. EU missions were also seen as 
an additional activity of secondary importance.180 Although Poland 
                                                   
179 Council of Ministers of the Republic of Poland (2012), Polish Foreign Policy 
Priorities 2012-2016, p. 14. 
180 S. Parzymies (2001), “European Orientation in Polish Security Policy, in R. 
Kuźniar (ed.), Poland’s Security Policy 1989–2000, Warsaw: Scholar Publishing 
House, p. 360; K. Malinowski (2013), “The Culture of National Security and the 
Transformation in Polish Security Policy”, in S. Wojciechowski and A. Potyrała 
(eds), Poland’s Security, Berlin: Logos Verlag, p. 34. 
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stressed the importance of providing aid to the victims of massive attacks 
and stabilising areas of crisis, it concentrated its activities mainly within the 
framework of the UN. 
Despite taking part in NATO’s and the EU’s out-of-area missions, for 
a long time Poles have opposed the two organisations’ enhanced 
involvement outside their areas. They have argued that these operations 
impair the implementation of the collective defence principle. Today, this 
belief is shared by most military decision-makers. In their opinion, the 
main role of armed forces is to defend the territory of a state (and its allies) 
against external attacks. They accept the idea of out-of-area crisis response 
operations in the event of asymmetric threats to security and allow for the 
use of armed forces in peacekeeping operations and humanitarian 
interventions in which civilians experience (or are threatened with) 
violence that results (or may result) in massive violations of human rights 
or humanitarian law. Yet they stress that these response operations should 
be restricted to the immediate vicinity of Europe. Polish politicians 
(irrespective of which political party they belong to) are more inclined than 
military officials to send Polish troops on an out-of-area mission. They 
believe that currently there are no direct political, military or societal 
threats to the territory of Poland, and they that it is necessary for Poland to 
meet treaty obligations, which they regard as offering support for their 
allies in reinforcing their security through promoting Western values and 
beliefs abroad, defending an ally against terrorist attacks by taking control 
of weak and failing states' territories, preventing the proliferation of 
instability outside the crisis area, and preventing attacks on civilians and 
massive migrations. They also stress the need to achieve the goals that are 
desirable not only in Western states but in the international arena, such as 
promoting democracy, human rights and self-determination, which are 
presented as main motivations for undertaking out-of-area action. In the 
case of Afghanistan, for example, where Poland undertook military 
intervention to meet its alliance obligations and eliminate the threat to 
(primarily US) security, politicians declared the need to defend Afghans 
(especially Afghan women) against violence from the Taliban as the major 
motivation for the operation. However, prior to 2001, there was no talk in 
Poland about the need to help the Afghans. Even now, politicians rarely 
mention the situation of underprivileged Afghan women.  
The internal dispute between military decision-makers (who wish to 
limit out-of-area missions and highlight the need to improve the skills of 
soldiers in the defence of Polish territory) and politicians (who opt for 
training rapid reaction forces used in out-of-area operations) has been 
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resolved with a temporary compromise: the government has taken a 
decision on developing ‘dual purpose’ forces, ready to take on both actions. 
This solution does not mean that the internal dispute is coming to an end, 
however. Representatives of the military still claim that in the current 
situation of limited military funding, Poland should restrict its out-of-area 
missions because they are conducted at the expense of reforms to the Polish 
army. According to Polish Foreign Policy Priorities (PFPP) 2012-2016: 
“Poland, which will maintain its spending at the level of 1.95% of GDP for 
the next few years, should be – in NATO and EU – an advocate of 
preserving defence potential in Europe”.181 The clauses generally provide 
for crisis management operations and the deployment of military forces in 
Europe, Asia and Africa. However, due to the beliefs of political and 
military elites, and for practical (mainly financial) reasons, the use of armed 
forces is restricted to regions close to the EU and NATO, i.e. the Balkans, 
the South Caucasus and the Middle East, which are regions of key 
importance for Polish national interests. 
Poland has participated in international missions to maintain or 
restore international peace and security since 1953, and has been an active 
contributor to peacekeeping missions since 1973. To date, more than 80,000 
Polish soldiers, police officers and civilian and military observers have 
taken part in peacekeeping missions. Until 1999, Poland mainly 
concentrated its peacekeeping activities within the framework of the UN. 
Over the last decades, due to its accession to NATO and the EU, the 
country has changed this view. In 1997-99, Poland was top of the list of UN 
member states engaged in peacekeeping operations (as of 31 November 
1998, 1,053 uniformed and civilian Poles were working in UN missions), 
despite having a sizeable contingent concurrently involved in NATO’s 
SFOR and KFOR operations. As of 31 December 2012, ten representatives of 
Poland were working in UN missions. This decrease is a consequence of an 
evaluation of the usefulness of UN, NATO and EU peacemaking missions 
that was carried out in the context of pursuing Poland’s national interests. 
As a result of this process, missions have been organised into a hierarchy. 
NATO and EU missions were given precedence for ensuring the state’s 
security. These were followed by missions carried out under the banner of 
the UN, and then by the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in 
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preserving Europe's defence potential”. 
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Europe (OSCE) missions. Anti-terrorist missions and interventions, 
dependent only on current political will, were not included in the 
prioritisation process. The gradation of peacekeeping missions has proved 
to be decisive in deciding on the deployment of Polish military units 
outside the country over the last decade. 
Concurrently with UN and NATO operations – under NATO 
missions over the last ten years, Poland has deployed its main contingents 
within ISAF Afghanistan (up to 2600 soldiers) and KFOR (up to 285)182 – 
Poland has also been contributing personnel to EU missions. The country 
expressed its willingness to participate in EU operations even before it 
joined the Union, partly as a way to confirm that it was ready to take on the 
obligations as an ally. The main reason for this, however, can be seen in the 
scope of the operations to which Poland contributes (Poland supports 
democracy changes, respect for human rights and political, societal and 
economic transitions) and their locations (stabilisation of Europe was one of 
Poland’s national interests). These two elements were decisive for Poland 
taking part in the first EU operations. 
More precisely, Poland took part in the following completed CSDP 
operations: EUFOR Concordia (EU military operation in the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), EUPOL Proxima (EU Police Mission in 
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), EUPM Bosnia i Hercegowina 
(EU Police Mission), EUJUST THEMIS (EU Rule of Law Mission in 
Georgia), EUFOR RD Congo and EUFOR TCHAD/RCA. Of the completed 
missions, the most difficult was EUFOR TCHAD/RCA, not only due to the 
scope of tasks included in the mandate, but also the extremely demanding 
climate and infrastructure conditions in the mission area. As of 31 
December 2013,Poland was still engaged in the following missions: 
EUFOR-Althea (EU military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina) with up 
to 50 soldiers, EUBAM Moldova/Ukraine (EU Border Assistance Mission 
to Moldova and Ukraine) with 16 experts on missions, EUMM Georgia (EU 
Monitoring Mission in Georgia) with 25 experts on missions, EUPOL 
Afghanistan (European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan) with 3 
policemen, EULEX Kosovo (EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo) with 
around 100 policemen in a Formed Police Unit and about 10 experts, and 
                                                   
182 The source for data on Polish engagement in NATO and EU operations is the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland. 
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EUNAVFOR ATALANTA Somalia (European Union Naval Force 
ATALANTA) with 2 officers in Command in Northwood.  
From an institutional point of view, in accordance with formal and 
legal regulations, Polish armed forces can be deployed abroad in order to 
defend a state and its allies (by doing so, Poland meets the obligations 
covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article 42.7 of the 
Lisbon Treaty) and to restore stability in a crisis area through crisis 
response operations and anti-terrorist operations carried out by NATO, the 
EU, the OSCE, the UN and coalitions of “willing states”. The Polish 
Ministry of Defence allows for involvement in the following out-of-area 
operations: peacemaking, conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peace-
building, peace enforcement, humanitarian relief, support to humanitarian 
operations, support to disaster relief, search and rescue, support to non-
combatant evacuation operations, extraction operations, military 
aid/support to civil authorities, enforcement of sanctions and 
embargoes.183 The Ministry of Defence also allows the following operations 
against terrorism: anti-terrorist, consequence management and counter-
terrorism.184 The use of armed forces overseas is allowed both on a long-
term basis (with troop rotation) and in the short term (no rotation), in 
accordance with the perceived need. The rules concerning the use of force 
by the Polish army outside the country (in out-of-area missions) are 
restrictive, however. In practice, stabilisation missions and peacekeeping 
operations may only involve reactive measures, in proportion to the needs 
of the local population and with full respect for humanitarian law.  
The deployment of Polish troops in missions abroad is precisely 
governed by the instruments of the country’s national law. The legal basis 
for the use or stationing of the armed forces of the Republic of Poland was 
set by the Act on Principles of Use or Stay of Polish Armed Forces outside 
the Country as of 1998. Under its regulations, the use of military forces in 
armed conflicts, alliance operations, peacemaking operations and anti-
terrorist operations outside Poland is authorised by the president at the 
request of the government (in the first three cases) or the prime minister (in 
the last case). The stationing of armed forces outside Poland during search, 
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rescue or humanitarian operations is authorised by the minister in charge 
of the units that are to take part in the operation (the foreign minister or the 
defence minister).185 
Although in 1999 Poland participated in a humanitarian intervention 
in Kosovo that had no authorisation from the UN Security Council, 
followed by the 2001 (Afghanistan) and 2003 (Iraq) abuses of the right to 
military intervention, it also limited its support for humanitarian 
intervention. The 2005 World Summit confined the “responsibility to 
protect” formerly proposed by the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty to actions authorised by the UN 
Security Council, and Poland accepted that restriction. The 2007 Polish 
National Security Strategy declared support for the development of the 
“responsibility to protect” concept, and its readiness to make efforts to 
“adapt the UN to the changing international situation”.186 Poland is also in 
favour of strengthening the role played by the UN Security Council in 
preserving peace and security.187 Thus, Poland is currently in favour of 
cooperation on the basis of laws, treaties and rules, within the framework 
of the UN, NATO and the EU. Furthermore, with regard to NATO, Poland 
attaches special weight to instances of all allies acting in concert, perceiving 
NATO as a basis for the collective defence of European countries, while in 
the EU Poland accepts – in accordance with the Lisbon Treaty – cooperation 
between individual states willing to enhance CSDP. 
Main national interests  
Contemporary national interests – as perceived by state authorities and 
political and military elites – are based on an overall concept of state 
security. The set of values that must be preserved and protected includes 
vital national interests, such as state independence and sovereignty, 
territorial integrity and inviolability of borders, freedom, security, respect 
for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and democratic political 
order. The national interests of importance for Poland also comprise: 
protection of the natural environment in sustainable civilisation and 
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economic development, the growth of a more prosperous society and the 
protection of national heritage and identity. Other significant Polish 
national interests involve efforts to ensure that the state maintains a strong 
international position and is capable of effectively promoting Polish 
interests abroad, strengthening the effectiveness of the international 
organisations and institutions in which Poland participates, and the 
development of international relations based on respect for law and 
multilateral cooperation in line with the goals and principles laid down in 
the UN Charter.188 Basic documents on national security also call for 
“building an integrated social community”189 involving the state and its 
institutions and the nation as a whole, but also socio-economic growth and 
the well-being of individual citizens. The pursuit of these national interests 
and goals is accomplished through measures the state undertakes at home 
and in the international arena.  
In accordance with the Polish Foreign Policy Priorities 2012-2016, 
adopted by the Council of Ministers in 2012, it is in Poland’s interests to: 
1. Strengthen the European Union by: 
a. pursuing deeper European integration, both in area of politics 
and security (“hopefully, the European Union will eventually 
become a political union”);190 
b. enhancing EU economic competitiveness;  
c. maintaining solidarity among member states (especially with 
respect to eliminating disproportion in development levels, 
common energy policy and climate change); and 
d. implementing the policy of openness, with special respect to:  
i. continuing the processes of EU enlargement, which even at 
the stage of preparing for future membership of the EU, create 
favourable conditions for expanding the sphere of stability in 
Europe and its neighbourhood. Poland especially supports the 
accession aspirations of Ukraine, Moldavia, the western 
Balkan states, the South Caucasus and Turkey. 
                                                   
188 Council of Ministers of the Republic of Poland (2012), op. cit., p. 14-15; Council 
of Ministers of the Republic of Poland (2007), op. cit., p. 4-5. 
189 Council of Ministers of the Republic of Poland (2006), Strategia Rozwoju Kraju 
2007–2015 [National Development Strategy 2007–2015], p. 47. 
190 Council of Ministers of the Republic of Poland (2012), op. cit., p. 8. 
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ii. strengthening the process of political and socio-economic 
modernisation in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood 
(especially in the Eastern Partnership countries) and 
stabilising the neighbourhood within the framework of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy. At the same time, Poland 
emphasises that Mediterranean countries must not be 
supported at the cost of Eastern Europe and South Caucasus. 
iii. emphasising the global role of the EU (with an effective 
instrument: the European External Action Service), 
iv. developing CSDP, as a result of which the EU should acquire 
military and civil capabilities that will “beneficially 
complement the transatlantic security system”.191 Developing 
CSDP is regarded as crucial;192 Poland sees it as an important 
contribution to the main goal of strengthening the EU.  
v. developing the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. 
2. Reinforce a stable transatlantic order by: 
a. maintaining NATO’s reliability as a defence alliance; 
b. developing the EU’s autonomous capabilities with respect to 
resource and security-building measures – independent and 
complimentary to those of NATO;  
c. preserving close relations with the US, which is still viewed by 
Poland as a “crucial actor in the area of international security”;193 
d. participation in mutual confidence-building measures between 
the west and Russia; 
e. close cooperation with Ukraine and other countries in eastern 
Europe and South Caucasus; and 
f. counteracting the so-called new threats to security, such as 
terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cyber 
attacks, manipulation of energy supplies, and risk of 
destabilisation from countries recognised as failed or fragile. 
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3. Increase the level of dynamics in regional cooperation and maintain 
positive results with neighbours by: 
a. maintaining the high level of bilateral relations with Germany 
and France (Poland’s key partners in Europe), also thanks to the 
Weimar Triangle, which “is intended to add substance to CSDP” 
(in the frame of Lisbon Treaty's willing states coalition) and “to 
formulate a cohesive EU eastern policy”;194 
b. supporting reform-oriented measures in eastern Europe (mainly 
in Belarus, Ukraine, Moldavia) and in the South Caucasus 
(especially in Georgia), increasing the dynamics of bilateral 
relations with Ukraine and maintaining good, pragmatic relations 
with Russia; 
c. developing relations with Sweden, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, 
supporting measures taken by the Council of the Baltic Sea States; 
d. fostering the cooperation of the Viségrad Group countries 
(Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary) and 
extending the Viségrad Group to include Baltic States (Lithuania, 
Latvia and Estonia) as well as Bulgaria, Romania and Ukraine; 
and 
e. supporting modernisation and democratisation efforts in North 
Africa by sharing systemic transformation models. 
4. Promote democracy and human rights: 
a. in the Eastern Partnership states, which will receive over 60% of 
development aid funds; 
b. by supporting the operations of the European Endowment for 
Democracy; 
c. by supporting the operations of the Organisation for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe. This element of the national interests is 
strongly influenced by values, which are a cornerstone of Polish 
culture: 
i. the need for respect for human dignity, basic human rights 
and freedoms, 
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ii. the importance of providing individuals, groups, societies and 
nations with the freedom to choose their own way of 
development, 
iii. the necessity to support those who find themselves in a 
difficult situation (facing mass violations of human rights and 
living under non-democratic rule), which is connected with 
the idea of solidarity and recognising Poland’s obligation to 
make symbolic repayment for the aid it received during the 
Cold War. 
5. Build a positive image of Poland in the world. 
6. Support the Polish diaspora and Poles living abroad. 
7. Modernise Polish diplomatic posts.195 Current parameters of the 
state’s security interests mentioned above are still heavily influenced 
by Poland’s traumatic and tragic war-time and Cold War experiences 
(markedly different from those of western states). In Poland’s 
thinking about national interests, the following are therefore still 
present:  
a. A fear of being the subject of an agreement between other 
countries, resulting in a strong aspiration to continue to develop 
the European and transatlantic strategic culture and the security-
building measures taken on the continent. 
b. A belief that it is essential to create multiple guarantees in terms 
of national security. 
c. A strong belief that alliance obligations must be kept. 
d. A conviction that it is essential to form multilateral agreements on 
security, regarded as being more effective and more reliable than 
bilateral ones. 
e. A fear of particular member states’ interests taking priority over 
the common interests of the EU, which implies the breach of 
solidarity within the Union. 
f. A fear of approval being granted to spheres of influence being 
established by superpowers (mainly a fear that western European 
states will view the area of eastern Europe as within the Russian 
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sphere of influence) and a fear of Russia regaining its superpower 
status. 
g. Strong pro-Americanism (which has been declining in the past 
few years).  
Poland’s approach to CSDP 
Poland has changed its approach to CSDP considerably over recent years. 
Prior to its accession to the EU and in the early years of its membership, 
Poland was extremely sceptical about the idea of developing Europe’s 
defence capabilities, presented as an alternative to NATO’s manner of 
ensuring security in the region. Poland was more in favour of the European 
Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) concept, proposed within the 
framework of the North Atlantic Alliance. The proposals to create a 
common security system of EU states – outlined in the 1993 Maastricht 
Treaty, designed in the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty and specified in the 
conclusions of the 1999 Cologne and Helsinki European Council and the 
Feira Council of 2000 – were seen as a threat to the cohesion of the 
transatlantic union and received no support whatsoever from Poland. Poles 
were against the idea of creating parallel military structures to NATO or 
building independent military capabilities in the EU. They saw them as an 
attempt to minimise US involvement in actions taken on the European 
continent, which they found to be at odds with the national raison d’état.  
While negotiating its accession to the EU, the Polish government, 
obliged to approve the assumptions of the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) outlined by the EU member states in 1998, formally adopted 
the CFSP common positions while remaining sceptical.196 Poland approved 
of the EU crisis management operations (in 2000, the country contributed a 
considerable contingent of more than 1,500 soldiers to the EU Rapid 
Reaction Force), but was reluctant to build a European security system as 
an alternative to the transatlantic one.197 In 2000, Poland’s National Security 
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Strategy incorporated the idea of establishing a place for the state in the 
EU’s political and military structures (as a consequence of the accession 
process). This did not change the Polish viewpoint, however. During the 
implementation by the EU of the 2001 Nice Treaty provisions, and the EU-
NATO negotiations on EU access to NATO’s planning and command 
facilities, Poland (like Turkey) remained sceptical about the idea. Although 
Poland backed the launch of the EU’s first CSDP military mission 
(Concordia in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), this was not a 
guarantee of full approval of CSDP, but was an expression of Poland’s 
willingness to take joint action with its partners. While working on the 
treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (signed in 2004), Poland – in 
line with the national security assumptions at the time – opted for the 
North Atlantic Alliance to have primacy over the EU in developing 
European countries’ security. Neither the new CSDP regulations outlined 
in the Constitution for Europe (including the mutual defence clause and 
solidarity clause, desirable under the Polish raison d’état), nor the initial 
provisions of the 2007 Lisbon Treaty changed Poland’s position on this 
matter.198 
Poland has changed its view on CSDP and expressed its political will 
to take advantage of its solutions following events in the international 
arena in parallel with the evolving CSDP concept. Among these were, in 
particular, conflicts in the immediate neighbourhood of the EU in the 
Caucasus in 2008, and then in the Middle East and Maghreb. However, the 
new hierarchy of US foreign policy priorities can be seen as the main 
reason for this reorientation of Polish national policy. The change at the 
helm of the Polish state was also not without significance. The new 
government, headed by Donald Tusk, appreciated the opportunity to 
cooperate within the CSDP framework and began to actively engage in 
building Europe’s defence and security capabilities, aspiring to a leading 
role in its development. Poland supported France’s efforts to effectively 
reform CSDP and in 2010, together with France and Germany acting within 
the framework of the Weimar Triangle, urged EU Foreign Relations Chief 
                                                                                                                                 
Statement in a Weimar Triangle Summit on 9 April 2003; B. Koszel, (2008), Polska i 
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Catherine Ashton to boost the efficacy of the Lisbon Treaty 
implementation.  
In his 2011 annual address, Poland’s Foreign Minister, Radosław 
Sikorski, articulated Poland’s goal to develop the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy, including CSDP, so that 
“when blood is shed yet again in our neighbourhood – like it was 
in the Balkans in the 1990s, Europe should speak the language of 
diplomacy, backed by force”.199 
In 2012, the Polish government repeated this goal, adding that EU 
diplomacy must be backed with “efficient force”.200 
Boosting the effectiveness of the EU defence capabilities was also one 
of the priorities of the Polish presidency of the EU in the second half of 
2011 and many of the presidency’s tasks focused on CSDP. Polish 
diplomacy still proposes to reform command structures, develop advance 
planning, boost the potential to carry out operations at the strategic level, 
improve the mechanisms of information exchange and harmonise the civil-
military cooperation, reform battle groups, develop EU defence 
cooperation (pooling and sharing), continue to harmonise NATO-EU 
relations, enhance cooperation between the EU and the OSCE, promote 
closer cooperation on CSDP between the EU and its eastern neighbours 
(especially the Eastern Partnership and Russia), and improve cooperation 
with North African countries.201 
Since subsequent presidencies (Danish and Cypriot) showed no 
interest in developing CSDP, and due to ineffective reform actions taken by 
the EU High Representative in this area, Poland decided to enhance its 
cooperation for security with countries that express such a will. Efforts to 
this effect were pledged by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Radosław 
Sikorski, in April 2012 in his annual address on Polish foreign policy: 
“The experiences of the Polish Presidency show us that EU 
Common Security and Defence Policy is unfortunately impossible 
to implement in a group of 27 countries, and that we must initiate 
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tighter cooperation between willing countries, in line with the 
provisions of the Lisbon Treaty.”202 
As result, Poland has taken steps to strengthen CSDP in partnership 
with France and Germany (within the framework of the Weimar Triangle 
which, since 15 December 2012, has also comprised Italy and Spain and is 
now referred to as ‘Weimar Plus’). Taking into account Poland’s security 
interests, it is essential to anchor the cooperation at the level of European 
law and to ‘leave the door open’ for all EU members wanting to cooperate. 
Poland views any particularistic policy (national or bilateral) in the field of 
defence that excludes other countries (such as UK-French military 
cooperation) as a threat to the cohesive defence and security of the EU. In 
their military relations, the UK and France avoid any reference to 
developing permanent structured cooperation within the framework of 
CSDP. Both countries’ military interventions in Libya (2011) and Mali 
(2013) have shown that these states prepare operations tapping into the 
capacity of their own armed forces and that of the North Atlantic Treaty. 
Although Poland has limited military capabilities and has not taken part in 
the interventions in Libya and Mali, the country is opposed to minimising 
the role of CSDP. 
Conclusions 
Poland stands as a new, active and responsible CSDP stakeholder. 
In the last five years, the Polish government has transformed the 
country’s approach to Common Security and Defence Policy and decided 
to increase the country's engagement in its development, considering the 
creation of an effective common defence and strengthening European 
capabilities for crisis management operations. Due to changes in the Polish 
security environment (conflicts in the Caucasus in 2008 and the Arab 
Spring in 2011) and a concurrent refocusing of US foreign policy priorities, 
which could have effects on NATO's role in transatlantic area, Poland 
recognised the need to develop and strengthen an alternative security 
system to NATO. 
Currently, Poland perceives the efforts to develop effective defence 
capacity and out-of-area stabilisation in a comprehensive manner, treating 
its own capacity as an element of a wider capability (that of NATO allies 
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and EU member states). According to the Development Strategy of 
National Security System 2022 adopted by the government in 2013, Poland 
intends to pursue the goal of “shaping a stable international security 
environment on a regional and global scale” by “strengthening collective 
defence within the framework of NATO” and “developing the European 
Union’s capacity for comprehensive crisis management operations”.203 
From a Polish point of view, NATO and the EU can complement each other 
in terms of defence capabilities. NATO should focus on defending member 
states’ territories and deploying stabilisation missions, while the EU should 
concentrate on the deployment of crisis management missions in the 
neighbourhood of Europe. However, the EU should maintain its territorial 
defence capacity to maintain peace, stability and security of its member 
states, and develop it to be ready to replace NATO's actions if the need 
arises. The development of both aspects of CSDP (common defence and 
crisis management) constitutes the aim of the ‘Weimar Plus’ initiative, in 
which a partnership between Poland, Germany and France was joined by 
Spain and Italy. 
Poland has not been actively engaged in all EU peace missions. 
Although in 2009 the country resigned from active participation in UN 
operations, it has focused its commitment – according to the accepted 
hierarchy of out-of-area missions – on NATO's missions and not those of 
the EU. Polish participation in the ISAF mission in Afghanistan (and in 
non-treaty international intervention in Iraq) was a significant burden for 
the Polish army. Therefore while Polish contingents have participated in 
several EU operations, these have primarily been operations conducted in 
Europe.  
In the future, one can expect increased Polish participation in 
European CSDP operations. However, in coming years Poland’s 
involvement in CSDP missions will be curbed by financial concerns, which 
might determine the scope of its involvement in particular operations. 
Development of CSDP out-of-area missions remains compatible with 
Polish national interests. The EU’s immediate neighbourhood is seen by 
Poland as the area in need of CSDP crisis management operations. 
However, Poland diversifies its operational involvement there. The country 
pays special attention to the stabilisation of countries lying beyond the EU's 
eastern border, offering support to the ongoing democratic transition there 
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and strengthening the respect for human rights and the rule of law. In its 
Eastern Partnership, in the Balkan states and in Afghanistan, Poland plans 
to adopt an array of CSDP practices, including civilian and military 
missions. In the case of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership states, Poland 
accepts its participation in civilian missions and focuses chiefly on 
promoting democracy, respect for human rights and positive models of 
systemic transition. Such apportionment of engagement is confirmed in the 
government's most important strategic documents (such as the national 
strategies and lists of foreign policy priorities), and by the practice of the 
state. For example, in the last EU operation in Mali, Poland limited its 
participation to sending 20 instructors and offering logistical support. 
Outside of the key regions of interest, for example in North Africa 
and the near and central east, Polish military engagement seems to be 
possible only in situations where an ongoing crisis may result in security 
threats to an EU ally. In this situation, Poland would act under its 
obligations as an ally. Out of the area of its main interests, Poland can also 
engage in the ‘conscience-shocking situation’ of strong and massive human 
rights abuses, when the country would act in favour of 'more Europe' in the 
global responsibility to protect civilians under the shadow of the war.  
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SPAIN: THE DON QUIXOTE OF EUROPEAN 
DEFENCE 
MANUEL MUNIZ 
Abstract 
The two defining features of Spanish policy towards CSDP have been 
loyalty and commitment. Spain’s political elite is entirely convinced that it 
is in the country’s interest to assume responsibilities in the CSDP 
equivalent, at least, to its weight in the EU as a whole. This has resulted in 
Spain taking part, either through the deployment of personnel, the 
assumption of command responsibilities or the contribution of financial 
resources, in almost all of the EU’s missions and operations, especially 
those of a military nature. Overall, Spain believes it should cover between 
8% and 10% of CSDP’s various requirements.  
What has been missing in Spain is an overarching strategy that 
justifies this commitment. The specific reasons that led Spain to participate 
in each mission are almost always unclear or non-existent. The country is 
basing its defence policy, and its relation with CSDP, entirely on the 
pursuit of the milieu goal of a stronger EU. As valid as this goal may be, it 
is insufficient if the meaning of a ‘stronger EU’ is not spelled out. Here 
again, Spain shows a lack of clarity or strategic guidance. As with the 
fictional character Don Quixote, Spanish policy towards CSDP displays 
both loyalty and confusion, in an attitude that is both honourable and 
extremely risky.  
Overview 
Spain has been an active member of the EU’s Common Security and 
Defence Policy (CSDP) over the past decade. Madrid deployed close to 800 
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troops and personnel in CSDP missions from 1999 to 2009.204 Over 700 were 
assigned to missions of a military character, such as Althea in Bosnia or 
EUFOR DRC in Congo. This made Spain the sixth largest troop contributor 
to EU military operations overall, and one of the very few member states to 
participate in all missions of this character. Furthermore, Spain is a key 
player in the EU’s current military operations. It very recently gave up the 
Force Command of EU NAVFOR Atalanta, the first EU naval mission to 
fight piracy off the coast of Somalia, to which it has contributed 
significantly in terms of staff and equipment. Spain is also a key player in 
efforts underway to train Somali security forces within the framework of 
EUTM Somalia. As a high ranking naval officer, the current Director 
General of Defence Strategy and Planning at Spain’s Defence Chiefs of Staff 
(with the Spanish acronym of DIVESPLA), said when interviewed, “Spain 
feels comfortable contributing to EU operations. It feels like a valued 
partner and it allows it to fulfil its role as a soft power.”205 
Spain’s strategy documents have reflected this commitment to 
European defence since the early 1990s. Europe plays a predominant role in 
all of them, including the 2011 National Security Strategy where the EU is 
cited in almost every page. Interviews in Spain with top defence and 
foreign policy officials confirmed this widespread support for the 
emergence of the EU as a foreign policy and defence actor. 
However, finding the specific reasons that led Spain to support 
specific missions is a difficult task. Simply put, Spain supports CSDP in 
almost all its manifestations, and it seems to do so out of a conviction that 
such a policy will strengthen EU integration more broadly. It is 
nevertheless hard not to feel that this fuzzy pursuit of milieu goals amounts 
to a lack of strategy, particularly if one is talking about defence. When 
faced with straightforward questions such as “Why did Spain deploy 
troops in Congo in 2006?” or “What were the strategic interests Spain was 
defending by deploying military personnel in Chad in 2008?”, most 
interviewees responded by saying that it was where our allies were going 
and we had to be there with them. This lack of strategic guidance has given 
this chapter its title. Don Quixote was a fictional Spanish knight known for 
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his commitment to the defence of causes in which he rarely had a direct 
stake. That noble and tragic ability to get into harm’s way for a purpose 
‘higher’ than protecting one’s own interests seems to have survived the 
four centuries that separate Don Quixote and Spain’s current defence 
policy. 
It should also be pointed out that Spain today faces significant 
challenges, particularly when it comes to the health of its public finances 
and its ability to direct sufficient resources towards its defence. These 
difficulties, compounded by security risks derived from the Arab Spring 
and the US’s pivot to Asia, will force the country to make long-lasting 
decisions about its defence posture.  
If Spain’s past strategic doctrine and defence policy are to serve as 
guidance, then it should be expected that the country will look for ways to 
cooperate with European allies in these difficult times. Indeed, tighter 
cooperation with the EU seems to be the default reaction for this strongly 
pro-European nation. The fact that this is the case is almost certainly a 
consequence of deep support for EU integration in Spain, elite and popular 
belief in the benefits of membership for Spanish citizens, and the 
generalised perception that the country will only be able to further its 
interests in the future from within a strong Europe. It might indeed be the 
case that such wide support has prevented deep reflection about what 
Spain wants to achieve with its participation in CSDP and, most 
importantly, about the country’s agenda for the future of European 
defence.  
Institutional structure and strategic doctrine 
Spain has been extremely prolific in terms of documents containing its 
strategic vision. This is particularly true from the year 2000 onwards. 
Indeed, Spain, like France, is one of the few countries in the world that has 
a White Paper of Defence (LBD, or “White Paper”), a Spanish Security 
Strategy (EES or “Security Strategy”), a Strategic Defence Review (RED or 
“Defence Review”) and lower-level strategic planning documents such as a 
National Defence Directive (DDN) and a Spanish Military Strategy (EME). 
Some of these documents, such as the Defence Review, are meant to have a 
lifespan of 15 years; others, such as the Security Strategy should last about 
a decade, while a new National Defence Directive is approved by the 
Spanish prime minister every four years. As we will see, the most 
significant of these documents are drafted and approved by either the 
prime minister or the defence minister, meaning that the government 
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retains control over strategic planning. This fact, however, has not led to 
significant shifts in strategic outlook with changing governments. As 
developed below, Spain has had quite a stable, albeit undetailed, strategic 
vision.  
The military in Spain normally refers to the classic model of the three-
level strategic pyramid to explain the country’s planning process (Figure 2).  
Figure 2. Spain’s strategic pyramid 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Based on the model above, the National Security Strategy would be at 
the very top of the strategic pyramid, addressing broad issues of security, 
including defence. The EES should be approved by the government and 
should clearly delineate the country’s interests as well as the goals of its 
security and defence policy. The Security Strategy of 2011 remains the sole 
document of this nature in Spain. It should be pointed out, however, that 
despite the original intention of leaving the EES unchanged for at least ten 
years, it is now being reviewed by the government that was elected in 
November 2011. It is expected that this process will be completed in 2013 
and, although the review that is taking place is thorough and involves 
many branches of government, it is expected that the final outcome will 
leave “almost 80% of the current strategy’s content unchanged.”206 
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The one-off White Paper on Defence of 2000, together with the 
longer-term Defence Review from 2003 and the shorter-term National 
Defence Directives, would then constitute the second level of the pyramid, 
that of “National Defence Strategy”. It is the defence minister who is 
mostly responsible for the drafting of these documents and in charge of 
their implementation. Since its transition to democracy in the late 1970s, 
Spain has produced nine DDNs: in 1980, 1984, 1986, 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 
2008 and 2012. At this second level of planning we should see a depiction 
of Spain’s defence policy objectives, which will of course be linked to the 
broader goals set in its Security Strategy.  
The National Defence Directives are of particular importance as they 
are the expression of the government’s desired defence policy for the next 
four years and the starting point of the planning process at the Ministry of 
Defence, which will ultimately lead to the approval of the force structure 
and defence budget. The norm that regulates this “defence planning 
process” is the Ministerial Order 37/2005. This Order delineates the process 
in detail, all the way from the approval of the DDN to the drafting by the 
secretary general of defence policy (SEGENPOL) of the Defence Policy 
Directive (DPD) to the initiation and completion of the Military and 
Resource Planning processes. Most documents below the National Defence 
Directive are classified, however, and deal with issues pertaining to force 
requirements and to technical budget issues that in and of themselves, have 
little strategic relevance. 
Finally, the third and last level of the pyramid depicted in Figure 2 
would be constituted by the Military Strategy. The Spanish EM is drafted 
and approved by the head of the joint chiefs (JEMAD) and should contain 
clear military objectives as required by the country’s defence policy. The 
last available Military Strategy, titled “New Challenges. New Responses”, 
was approved in 2003 and de-classified in the summer of 2004. Below the 
Military Strategy, we find no more strategic documents but only “plans” 
and other documents of a tactical nature that take us too far from our object 
of study to be of interest.  
This cascade of documents seems clear enough and we should see a 
certain specification of strategic interests, from the broader concepts 
contained in the EES to the much more specific EM. Each level of the 
process sets new goals that should enable the achievement of those set in 
higher levels of strategic planning (Figure 3).  
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Figure 3. Spain’s strategic model207 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Spain’s strategic interests 
A rigorous analysis of the documents indicated in the section above should 
enable us to understand Spain’s formal strategic thought and to discern 
some of its interests. It might be most interesting to proceed in a 
chronological order to better understand how Spain’s strategic thought has 
evolved over time. In this regard, one should start with an analysis of 
Spain’s National Defence Directives (DDN) which, going back to the 1980s, 
represent the only truly stable and recurrent element of Spain’s strategic 
planning since the country’s transition to democracy. For a study of this 
nature it is most appropriate to look at the 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008 and 2012 
DDNs, as this enables us to cover both of José María Aznar’s governments 
(1996-2000 and 2000-04) as well as Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero’s entire 
tenure as premier (2004-12). On the other hand, the 2012 DDN, adopted by 
Spain’s current Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy, is an interesting window 
into the country’s defence policy until the year 2016. 
The 1996 DDN is a short document that, given the fact that Spain 
lacked a full Security Strategy, is to some extent forced to define the 
broader objectives of Spain’s security policy before it can tackle the 
specifics of the country’s defence. In terms of objectives for Spain’s defence 
policy, the 1996 DDN enumerates three:  
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1. Consolidate Spain’s presence in international security and 
defence organisations, assuming the responsibilities and 
commitments derived from membership.208 
2. Improve the efficiency of the Spanish Armed Forces so as to 
make them fully capable of assuming the responsibilities the 
Spanish Constitution assigns to them, of contributing to 
collective security with our allies, and of cooperating in the 
effort to keep international peace and stability, particularly in 
areas of cultural and geographic proximity.209 
3. Succeed in making Spanish society more supportive and 
participatory in the task of keeping a defence establishment 
appropriate for current needs, responsibilities and national 
strategic interests.210 
The three objectives listed above are developed in further sections of 
the DDN and lines of action are established for each of them. For our 
current analysis, it is of interest to point out the prescriptions of the first 
Aznar government for consolidating “Spain’s presence in international 
security organisations”. The first of those prescriptions is to “participate 
fully in the Atlantic Alliance including in its decision-making bodies”. The 
second is to “contribute to the emergence of a defence policy in the 
European Union, compatible with NATO” as well as to “actively 
participate in the development of the Western European Union, increasing 
its political and operational capacities”.211 
In 2000, Spain set out to complete a deep exercise of reflection on its 
defence and its armed forces. As expressed in its Prologue by the then 
Defence Minister, Eduardo Serra, Spain’s White Paper on Defence was a 
required document given “the social evolution of Spain, strategic changes 
in the international environment, and the important transformation of the 
Armed Forces”.212 Serra was referring mainly to the transition of Spain 
from an isolationist dictatorship under General Franco to a democracy, the 
change (improvement) in perceptions about the defence establishment in 
Spain, the recent professionalisation of the armed forces, the country’s 
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integration into both NATO and the EU, the change in the international 
order brought about by the fall of the Berlin Wall and, lastly, the impact of 
globalisation and interdependency on the provision of security. The White 
Paper was therefore meant to take stock of all of those developments and to 
arrive at recommendations regarding Spain’s future defence policy and 
armed forces.  
The White Paper’s 264 pages were divided into eight chapters with 
the following titles: “The Strategic Landscape”, “The West’s Response to 
the Landscape”, “Spain’s Defence Policy”, “Armed Forces for the 21st 
Century”, “Professionalisation”, “Modernisation”, “Rationalisation and 
Adaptation of Defence Structures” and “The Economic Footing of 
Defence”. For the purpose of our study, the second chapter is perhaps of 
most interest as it contains Spain’s perceptions of NATO and the newly 
born European Foreign and Security Policy (EFSP). The White Paper points 
to Spain’s commitment to NATO, to its 1999 new Strategic Concept and, in 
particular, to the development of the European Defence Identity (EDI) 
within the Alliance. It also insists on Spain’s commitment to the emergence 
of a truly European defence capability. Despite its abstract and reflective 
nature, the White Paper remains an interesting reference document when 
studying Spain’s changing perceptions of the security landscape at the turn 
of the millennium.  
It was, however, the task of the 2000 National Defence Directive to set 
out some of the steps Spain’s defence would need to take at such a critical 
time. Some of the most significant were the “completion of a Strategic 
Defence Review”, “supporting the processes of creation of European 
political and military structures” as well as “participating in arms control 
and disarmament operations”, and “completing the process of 
professionalising the Armed Forces”.213 Of all of these objectives, the 
drafting of a Strategic Defence Review (RED), which was to take more than 
three years and was only completed in 2003, was the most important as it 
would lead to the turning of the broader ideas put forward by the White 
Paper into concrete policy recommendations.  
At over 350 pages, the RED remains one of the most comprehensive 
reviews of defence matters Spain has ever undertaken. The intention was 
for the document to be valid at least until 2015 when, presumably, another 
RED would be undertaken. Perhaps the greatest contribution of this 
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document to Spain’s strategic thought is its breakdown of the country’s 
national interests into three categories: “vital interests”, being those upon 
which the survival of the state depends; “strategic interests”, being those 
that contribute in a significant way to the protection of the nation’s vital 
interests; and “other interests”, being those derived from Spain’s belonging 
to the international community and from its solidarity towards others. The 
RED dedicated its entire Annex A to the development of this division of the 
national interests.214As we will see, this approach has remained almost 
unchanged for close to a decade and is still present in Spain’s 2011 National 
Security Strategy.  
The 2003 RED also listed the main threats to Spain’s security and, 
once again, these would remain unchanged for most of the following ten 
years. Terrorism (both internal and external), the proliferation of WMDs, 
the protection of the national territory (including Ceuta and Melilla in the 
north of Africa), and the recuperation of sovereignty over Gibraltar are all 
there. The Review also mentions threats linked to globalisation such as 
environmental degradation, cyber-attacks, or mass migrations.215 
The publishing of the RED in 2003 led to the drafting of Spain’s 
Military Strategy. This 2003 document remains the only one of its kind and, 
as indicated in Figure 1, is the lowest level strategy document in Spain.216It 
contains a somewhat more detailed analysis of the threats faced by the 
country, but adds little to the analysis of the RED.  
By 2004, Spain had been in a constant process of strategic reflection 
for close to five years; first with the White Paper, then the RED, and lastly 
with the drafting of the Military Strategy. It was therefore not surprising 
that the 2004 National Defence Directive was one of the most detailed 
documents of its kind to be produced and, perhaps, the one that for the first 
time captured not only Spain’s defence policy for the next four years, but 
also broader strategic trends in the country’s defence outlook. The 
document begins by mentioning the all-important fight against terrorism, 
which is not surprising given the events in Madrid earlier that year when al 
Qaida blew up a commuter train, taking the lives of 191 and wounding 
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close to 2,000. It is, however, the document’s “seven vectors for Spain’s 
defence policy”217 which are of most interest: 
1. Significantly develop the Common Security and Defence 
Policy of the European Union through Spain’s commitment to 
the Helsinki 2010 Headline Goal, our contribution to the 
Battlegroups, as well as through our participation in the 
European Capability Action Plan and the European Defence 
Agency. 
2. Take part in the initiatives of an expanded and transformed 
NATO; particularly the Capability Commitment agreed in 
Prague and the Response Force, with the goal of contributing 
to conflict prevention and, if needed, crisis management. 
3. Strengthen relations between the EU and NATO, given our 
conviction that a strong, robust and balanced transatlantic link 
is a key element of international peace and stability.  
4. Contribute to security in the Mediterranean, strengthening 
CSDP’s Mediterranean dimension, in the broader framework 
of the Barcelona Process and the Mediterranean Dialogue 
within NATO. 
5. Prioritise the construction of a solid and balanced relationship 
with the US, based on the ‘Agreement of Defence Cooperation’ 
and guided by the objectives contained in the Joint Declaration 
of the 11th January 2001. 
6. Tighten security and defence relations as well as military 
cooperation with countries of Latin America. 
7. Intensify military diplomacy, promoting trust between our 
armed forces and those of countries within our areas of 
strategic interest. 
These seven goals delineate with precision the areas where Spain 
believes it should develop its defence policy still today: the EU, NATO, the 
Mediterranean, and the broader Atlantic and its neighbourhood (meaning, 
mostly, the Maghreb). 
The 2008 DDN did little more than reiterate what was stated in its 
2004 predecessor. It did, however, formally call for the drafting of a 
Spanish Security Strategy. It would take three years for this Strategy to see 
the light of day, but once drafted it could be said that it completed Spain’s 
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strategic framework. Indeed, from 2008 onwards it has been clear that 
Spain will have a Strategic Defence Review every 15 years, a Security 
Strategy every ten years (or earlier if the government sees fit) and a 
National Defence Directive every four years.  
Be that as it may, let us now move to an analysis of the 2011 Spanish 
Security Strategy, which, as indicated before, remains the only one of its 
kind and the very top piece of Spain’s strategic pyramid. Oddly enough, 
the document begins by listing the threats to Spain’s security rather than by 
delineating its interests, which is common practice elsewhere. 
Nevertheless, those threats are: 
1. Armed conflict 
2. Terrorism (with a special emphasis on the Basque separatist group 
ETA)  
3. Organised crime 
4. Economic and financial insecurity 
5. Energy dependency 
6. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) 
7. Cyber threats 
8. Migratory flows 
9. Emergencies and natural disasters218 
 
The country’s interests are defined in page 8 of the EES, and are 
divided into the same three categories used in the 2003 RED (Figure 4). The 
first of these categories is “vital interests”, which in this case are in turn 
divided into two subcategories: those related to “fundamental rights”, such 
as “the right to life, liberty, democracy or the prosperity and development 
of Spain’s citizens”, and those related to the “constitutive elements of the 
State”, such as “sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, the 
constitutional order, and economic security”. The second category is 
“strategic interests” and contains interests of importance for “the 
attainment of a peaceful and secure environment” such as “the adequate 
functioning of the EU, the consecution of a stable, just, peaceful and safe 
international order where human rights are respected, the preservation of 
free exchange and free communications”, and, lastly, “the construction of 
good relations with our neighbours”. The third category is “values”, which 
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includes issues such as “the defence of democracy, the rule of law, peace, 
liberty, tolerance, solidarity, sustainability, global progress and the welfare 
state”. Although this latter list seems to be a category of interests in its own 
right, it is also a set of norms Spain should abide by when acting 
internationally; as the EES points out, “the defence of our interests should 
always be undertaken in full respect of our values...which are contained in 
the Spanish Constitution and the UN Charter”.219 
Figure 4. Spain’s interests according to its 2011 Security Strategy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The EES, with its 90 pages, is a long document for its kind and 
touches upon many different aspects of Spain’s defence aspirations. There 
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is a lot of emphasis put on developing an “integral approach” to defence 
matters involving all the branches of government and not just the armed 
forces or the security forces. It remains, for the most part, a well thought-
out text that captures most of the issues addressed in previous strategic 
documents.  
Finally, we arrive at the 2012 National Defence Directive, issued by 
the Rajoy government only a few months into its first year in power. There 
is nothing truly revolutionary about this document beyond the fact that it 
calls for the drafting of a new Security Strategy, only months after the first 
one had been published, and that it also demands a fresh Strategic Defence 
Review. It seems, therefore, that the next two to three years will resemble 
those of a decade ago, in that Spain will undertake a deep process of 
reflection on its defence policy and the adequacy of its armed forces. 
Another interesting aspect of the 2012 DDN is that it cites the following 
three issues as defining elements of Spain’s defence policy: the increase in 
instability in the country’s neighbourhood (meaning mostly the Arab 
Spring), the need to build a stronger transatlantic link, and the negative 
impact of the economic crisis on its defence capabilities.220 
We see in the documents listed above a clear development in Spanish 
defence policy. In the mid to late 1990s, Spain’s fundamental concerns were 
the reform and modernisation of its armed forces, and the full integration 
of the country into NATO. Those concerns were left behind due to the 
successful professionalisation of Spain’s armed forces and the active role 
played by the country in the reshaping of NATO through a new Strategic 
Concept and a new eastern outlook. At the turn of the millennium, we see 
Spain being very supportive of an EU defence capacity and wanting to 
behave like a responsible stakeholder in the international arena. The areas 
in which it considers itself to have the most significant strategic interests 
were clearly defined at the time: Europe, the Atlantic partnership, the 
Mediterranean and Latin America. Today, the Mediterranean continues to 
be of paramount importance to Spain, particularly in terms of dealing with 
the effects of the Arab Spring, as is the transatlantic partnership. The 
economic crisis, and its impact on Spain’s finances, has crept into its 
defence planning, however, and has become one of its greatest concerns. 
This will surely be reflected in future doctrine, quite possibly in the new 
Security Strategy and the next RED.  
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Spanish attitudes towards European defence and participation in 
CSDP 
It is fair to say that Spain’s support for a stronger European defence policy 
has been strong and constant throughout the years. Even before the CFSP 
was formally launched in the early 1990s, Spain was already calling for the 
development of a common defence capacity in Europe, and for the transfers 
of Western European Union (WEU) commitments to the EU.  
It is true that the EU was not widely mentioned in the 1996 and 2000 
DDNs, but that is of course because the Union’s defence policy was almost 
nonexistent. Spain limited itself to calling for the emergence of a true 
European defence policy. The 2004 and 2008 DDNs seem to be the 
documents that truly capture Spain’s European ambitions and that set the 
tone for Spanish defence in the longer term. That tone is none other than a 
clear desire for a strong and united European defence, in cooperation with 
NATO. These objectives are indicated in the 2004 document and have 
remained in Spain’s DDNs, with very little alteration, since. 
It is also important to point out that the 2003 RED started with a long 
analysis of the new strategic landscape Spain inhabited. Some of the most 
momentous changes mentioned in the section are directly related to the 
emergence of a European Security and Defence Policy. In fact, the text says 
that “[w]ith this new institutional capacity the EU becomes a truly strategic 
actor, altering to some extent the strategic landscape: there is now not only 
an Atlantic dimension to security, manifested in NATO, but also the 
possibility of the Europeans developing their own missions 
autonomously”.221A few pages later, the RED touches upon this point once 
again: “Spain is actively committed to the development of autonomous 
military capabilities within the European Union so as to consolidate the 
Union as a global actor in its own right.”222 So the most significant review 
of Spain’s defence to date was undertaken to a large degree in response to 
the emergence of CSDP and with the clear intention of supporting its 
development. 
It is well known that the former High Representative of the EU, Javier 
Solana, actively participated in the drafting of Spain’s 2011 Security 
Strategy, and his input is clearly felt throughout it. The EU is mentioned 66 
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times in this text, meaning that you can almost find it on every page. The 
US, on the other hand, is referenced 11 times and the UN 19. However, it is 
not just the number of times Europe is mentioned, but how and where it is 
cited that matters the most. One only need go to page 2 of the document to 
read that “this strategy is drafted from the conviction…that Spain is a 
medium-sized power and that its capacity to act is strengthened by its 
membership of the European Union”.223 On page 13, it is again stated that 
“[t]he defence of Spain and its interests is enhanced from within an EU that 
strengthens its influence in the world”.224 This same idea is reiterated a few 
pages later when the Security Strategy cites the size of the EU in terms of 
population and percentage of world GDP, to then add: “Spanish interests 
are better served with an EU that increases the role in plays in the 
world.”225 
The EES has an entire section dedicated to European defence and its 
relation to that of Spain. In a matter of three pages, a clear picture of Spain’s 
commitment to European defence is painted. Here is a short list of excerpts 
from this section, titled “The European Union, identity and influence”: 
“If Europe wants to remain relevant in the Concert of Nations it 
must provide itself with the necessary political will to act abroad 
in a united manner, and with a true European defence policy with 
the necessary capabilities, among them a strategic transport 
capacity.” 
“…it will be necessary to advance efforts towards common 
capability planning, and to realise the potential of the European 
Defence Agency…” 
“Spain defends the enlargement of the EU as a factor that 
will contribute to the stability and security of Europe. With the 
progressive incorporation of candidate countries such as Turkey, 
Croatia, Iceland and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
(FYROM), we will enrich the different visions and capacities of the 
European project”.226 
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The EES’s list of threats to Spanish security is, on the other hand, 
almost identical to that contained in the 2003 European Security Strategy 
(ESS). Indeed, the ESS lists five key threats to European security – 
terrorism, proliferation of WMDs, regional conflict, state failure and 
organised Crime227 – all of which are reflected in the Spanish Security 
Strategy. Not surprisingly, the Spanish document concludes that “Spain 
fully supports the European Security Strategy”.228 
This formal support for CSDP, and for the CFSP more broadly, was 
ratified by numerous interviews performed in Spain during the months of 
October and November 2012. Not a single person from a list of over a 
dozen selected interviewees expressed any doubt that Spain had an interest 
in seeing a strong EU defence policy (see Annex 1 for a list of interviewees). 
The Defence Minister himself clearly stated that “Spain wishes for CSDP to 
develop the necessary capabilities to take on a comprehensive approach to 
security that brings together both civilian and military elements”.229 It is 
therefore fair to say that Spanish support for CSDP is widespread. 
Furthermore, the country’s participation in EU missions is almost the 
default scenario. This default participation was quantified by Spain’s 
Deputy Director for Defence Planning and International Relations, who 
said in an interview that “our European allies expect us to assume between 
8 and 10% of all obligations derived from CSDP operations”.230 In his 
opinion, this is a natural thing as membership of the EU brings with it the 
obligation of being a “general net provider of security instead of a 
consumer”.231 
That broad support for European defence is, however, not 
accompanied by a structured argument regarding the specific interest 
Spain has in participating in specific missions. Time and time again, 
interviewees had to refer to the broad concept of “support for European 
integration” when asked about the reason(s) why Spanish troops had been 
sent to fight under the EU flag to places such as the Democratic Republic of 
Congo or the Republic of Chad. Simply put, it seems that Spain has 
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assumed its obligations at the European level out of a desire to construct 
“more Europe”, but without clear and concise strategic goals. 
In the case of EUFOR DRC Congo, for example, it is clear that Spain 
provided troops only because it was requested to do so by its allies, mainly 
France and Belgium. When asked what were the Spanish strategic interests 
at stake in Congo, the reply of a Spanish Captain and former member of 
Spain’s delegation at the European Military Committee (EUMC) was clear: 
“None”.232 This lack of a concise strategy was confirmed by retired Admiral 
Fernando Lista Blanco, a former Deputy Director of the EU’s Military Staff 
(EUMS), who said quite clearly, “membership of the EU and NATO has 
been the cornerstone of Spain’s defence policy since it joined both 
organisations...Participation in many EU missions was not the result of 
direct interest but rather of solidarity and compromise with partners”.233 
This issue of a lack of direct strategic interest in certain missions came up 
regularly when discussing EUFOR Althea in Bosnia. Not only did Spain 
take on the Force Command of that mission, but for a certain period of time 
it was the largest troop contributor. People involved with the mission could 
not find an explanation for this over-commitment other than Spain’s desire 
to be a responsible and loyal ally.  
Indeed, Spain’s involvement in EU missions seems to respond to 
exogenous factors such as the importance of having the placet of the 
country where troops are deployed. Its participation in EUTM Somalia, for 
example, was prompted not so much by Spain’s direct interest in the 
mission as by the EU’s need to have troops on the ground from a country 
without a colonial past in the region. A similar logic was behind Spain’s 
involvement in and, ultimately, it’s taking on the command of EUSSR 
Guinea-Bissau. Furthermore, there is now a clear consensus that France 
made efforts to make EUFOR TChad as European as possible in order to 
reduce the association of the mission with historic French interests in the 
country/region. Once again, Spain agreed to participate there as a “means 
of demonstrating its support to a relevant ally”.234 
The arguments above are of great importance because they point to a 
paradoxical characteristic of European military intervention. It is 
sometimes useful for countries to abstain from participating in missions 
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where they have a direct interest but where their participation could be 
highly controversial, and to see others lead. If there was ever the need for a 
CSDP mission in Morocco, it is hard to picture it being led by a Spaniard 
given Spain’s historical ties to the region, and despite its almost natural 
interest in seeing an operation there succeed. This point was explicitly 
made by Admiral Horcada Rubio when referring to how we might even see 
a negative correlation in Europe between a country’s strategic interests and 
its direct involvement in missions launched to protect those interests.  
Although the argument above is compelling, it is still possible to see 
some correlation between the missions France or the UK insisted upon 
launching and the national interest of those countries. That willingness and 
capacity to successfully escalate national defence policy concerns to the EU 
level, even if it results in modest operations, is hard to find in the case of 
Spain. The most significant exception to this dynamic is perhaps Spain’s 
support and active involvement in EUFOR Atalanta. This mission seems to 
respond quite directly to French and Spanish strategic concerns, given that 
piracy in the Horn of Africa has a very negative impact on both fishing in 
the region and trade coming through the Red Sea and into the 
Mediterranean. Although the mission’s mandate is formally formulated as 
an operation in support of the activities of the World Food Program in 
Somalia and of sea lanes in general terms, it is clear that it was designed to 
tackle the problem of piracy head on and to prevent further damage to the 
European fishing interests in the region. In the case of Spain, it is 
particularly important to mention that its support of the mission was also 
shaped by news of the Alakrana, a Spanish shipping boat, being taken 
hostage by pirates in the Indian Ocean in October 2009.  
Spain’s current defence policy and European implications 
As indicated before, the 2012 Spanish National Defence Directive asked for 
the drafting of a new Security Strategy and for the undertaking of a new 
Strategic Defence Review. Both processes are bound to reflect some of the 
new realities Spanish defence has to deal with.  
The first of those new circumstances is, of course, the economic crisis 
Spain is suffering. It is important not to forget the effect this is having on 
the country’s defence spending. Defence policy spending peaked at €8.149 
million in 2008; that figure had gone down to €6.261 million by 2012 and it 
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is expected to fall to €5.786 million in 2013.235 This means that Spain has 
reduced its defence-related outlays by over 25% in nominal terms over the 
last four years. Of that reduced budget, over 75% is used on salaries and 
other personnel-related expenses. Further cuts to the budget would 
necessarily mean cutbacks in the size of the force (currently at 80,000 
soldiers and marines), or significant reductions in investments in 
equipment and modernisation programmes. When interviewed, Spain’s 
Defence Minister pointed to the health of the economy as one of Spain’s 
major challenges, and as one of the most significant factors affecting its 
defence policy.236 This is of course not dissimilar to what was stated back in 
2010 by the then Head of the Joints Chiefs of Staff of the United States 
regarding his own country’s defence: “The single biggest threat to national 
security is the national debt.”237 
It is as yet unclear what effect the reduction in defence spending will 
have on Spain’s participation in CSDP. On the one hand, there will be a 
clear incentive to pool and share and to look for ways to cooperate on 
defence matters. On the other hand, it will quite simply reduce Spain’s 
ability to sustain long and costly deployments. This latter fact might lead 
Spain to support missions in which it has more of a direct interest, such as 
Atalanta, and to direct fewer resources to others where its interests are less 
defined, such as Althea.  
A second significant development in Spain’s security landscape has 
of course been the Arab Spring. Events in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt have 
changed a region considered of importance by Spain not only because it 
obtains a substantial portion of its energy imports from it, but also because 
of its proximity to Spanish shores. It is this proximity that has made 
security and stability in the southern rim of the Mediterranean a key 
objective for Spain. Although Spain retains its full capacity to engage in the 
region, which it does regularly, the EU and its External Action Service have 
taken the lead on many fronts. In a recent interview, Bernardino Leon, the 
Special Representative of the EU for the Southern Mediterranean and 
former Deputy Foreign Minister during the Zapatero presidency, stated 
that, “the EU is the most important actor in the region at the moment…and 
it is performing very well…all thanks to the fact that the Union’s member 
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states are giving it space to act”.238 That interview took place only days 
before the EU announced a €5 billion aid and investment package to Egypt 
in what was one of the most significant moves in the region since the 
beginning of the Arab revolts.239 Spain seems satisfied with the role played 
by the EU in this field and it is therefore doubtful that the Arab Spring will 
produce anything other than a doubling down of Spain’s pro-European 
stance, and a further attempt to Europeanise security in the Mediterranean.  
The third and final issue Spain will need to grapple with in the 
coming years is the health of the transatlantic alliance, and of NATO, in 
light of the much-touted US pivot to Asia. The 2012 Spanish National 
Defence Directive defines the Atlantic Alliance as “Spain’s most 
appropriate framework for collective defence”.240 This is not too dissimilar 
from the way the issue is addressed in other Spanish strategic documents. 
When asked about the shift in US priorities towards Asia, Spain’s Defence 
Minister interpreted it as a “respectable decision in terms of defence policy 
on the part of the US” and added that it would be mistaken to see it as 
equivalent to “leaving the European strategic theatre.”241 Still, there is a 
growing concern in Europe’s defence establishment that a decreasing 
importance of Europe for American defence planners will lead to growing 
demands on Europe’s already stretched defence capabilities.  
Here it should also be noted that many in Spain’s defence and foreign 
policy leadership positions believe that the country carries more weight in 
EU bodies than in NATO. Given its relative size, active participation and 
general pro-European stance, Spain is regularly consulted on matters of EU 
security and defence. The following quote puts this into sharp contrast with 
its role in NATO: “The role played by Spain in NATO is truly a secondary 
one. When it comes to building big European consensus Spain is amongst 
the big players… This means that every time an issue of security and 
defence is discussed in Europe the other partners expect Spain to express 
its opinion. In NATO, however, we are rarely taken into account.”242 
Changes in the Atlantic security architecture are bound to affect Spain and 
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its defence policy, however, but it is unlikely they will reduce its support 
for the further development of CSDP.  
Conclusions  
Spain has been and will continue to be a strong supporter of CSDP. This 
support for a strong European defence policy has been in place since the 
early 1990s. The EU figures prominently in all of the country’s strategic 
documents and is bound to continue to do so in future documents. This 
formal commitment to the European cause has led Spain to assume great 
responsibilities within CSDP. It has participated in all of the EU’s military 
missions to date, including the most demanding of these such as EUFOR 
Althea, EUFOR TChad and EUNAVFOR Atalanta. Spain is without doubt 
one of the key actors in CSDP. 
What seems to be lacking in Spain’s European approach is a concise 
strategy regarding participation in specific missions. Participation seems to 
be haphazard and in response to abstract arguments in favour of “more 
Europe” rather than to some harder strategic logic. The source of this deep 
desire to further EU integration is surely to be found outside of the realm of 
defence. It quite probably has to do with the country’s turbulent past, its 
many decades of isolation under the Franco regime, and the promise of 
democracy and prosperity that EU membership brought. Furthermore, 
although probably unsustainable, it is true that the pursuit of milieu goals 
on the part of Spain is not totally deprived of reason. It is in response to the 
country’s belief that in the long term it will profit from a stronger CSDP 
and a stronger Europe. For a self-declared medium power on the very 
frontier of the EU, the world looks much safer if you belong to a strong 
alliance.  
Furthermore, and in all fairness to the Spanish defence establishment, 
this lack of strategy seems to be shared by other member states. Indeed, the 
challenge of defining a country’s strategic interests is one faced by all the 
other European actors. The field of defence is plagued by problems of 
priority-setting and resource allocation. EU defence is no different in this 
regard from other forms of military cooperation, and Spain’s participation 
faces the same challenges when it comes to defining clear strategic goals as 
that of other actors.  
Ad hoc arrangements and a reliance on almost disinterested 
contributions seem to be at the very heart, and are perhaps the greatest 
weaknesses, of European defence. When asked about the origins of the 
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strategic content of CSDP missions, the former High Representative of the 
EU, Javier Solana, said the following: 
“You are going to find little order in that process. The objectives of 
the missions were decided as they were required by circumstances 
on the ground…our missions were in essence a response to 
situations that emerged at a given point in time.”243 
This reactive process led to ad hoc coalitions being formed for each 
mission. Action preceded strategy, even at the highest European level. 
Participation in those coalitions therefore seems to have been only loosely 
correlated to the strategic interests of those participating, and Spain was no 
exception to that rule. 
For the EU, launching a mission is a statement in itself as it reaffirms 
the legitimacy and capacity of this emerging actor. In fact, Solana is known 
for having set the goal of launching a CSDP mission every six months as a 
means of keeping the CFSP alive and evolving. Spain has always been 
aware of this dynamic, and that is one of the reasons why its support for 
European integration translated over the years into its direct participation 
in missions it would have otherwise not undertaken. Europe might, 
therefore, need a few Don Quixotes if it is to prosper in this field. What 
would surely be desirable is for member states to have a clearer idea of 
their interests and, above all, to be well aware of why they undertake the 
responsibilities they do within CSDP. Broad and unclear references to 
European unity are unsatisfactory when they lead to the deployment of 
troops with a mandate to use force. If one is willing to commit its armed 
forces for the pursuit of high milieu goals, it should be clear what those 
goals are. Spain should therefore express a clear view of what it wants 
CSDP to become, of the kind of actor it wants the EU to develop into, and 
how such an actor can further the interests of Spain and its citizens.  
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SWEDEN: AN ACTIVE, NORMATIVE, 
NON-ALIGNED COUNTRY 
ALESSANDRO MARRONE 
Abstract 
Sweden’s strategic culture and its participation in CSDP have been 
substantially shaped by the heritage of the country’s neutrality. However, 
active engagement in UN peacekeeping, mediation and humanitarian 
assistance, coupled with constant advocacy on human rights, rule of law 
and democracy values, have been and continue to be an important part of 
Swedish strategic culture, influencing its participation in the CSDP.  
At the same time, the national interests of Sweden in the post-Cold 
War period have been, and continue to be, grouped into two main 
categories both influencing Swedish approach to CSDP. First, there is a 
strategic interest in the peace, security and stability of the neighbourhood – 
including not only the Baltic states but also Eastern European countries and 
the Arctic – as a vital condition for Swedish national security, particularly 
vis-à-vis Russia. The Swedish national interest in the stable functioning of 
the global economy based on free trade and access to markets falls in the 
second category. That implies a free, safe and reliable flow of goods, from 
raw materials to manufacturing products, services and information, 
through both physical and cyber infrastructures and lines of 
communication. 
Although Sweden joined the EU only in 1995, the country has 
actively participated in CSDP conceptual development, institution-building 
and operations, to the point that it has been present in every single CSDP 
mission launched by the EU up to 2012. Overall, Sweden can be considered 
an active, normative, non-aligned country, and these characteristics are 
likely to remain in place in the years to come.  
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Overview 
Sweden’s strategic culture and its participation in the Common Security 
Defence Policy (CSDP) have been substantially shaped by the heritage of 
the country’s neutrality. Sweden was not involved in either World War I or 
World War II and it remained a neutral country during the Cold War, albeit 
substantially West-oriented. However, active engagement in UN 
peacekeeping, mediation and humanitarian assistance, coupled with 
constant advocacy on human rights, rule of law and democracy values, 
have been and continue to be an important part of Swedish strategic 
culture, influencing its participation in CSDP. Sweden only joined the EU 
in 1995 and it is not a member of NATO. In this context, it is worth noting 
that Sweden has actively participated in CSDP conceptual development, 
institution building and operations, to the point that it has been present in 
every single CSDP mission launched by the EU up to 2012. Considering its 
heritage of neutrality and the fact that its population in 2013 amounts to 
just 9.8 million, Sweden’s participation in CSDP is noticeable. Overall, 
Sweden can be considered an active, normative, non-aligned country.  
Strategic culture 
Swedish strategic culture has been largely shaped by two centuries of 
neutrality. This implies a lack of recent collective memory of wartime on 
the national territory. But being neutral during the Cold War in 
Scandinavia also meant relying only on national forces to defend its eastern 
border from a Soviet invasion. In this context, for decades Sweden adopted 
the concept of a ‘people’s defence’, implying the possible total mobilisation 
of the Swedish male population244 and 800,000 deployable soldiers. At the 
same time, since the 1950s there has been a strong commitment to UN-led 
peacekeeping. The combination of these elements led to a multi-faced 
situation. Indeed, until 2010 Sweden retained a large conscript army, 
theoretically able to mobilise 500,000 troops on the eastern border within 
three months,245 while at the same time championing and participating in 
UN-led peacekeeping operations worldwide.  
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The basic tenet of Swedish strategic culture has been – and continues 
to be – that the use of force is legitimate in only two cases: either for the 
country’s territorial defence from an armed attack, or with the consent of 
the host nation or a resolution from the UN Security Council authorising 
the of use military force for purposes other than territorial defence. This 
basic assumption has so far not been questioned been put under question 
in Sweden.  
Nevertheless, the evolution of the Swedish political discourse from a 
position of ‘neutrality’ during the Cold War to a position of ‘non-
alignment’ in the post-Cold War period is notable. This process led to the 
elaboration by Sweden of the so-called ‘unilateral solidarity clause’. The 
resolution, adopted in 2009 by a unanimous vote of the Swedish 
parliament, affirmed that: 
The government supports the Declaration of Solidarity presented 
by the Defence Committee and covering EU Member States 
together with Norway and Iceland. It is impossible to see military 
conflicts in our immediate surroundings that could affect one 
country alone. Sweden will not remain passive should a disaster or 
an attack afflict another member country or Nordic country. We 
expect that these countries will act in the same manner should 
Sweden be afflicted. Sweden should therefore be able to both give 
and to receive military support.246 
This document can be considered an evolution of Sweden’s strategic 
culture towards a more active role in the case of conflicts in Europe. 
However, such evolution does not imply that Sweden has signed up to a 
kind of collective defence obligation similar to the Article 5 of the 
Washington Treaty that established NATO. Moreover, there is no 
willingness in the country to seriously and openly consider the possibility 
of joining NATO and thus subscribe to a collective defence obligation. 
Sweden does not want the EU to undertake such obligations, but would 
rather keep the focus of CSDP on crisis management operations. 
However, neutrality or non-alignment did not and does not imply a 
passive or silent position for Sweden on world affairs, as has been the case 
for other neutral countries such as Switzerland. On the contrary, Sweden 
often took normative-led positions on a number of issues, including a 
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constant emphasis on the protection and spreading of human rights, rule of 
law and democracy. It has been rightly argued that Swedish foreign and 
defence policy has often demonstrated a clear preference for multilateral, 
value-driven solutions rather than a need to satisfy purely material, 
national interests.247 Sweden has also been a steady supporter of the 
development and enforcement of international law.  
Moreover, Swedish strategic culture is marked by a strong attitude 
towards international cooperation. This regards, in particular, its long-
standing activities with other Nordic countries, which have led to the 
establishment of the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO).248 
Cooperation in the Nordic region has increased in the post-Cold War 
period. In 2008, the foreign ministers of the five countries tasked Thordvald 
Stoltemberg249 with the preparation of the Report on the Nordic 
Cooperation on Foreign and Security Field, delivered in 2009 and 
commonly known as the Stoltemberg Report. It put forward 13 proposals 
ranging from airspace surveillance to a maritime monitoring system, 
including defence procurement and the joint agreement of a “Nordic 
Solidarity Clause”.250 
Swedish attitudes towards cooperation in the post-Cold War have 
been also demonstrated by the active participation in the NATO 
Partnership for Peace (PfP). It included a military contribution to the 
Alliance’s operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Libya, as well as the 
modernisation of the Swedish armed forces to achieve NATO 
interoperability. In other words, Sweden has never considered joining 
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NATO, but has progressively developed a constant and deep cooperation 
with the Alliance at the operational level, particularly in crisis management 
operations. At the same time, since the mid-1990s, Sweden has shown its 
activism in the EU and particularly within the CSDP framework.  
Finally, over the last six decades Sweden has maintained an active 
role within the UN system, particularly with regard to peacekeeping. 
According to some, the first example of Swedish peacekeeping was the 
inter-positioning force deployed to maintain the ceasefire between two 
German kingdoms in the 17th century.251 In the 1920s, Sweden was an active 
member of the League of Nations. Since the 1950s, and particularly when 
Swedish diplomat Dag Hammarskjöld held the position of UN secretary 
general,252 Sweden began to constantly deploy troops to UN-led 
peacekeeping operations. It has been calculated253 that 12% of the 530,000 
troops deployed to UN missions up to 1997 came from Sweden.254 
Moreover, as of 2004, the total of Swedish soldiers and police officials who 
had participated in UN missions amounted to roughly 80,000.255 The 
temporary peak in Swedish contributions to UN peacekeeping occurred in 
the early 1990s – partly due to the Balkan wars – when the total 
contributions amounted to 2,000 units. There has been no geographical 
focus in this regard; for Sweden, the engagement in peacekeeping is rather 
a matter of principle. It took part in CSDP missions in Congo and Chad 
because these countries belonged to the category of those needing the 
international community’s intervention for conflict resolution.256 In this 
context, a military option is seen only as the last resort, while preference is 
given to non-military ways of solving international disputes.  
This commitment to peacekeeping has been traditionally coupled 
with a pro-active role as mediator or honest broker within diplomatic 
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crises. This is also due to Sweden’s globally positive reputation as a neutral 
country during the Cold War.257 Sweden has also maintained a good track 
record of providing relatively large funds for development aid and 
humanitarian assistance – it currently devotes 1.1% of GDP to international 
aid, directed towards more than 30 countries in Africa, Central Asia and 
Latin America. As a whole, the commitment to international peace and 
security258 reflected a strategic culture with a strong normative character.  
Swedish policymakers and public opinion generally perceive Sweden 
as a sort of ‘force for good in the world’, or ‘conscience of the world’, which 
is keen to support the international community’s efforts to maintain or 
restore peace as well as to alleviate human suffering.259 
In this context, Sweden has been a staunch supporter of the 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle as a natural follow-up to its 
normative stance. According to the Swedish view, R2P is based on three 
pillars: first, it is the responsibility of the local government to protect its 
citizens; second, if the local government fails, the international community 
has the responsibility to assist through capacity building, security sector 
reform, and means other than the use of force; third, only as a last resort 
may the international community intervene militarily by the use of force to 
enforce R2P. It should be noted that policymakers consider R2P only one 
among several guidelines for Swedish foreign policy.260 Public support for 
this normative approach is very high: according to a 2012 Transatlantic 
Trends survey, 81% of the Swedish population supports the R2P principle, 
which is higher than the EU average of 67%.261 The same survey shows that 
Sweden has the highest percentage in Europe of people endorsing military 
intervention in Libya (68%), Afghanistan (62%) and even Iraq (56%), based 
on the assumption that it was “the right thing to do”.262 
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Such a normative stance seems in contrast to some of Sweden’s 
external actions. For example, Sweden is a net exporter of defence 
equipment, has a tradition of arms manufacturing dating back to the 17th 
century, and maintains a strong defence industrial base with large 
industries such as Saab producing the Gripen fighter aircraft. In 2012, the 
Swedish defence minister had to resign because of a scandal over the 
building of an arms factory in Saudi Arabia – not exactly a democratic and 
peaceful country – by the Swedish defence industry with the involvement 
of government agencies. This deal had been kept secret for several years, 
away from public opinion scrutiny.263 Swedish normative rhetoric also 
implies that when national troops are involved in serious fighting abroad, 
the policymakers try to not emphasise this in the public discourse. At the 
same time, they wish to demonstrate to the EU and US partners that 
Swedish troops are able to fight when there is a UN mandate, such as in the 
case of CSDP Artemis operation and the NATO International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF). This is related to the importance Sweden attaches 
to long-standing relations with partners, which are – based also on the 
country’s credibility and reliability – maintained and enhanced over time.  
The current global outlook of the Swedish international vision 
recognises the rise of new powers such as China, India and Brazil, and the 
resurgence of old ones such as Russia. In addition to the concerns over 
Russia discussed below, China is seen by many policymakers as a 
dangerous economic competitor because of its unfair trade competition 
based partly on reduced workers’ rights.264 Sweden therefore favours a 
strong and united EU in order to ensure that the European voice carries 
sufficient leverage in an increasingly multi-polar world vis-à-vis other 
powers. Furthermore, Sweden shares the view that an effective CSDP can 
contribute to this goal. In particular, it is believed that Sweden can put 
forward its policy on many issues, including advocacy of human rights and 
democracy, better through the EU than on its own. In other words, Sweden 
believes it is stronger together with other Europeans. Indeed, during the 
debate on the observer status of the Palestinian National Authority at the 
UN General Assembly, Sweden was ready to adapt its vote to a united EU 
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position on abstention,265 which Europeans were at the end unable to forge. 
This is an example of the Swedish pragmatic approach, traditionally keen 
to reach a compromise at the European level in order to achieve EU 
support in the international arena for at least part of the country’s agenda. 
The current trend towards multi-polarity is also seen as a potential source 
of increased global instability, including in the EU neighbourhood. This 
was epitomised in Syria, where the international community has proven ill-
equipped to quickly adopt a common approach to the crisis.  
The transition undertaken by some Arab countries is predominantly 
considered a positive process, somewhat similar to the transition 
undertaken by Eastern Europe after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
However, Swedish policymakers are aware that the direction of transition 
in Arab countries is highly uncertain. In addition, Sweden has strong ties 
with the region because of the number of refugees from countries such as 
Syria that are hosted on Swedish territory. So far, Sweden has prided itself 
on its relatively permissive asylum and immigration policy, also because 
this fits well in the normative approach to international cooperation and 
assistance to people suffering worldwide. At the same time, addressing 
security and development challenges in countries from which asylum-
seekers and immigrants originate, such as the Balkans, contributes to a 
strategy of managing the situation better before it reaches Sweden’s 
borders.  
Institutional framework 
The Swedish political system266 is parliamentary, without the direct election 
of a prime minister. It is characterised by the presence of several political 
parties forming coalition governments, which often lack a majority of seats 
in the parliament. This has implied a constant dialogue between governing 
and opposition parties, which traditionally take decisions on foreign and 
defence policy by consensus, including those on the use of force. In other 
words, the Swedish government acts militarily only when it obtains the 
consensus of the main opposition parties. This ensures the strong 
continuity of the Swedish approach to crisis management operations over 
the years, despite changes in the ruling coalitions. For example, the shift 
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from a progressive to a conservative government in the 2000s did not 
significantly alter Sweden’s position in this regard.  
Within Sweden’s institutional framework, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MFA) plays an important role in decision-making related to the 
deployment of armed forces abroad, particularly by initiating and framing 
the proposal for joining crisis management operations. In general, the 
parliament has the final say on the launch of every military operation 
before it is deployed. The government can deploy troops without the 
parliament’s authorisation only in exceptional cases of self-defence, to put 
up to 3,000 troops on stand-by, or to implement a decision taken on the 
basis of an international agreement previously approved by the 
parliament.267 Even when parliament approval is not mandatory, informal 
consultations between government officials and lawmakers usually take 
place. In particular, the Foreign Affairs Committee is an important venue 
where political decisions are taken. Parliament also exercises oversight 
through its budgetary power. Moreover, every five years a special 
commission appointed by the parliament reviews the position of the 
Swedish armed forces. The 2008 review involved the shift from a conscript 
to a professional army, and the current review is scheduled for completion 
by 2013268. 
The decision over the participation in a specific mission is often 
informally shared between government officials, usually officials from the 
MFA, parliamentarians and the parliament’s civil servants on the Foreign 
Affairs Committee. This is in order to ensure the smooth approval of the 
formal government proposal when it is presented. Meanwhile, the 
government tasks the armed forces to manage preliminary military 
planning, which in turn feeds the elaboration of the government's proposal 
to the parliament. Formally, in the case of Swedish participation in the 
NATO Operation Unified Protector (OUP) in Libya, it took only three days 
to go from government decision to parliament approval to the deployment 
of Swedish fighter aircraft to the Italian base of Sigonella.  
Within the aforementioned context of broad and cross-party 
consensus on foreign and defence policy, the relative influence of the prime 
minister regarding crisis management operations, CSDP and, generally 
speaking, the use of force partly depends on his personality and that of the 
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foreign minister. Indeed, the prime minister has the overall responsibility 
for the government’s actions and the power to influence the country’s 
foreign policy, but often the lead is left to the foreign minister, as happened 
in recent years with Carl Bildt. The Ministry of Defence obviously play a 
significant role in planning and implementing CSDP missions. The 
Ministry of Justice269 also makes an important contribution concerning, in 
particular, civilian missions involving the police, border guards, judges and 
prosecutors, while the Ministry of International Development Cooperation 
is also involved, albeit to a lesser extent. Finally, it should be mentioned 
that the Council on Foreign Affairs, composed of parliamentarians and 
government officials and formally chaired by the king, has an advisory role 
in the decision-making process. 
At the operational level, government agencies such as the Swedish 
Defence Research Agency (Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, FOI) and the 
Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA) have specific tasks as a strategic research 
centre and a training centre for civilian and military personnel involved in 
crisis management operations, respectively. This institutional and 
organisational arrangement contributes to keeping the MFA core structure 
relatively small and cohesive with strong interpersonal relations, thus 
increasing its agility at the strategic level.270 
Regarding the Swedish military, in 2012 the armed forces amounted 
to roughly 20,000 units and the defence budget accounted for $6.21 billion. 
It should be noted that the defence budget for 2012 remained stable with 
respect to 2011, and increased in comparison to 2010 when it was $5.6 
billion.271 In a time of severe defence budget cuts in several EU countries, 
Sweden, together with Poland, is one of the few EU countries where no 
substantial austerity measures were needed and no additional financial 
constraints have affected the country's military capabilities. In fact the 
country, which is not part of the eurozone, has experienced relatively low 
government debt and enjoyed a solid economy in recent years. However, 
the decision to move from a conscript to a professional army obviously 
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affected the quantity of available troops: Sweden currently plans for an 
army composed of seven professional battalions. 
Strategic interests 
The national interests of Sweden in the post-Cold War period have been, 
and continue to be, grouped into two main categories. First, there is a 
strategic interest in the peace, security and stability of the neighbourhood – 
including not only the Baltic states but also eastern European countries and 
the Arctic – as a vital condition for Swedish national security, particularly 
vis-à-vis Russia. Sweden joined the EU in 1995 partly because it believed 
that securing and stabilising the former communist countries was in its 
strategic interest and considered the Union a powerful tool in this regard, 
mainly through its enlargement.272 At the same time, Sweden welcomed the 
NATO enlargement to Eastern Europe, particularly to Poland and the Baltic 
states, because it saw this as contributing to the security of its 
neighbourhood and, thus, its territory. A substantial portion of Swedish 
policymakers are worried about the growth of Russian military 
expenditure and the authoritarian backlash experienced in Russia under 
Vladimir Putin’s leadership.273 The war between Russia and Georgia in 
2008 was a case in point. In this context, Sweden is in favour of the US 
commitment to NATO and European security, a strong cooperation among 
Nordic countries, and the EU’s stabilisation and outreach efforts in the its 
eastern neighbourhood. In particular, Sweden is one of the greatest 
supporters, together with Poland, of the EU Eastern Partnership,274 and is 
the biggest donor to countries such as Moldova and Ukraine.   
The Swedish national interest in the stable functioning of the global 
economy based on free trade and access to markets falls in the second 
category. The Swedish economy is highly globalised and dependent on the 
free, safe and reliable flow of goods, from raw materials to manufacturing 
products, services and information, through both physical and cyber 
infrastructures and lines of communications. In this context, it is not by 
accident that Sweden has contributed to EU and NATO counter-piracy 
operations in the Gulf of Aden, and has supported the Barcelona Process to 
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sustain security and economic integration of the Mediterranean.275 Sweden 
also has a strategic interest in promoting an effective multilateral 
governance system. Like other countries that are not sufficiently powerful 
to shape global politics, Sweden feels that its national interests are better 
protected by rules-based multilateral institutions. For example, Sweden 
believes that security can be built and guaranteed only with others, 
through NATO and the EU as part of wide web of world security.276 
Swedish strategic culture envisages that not only conflict resolution but 
also global security challenges are better dealt with by a global governance 
system. This is the case even if security challenges are not threats in a strict 
military sense, for example, terrorism,277 climate change, pandemics or 
migration. Moreover, there is strong normative value attached to 
international law and cooperation within global and regional institutions. 
In this context, a strong and active EU is seen as an important building 
block of the global governance system and CSDP is, in this regard, 
considered a significant tool within the EU toolbox.  
Participation in CSDP 
Sweden joined the EU in 1995 through a referendum in which only a tiny 
majority of the population voted in favour of membership. In this sense, the 
country is a ‘recent’ EU member with a previous, long-standing tradition of 
neutrality, like Finland and Austria. However, Sweden has taken an active 
role in shaping CSDP and contributing to EU civilian and military 
missions.  
The Swedish government was pro-actively involved in the decision-
making that culminated in the establishment of CSDP. In particular, 
Sweden – together with Finland – encouraged other EU members to focus 
CSDP on crisis management operations and not on the Union’s territorial 
defence.278 The reason was three-fold. First, a significant share of Swedish 
public opinion at that time feared a kind of ‘militarisation’ of the EU. 
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Second, the country’s neutral status implied the refusal of any kind of EU 
approach to collective defence similar to NATO Article 5. Third, Sweden 
believed that the post-Cold War security environment required a range of 
peacekeeping, peace-enforcing and peace-making operations to conduct 
crisis management through a comprehensive approach, rather than 
conventional state-to-state warfare. Sweden understood this as essential in 
order to support peace and security worldwide.279 Generally speaking, 
Sweden has been and continues to be an explicit supporter of this 
understanding of the comprehensive approach. 
The Swedish engagement resulted inter alia in a strong focus on 
civilian capabilities for crisis management operations alongside the 
traditional military ones. For example, the idea of Civilian Response Team 
came from Sweden. At the same time, the country lobbied to move the set 
of Petersberg Tasks from the Western European Union – of which Sweden 
was not a member – to the EU in order to perform such peacekeeping tasks 
within CSDP, where Sweden played an active role.280 In the negotiation of 
the Lisbon Treaty, Stockholm took a cautious approach to Article 427 on the 
EU security guarantee, while it strongly supported Article 422 on the 
solidarity clause.281 In recent years, Sweden has put greater emphasis on 
human rights, including gender issues, within the CSDP framework.  
Since the early 2000s, the Swedish government has contributed to 
every CSDP mission with varying numbers of troops, ranging from a few 
units to several hundred. It did so for two main reasons. First, it considered 
CSDP important per se as a tool for international peacekeeping. Second, 
Sweden wanted to be perceived by other EU members as a reliable partner 
in order to increase its credibility and influence in CSDP. Additionally, 
there were reasons specific to the operations in question. In particular, 
Swedish participation in missions in the Balkans was mainly due to the 
geographical proximity of this crisis to the EU, while its contribution to the 
CSDP monitoring mission in Georgia is mostly related to Sweden’s interest 
in securing and stabilising the neighbourhood and demonstrating EU 
engagement in international law vis-à-vis the behaviour of Russia282. The 
Swedish participation in EUPOL Afghanistan and ISAF, on the other hand, 
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was mostly related to the need to maintain transatlantic solidarity and its 
partnership with the US (also achieved through being an active partner of 
NATO) and thus ensure the US commitment to European security. 
Swedish armed forces also engaged in complex military missions, for 
example in Operation Artemis in Chad, where there was good Franco-
Swedish cooperation both at the operational level – in particular, among 
the respective special forces – and at the strategic level between the two 
foreign ministers, Hubert Vedrine and Hanna Lindt. Moreover, Sweden has 
a good track record of deploying judges, prosecutors, police officials and 
civilian experts in CSDP operations, in line with the traditional Swedish 
emphasis on civilian capabilities. The national representatives to CSDP 
institutions in Brussels, from the Ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs and 
Justice, are relatively proactive and show a noticeable degree of internal 
coordination from the working level to the politico-strategic level.283 
The Swedish perception of CSDP has evolved over time. In the late 
1990s and early 2000s, two different views were widespread among 
policymakers and public opinion. On the one hand, there was the 
aforementioned fear of a ‘militarisation’ of the EU and a strong emphasis 
on civilian aspects and capabilities for CSDP, in common with Finland. On 
the other hand, there was much enthusiasm about the EU’s potential 
capacity to be an effective peacekeeper and peace-maker in Europe, its 
neighbourhood and worldwide, in close relation with the UN. After more 
than a decade of CSDP commitment, both views have changed in Sweden. 
The fear of a ‘militarised’ EU has lessened and almost disappeared, given 
the path undertaken by CSDP and greater Swedish understanding of EU 
dynamics. At the same time, the initial enthusiasm and expectations have 
also decreased, particularly in the light of the stalemate of CSDP missions 
between 2009 and 2011.  
However, Swedish attitudes towards CSDP remain positive, and 
there is a general belief among policymakers that in the security and 
defence domain it is important to do things together at the EU level. 
Consensus on CSDP is still strong in Swedish public opinion, despite the 
EU having lost part of its appeal as a result of the eurozone crisis, and no 
EU mission has been the object of explicit opposition. Nevertheless, 
support for crisis management operations – within the EU or other 
                                                   
283 Interview, 28 November 2012. 
SWEDEN: AN ACTIVE, NORMATIVE, NON-ALIGNED COUNTRY | 125 
 
frameworks – has decreased from an average of 75% in the mid-1990s to an 
average of 60% in 2007-12.284 
Only two serious criticisms have been raised from left-leaning public 
opinion and policymakers. The first concerns the decline of Sweden’s 
commitment to peacekeeping missions led by the UN or the Organization 
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which was the perceived 
result of the shift of resources to CSDP operations.285 This trend is related to 
the fact the EU as a whole has become a major institutional framework 
through which to channel Swedish foreign and defence policy, including its 
commitment to crisis management operations, although the UN remains a 
fundamental terms of reference. However, the limited size of CSDP 
operations – and thus the small number of personnel provided by Sweden 
– is notable, as is the fact that until 2012, an overwhelming share of 
Swedish personnel abroad was committed to the NATO operation in 
Afghanistan.286 
The second criticism has pointed to the fact that the EU Battle Groups 
have been an expensive capability never yet used by CSDP operations, thus 
questioning the value-for-money of the investment.287 This is not to say that 
Sweden is against Battle Groups, but rather that if the EU has to maintain 
this capability it is worth using it when necessary. Indeed, Sweden was a 
framework nation for the Battle Groups in 2008 and 2011, and despite the 
critical views expressed by the social democrat-opposition, it will remain a 
framework nation in 2015.  
CSDP, and generally speaking the EU, is largely perceived by 
policymakers as a vehicle to promote Swedish interests and values 
worldwide, through cooperation with other EU members. For example, 
CSDP missions are considered a useful tool to implement the Swedish 
traditional commitment to peacekeeping. CSDP is also considered a useful 
tool to enhance EU influence in the neighbourhood of the Union, including 
to the east and the south, as well as in the candidate countries in the 
western Balkans (for example, through the EU Monitoring Mission in 
Georgia). In this sense, the EU as a whole can represent a stronger and 
more attractive model than just Sweden alone for the former Soviet 
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Republics as they choose their future paths. As mentioned previously, the 
Swedish strategic interest in the free and safe flow of goods is served by the 
Atalanta anti-piracy mission.288 Sweden has also supported the 
establishment of the EU task force on cyber security in order to involve the 
EU in this aspect of international flows, which the country deems of 
interest. Moreover, there is a widespread belief that the EU can do more 
than CSDP operations on a broader security agenda, by mobilising multiple 
tools such as aid and humanitarian assistance, trade policy and advocacy 
on human rights, including the status of women.289 
CSDP missions are considered an important component of the broad 
EU toolbox, as well as a valuable asset to increase EU external action and its 
status in the world. In turn, EU external action is conceived as one of the 
most useful frameworks to increase Swedish influence in the international 
arena beyond the limited capabilities that a country like Sweden can 
leverage. In particular, Stockholm is interested in pursuing, through the 
EU, its goals on a broad range of issues, including not only crisis 
management operations but also international trade and climate change. 
Finally, according to the Swedish view, the EU should play an active role in 
spreading the values of human rights, rule of law and democracy 
worldwide and particularly in its neighbourhood. This is one of the reasons 
behind Sweden being one of the initial supporters of the European Global 
Strategy process,290 jointly launched by the Italian, Polish, Spanish and 
Swedish governments in 2012 to stimulate strategic thinking on EU 
external action.291 
At the same time, Sweden is aware of the limits of using CSDP as a 
tool to pursue national strategic interests. For example, there is no 
ambition, at least in the medium term, to make CSDP – and the EU 
solidarity clause – a way to ensure the security of Sweden and Nordic 
countries against an increasingly assertive Russia. Cooperation with NATO 
and the US, and a strong American commitment to European security, are 
deemed more useful in this regard. While NATO membership is currently 
not an option for Sweden, close cooperation with the Alliance and long-
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term integration in the NATO framework are deemed particularly 
important.292 
Concerning crisis management operations, in the Swedish view, the 
EU should aim to be able to intervene in a broad range of crises, including 
in the case of the US not contributing. However, CSDP should not be built 
in opposition to NATO or the US. The Atlantic Alliance maintains a unique 
resource for crisis management operations, and there is no unanimous 
consensus for replicating NATO military structures within the EU. 
Complementarity and synergies between the two organisations are 
favoured by most. Indeed, in 2001 the exchange of letters between Swedish 
Foreign Minister Hannah Lindt – acting as Sweden held the Presidency of 
the EU – and NATO Secretary General George Robertson established the 
first formal relations between the two actors. Some policymakers defined 
Sweden as the only “non-NATO Atlanticist EU member.”293 
In this context, the participation in ad hoc coalitions is less favoured 
than NATO or EU frameworks for conducting crisis management 
operations. In the case of the Mali crisis, since 2012 Sweden has supported 
the launch of a robust EU training mission to build up Malian armed forces 
and institutions in order to deal with the situation in the northern region of 
the country. In early 2013, Sweden also provided some air capabilities for a 
strategic airlift to move France’s troops and equipment from Europe to 
Africa, along with other European countries such as the UK, Germany, 
Belgium and Denmark. However, Sweden did not take any active part in 
the French-led military operation in Mali.  
Generally speaking, there is no formal Swedish preference for NATO 
or the EU framework in dealing with crises, the choice is mainly made on 
the basis of a case-by-case evaluation. Clearly, for the time being only 
NATO is able to provide the military framework needed to conduct high-
intensity, large-scale military operations. In any case, the UN remains 
extremely important in this regard. A UN Security Council mandate is a 
conditiosine qua non for the use of force abroad under Chapter VII of the UN 
                                                   
292 C. Wünderlich (2010), “Moving beyond neutrality: Sweden’s changing attitude 
towards the military use of force”, paper presented at the 7th Pan-European 
International Relations Conference of the Standing Group on International 
Relations (SGIR) of the ECPR, 9–11 September, Stockholm. 
293 Interview, 3 December 2012. 
128 |ALESSANDRO MARRONE 
Charter, while for operations falling under Chapter VI a clear sign of 
support from the UN Security Council is aimed for.294 
With regards to military capabilities, Sweden was among the first 
supporters of the EU Pooling and Sharing (P&S) initiative with the Ghent 
document signed with Germany in November 2010. Stockholm is not 
against NATO’s Smart Defence, but the fact that the country is not a NATO 
member obviously does matter in this regard. Sweden has also been 
member of the Letter of Intent/Framework Agreement (LOI/FA) and the 
Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en matière d'ARmement (OCCAR) 
because of its significance to the Swedish national defence industry. 
Nowadays, there is widespread belief that P&S should be a bottom-up 
approach, whereby EU institutions act as a facilitator to map opportunities 
for cooperation and to encourage it, so that bilateral, regional or other kinds 
of projects commence among interested EU member states.  Sweden is 
accustomed to defence cooperation within NORDEFCO, including both 
trilateral initiatives with Norway and Finland and bilateral initiatives.295 In 
the context of Nordic cooperation, Sweden and the other Nordic countries 
took a long-term approach based on the convergence of respective national 
approaches, for example with regard to standards, procedures and 
procurement plans.296 Defence cooperation, including P&S, is generally 
seen as long-term process with little expectation of immediate radical 
changes in this regard.  
Sweden has also been one of the most active supporters of the 
comprehensive approach. This is also rooted in the fact that the Swedish 
conscript army envisaged, by default, a number of soldiers with civilian 
employment, and thus civilian skills, who are extremely keen to also 
perform non-military tasks – from material reconstruction to institution 
building – as part of missions in operational theatres such as the Balkans 
and Afghanistan.297 Today, the link between security and development is 
well recognised in Sweden, up to the point that some civilian CSDP 
missions are co-funded from the Swedish government budget for 
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international aid.298 Official government documents confirm that Sweden 
links together different policies (foreign, development, security and 
defence) in crisis management operations. However, as happens in other 
EU countries, formal claims about applying a comprehensive approach are 
not always matched in practice.  
Finally, following the deterioration of the situation on the ground and 
the military intervention initiated by France in January 2013, the EU has 
launched the EU Training Mission (EUTM) Mali aimed at training and 
assisting Malian armed forces. Sweden supported this decision and 
provided 15 military trainers to EUTM Mali.    
Conclusion 
The Swedish approach to CSDP is rooted in the country's history and 
strategic culture, and largely reflects the strategic interests pursued by 
Sweden as well as the normative stance it asserts in the international arena. 
The approach is therefore likely to remain in place in the coming years. 
That means that Sweden will likely remain an active partner of CSDP 
operations, a supporter of normative-based EU advocacy at the global 
level, and a non-aligned country with several constraints and a strong 
reluctance when it comes to collective defence obligations. However, this 
does not necessarily mean that all the current characteristics of Swedish 
relations with CSDP will remain exactly the same.  
Two endogenous factors may affect Swedish foreign and defence 
policy. At the strategic level, there is a three-fold shift in Swedish strategic 
culture: from neutrality to non-alignment including a “unilateral solidarity 
clause”; from the priority of “territorial defence” to the one of “defence of 
national interests”;299 and from participation only in UN-led crisis 
management operations to only in UN-mandated crisis management 
operations, which therefore can be conducted through EU or NATO 
frameworks. The direction of this shift is clear, but it is not certain if it will 
continue or if so, at what pace.  
At the operational level, there may be long-term effects, including 
unintentional ones, of the recent Swedish decision to move from a conscript 
to a professional army. On the one hand, Western countries with 
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professional armies are more ready for crisis management operations than 
countries where conscription implies closer public scrutiny of the direct 
link between a military operation and national defence or interests. On the 
other hand, the reduction in size of the armed forces and the fact that the 
military will have to compete in the Swedish job market may affect the 
availability of a variety of skills among Swedish troops. These potential 
shortcomings will be mitigated, at least in the coming years, by the fact that 
the gradual withdrawal of a large proportion of Swedish troops from 
Afghanistan by 2014 will probably ensure the availability of well-trained 
capabilities for crisis management operations. 
In addition, three exogenous factors will be particularly important at 
the strategic level for Swedish foreign and defence policy in the next years. 
First, the evolution of Russian domestic politics and its external projection 
will have an impact. If an internal authoritarian backlash in Russia is 
coupled with a more assertive attitude towards Moscow's ‘near abroad’, 
Sweden will be more focused on the security of its neighbourhood and on 
territorial defence. On the other hand, a more peaceful, stable and 
cooperative situation in the region to the east of EU borders will allow and 
push Sweden to focus on issues primarily related to global security. In both 
cases, there will likely be implications for the Swedish approach to CSDP, 
for example, regarding the regional priorities for crisis management 
operations and, generally speaking, for EU external action.  
Second, the so-called US pivot towards Asia may have different 
impacts on Europe and thus on Sweden’s strategic outlook. If it will require 
greater European action in the EU neighbourhood – either through NATO, 
the EU or other multilateral frameworks – while maintaining transatlantic 
solidarity and a certain US commitment or European security, it will not 
necessarily lead to radical changes in Sweden’s foreign and defence policy. 
It may well favour an increase in Sweden’s commitment to crisis 
management operations led by Europeans, primarily but not exclusively 
throughCSDP. In contrast, if the US pivot will imply a substantial 
disengagement from European security, it may lead to a new situation in 
the Europe whereby Sweden – as well as other EU countries – reconsiders 
the fundamentals of its foreign and defence policy, including the purposes 
of CSDP.   
Finally, the evolution of the EU will obviously play a significant role 
in shaping Sweden’s position towards it. An analysis of possible scenarios 
regarding EU membership and patterns of integration is beyond the scope 
of this chapter. Suffice to say that – ceteris paribus the Russian and American 
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variables of Swedish strategic calculus – Sweden would prefer a sufficiently 
robust CSDP, integrated and effective in dealing with the full spectrum of 
crisis management operations. However, it would not favour an evolution 
of CSDP towards collective defence obligations, nor its decline as a tool for 
addressing crises and threats abroad.  
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UNITED KINGDOM: 
THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM 
GIOVANNI FALEG 
Abstract  
Drawing on fieldwork research in London (King’s College, Department of 
European and International Studies), this chapter analyses the CSDP through 
the lens of the British national interest. It accounts for the key elements of 
Britain’s national interest and how they are criss-crossed with security co-
operation at the CSDP level.  
Unquestionably, the UK has a leading role in European defence. Since 
Saint-Malo, the UK has recognised the value of a capable CSDP within the 
limited scope of crisis management or ‘Petersberg’ operations, with a clear 
focus on humanitarian tasks, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. It thus 
invested in the build-up of CSDP, both in the military (e.g. Headline Goal 
process, Battlegroup concept, creation of the European Defence Agency) 
and civilian dimension. Yet, as this chapter shows, the UK’s stance towards 
European defence has never been so uncertain. In response to austerity 
hitting public defence spending, the Coalition Government has privileged 
bilateral cooperation with France (e.g. Franco-British defence agreement) to 
the detriment of multilateral initiatives within the EU framework. 
Furthermore, the possibility of an opt-out makes Britain not just the engine, 
but also the elephant in the room for the CSDP: Is a common defence policy 
conceivable without the UK? The analysis presented in this chapter 
answers that question by showing that opting out of the CSDP would make 
British defence weaker and  is unlikely to occur; but also that an ‘à la carte’ 
approach is what may allow the UK to get best value for money, given the 
growing frustration with cumbersome CSDP instruments and decision-
making procedures.   
The methodology is based on semi-structured interviews with British 
officials, diplomats and members of parliament, and experts in the field of 
foreign and security policy, as well as on the review and content analysis of 
relevant secondary sources and material available.  
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Of course Britain could make her own way in the world,  
outside the EU, if we chose to do so. So could any other Member State. 
But the question we will have to ask ourselves is this:  
Is that the very best future for our country? 
We will have to weigh carefully where our true national interest lies. 
 
Prime Minister David Cameron’s EU Speech,  
23 January 2013300 
 
Introduction 
The United Kingdom’s participation in the EU’s Common Security and 
Defence Policy (CSDP) is at a crossroads. Since 2010, David Cameron’s 
coalition government has reversed the multilateralist approach pursued by 
the Labour governments over the previous 12 years, ending an era of 
assertive UK engagement in shaping and implementing CSDP. The practice 
of British foreign and security policy has therefore seen a return of 
‘exclusive’ bilateralism with selected worthy and like-minded partners 
(namely France – note the signature on 2 November 2010 of the Lancaster 
treaties) combined with a growing ‘malign neglect’ vis-à-vis the EU.301 This 
shift calls into question the assumption that austerity constraints lead to 
greater multilateral cooperation to save and pool resources, as Britain’s role 
in the CSDP is increasingly uncommitted and political uncertainties over its 
presence in the EU are on the rise.  
This chapter attempts to shed light on the UK’s contribution and 
vision of CSDP, bearing in mind that, at such a peculiar and critical 
juncture, understanding the way a strategic culture or national interest 
affects behaviour is somewhere between problematic and impossible. It 
argues that some clear red lines still characterise the UK’s political 
discourse on CSDP, namely as regards the division of labour with NATO 
(the privileged partner for hard-security tasks) and the vision of CSDP as a 
‘soft’ provider of conflict prevention, crisis management and peace-
building through the comprehensive approach. Accordingly, this chapter 
demonstrates that this very specific vision of CSDP, which partly emanates 
                                                   
300 Available at http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/david-cameron-eu-speech 
301 C.M. O’Donnell (2011), “Britain’s coalition government and EU defence 
cooperation: undermining British interests”, International Affairs, 87:2, pp. 419-433.   
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from British strategic culture, has not changed much; what has changed, 
however, is a broader and ideological foreign policy orientation of the 
coalition government, linked to the emergence of the bilateral posture. This 
new orientation, combined with a longstanding sense of frustration 
towards Brussels-based, ineffective crisis management structures, has 
caused Britain to start drifting away from the CSDP.   
The chapter is structured as follows. The first section briefly outlines 
the main features of the UK contribution to CSDP. The second section 
introduces the country’s security architecture shaping strategic preferences. 
The third section sketches out the main elements of the UK’s national 
interest and strategic objectives. The fourth section outlines Britain’s 
participation in CSDP missions, capacity or institution-building and 
explains why and how selected examples were instrumental to pursuing 
the UK national interest. Finally, the conclusion provides scenarios of the 
UK’s future relationship with the EU and their security implications.  
Overview 
The United Kingdom unquestionably adopts a leading role in European 
defence, due to the size of its armed forces, defence industry and 
experience in high-intensity warfare. In the late 1990s, Tony Blair’s support 
for the launch of the Common Security and Defence Policy at Saint Malo 
(1998) marked the end of an age-old opposition to the development of 
autonomous European military capabilities outside the NATO framework. 
The implications of Saint Malo were twofold, in the sense of being both a 
preservation and an advancement of the UK security interests to cope with 
adaptation pressures. On the one hand, in fact, the UK government sought 
to maintain intact the cornerstone of British strategic posture, namely the 
reliance on the US as a primary security partner and on NATO as 
guarantor of UK territorial defence (for example the ‘three Ds’302 shaping 
EU-NATO relations). On the other hand, and as a response to pressures 
from Washington and the lessons from Kosovo, Britain started to recognise 
the value of a militarily autonomous CSDP within the limited scope of 
                                                   
302 The ‘three Ds’ stand for: no discrimination against non-EU NATO members, no 
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operational planning system or its command structure. Cf. D. Hamilton (2004) 
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crisis management or ‘Petersberg’ operations,303 with a clear focus on 
humanitarian tasks, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. It is with this vision 
in mind that Labour governments continued to invest in the build-up of 
CSDP, both in the military (e.g. the Headline Goal process, the Battlegroup 
concept, the creation of the European Defence Agency)304 and civilian 
dimensions (as of February 2013, British civilian experts and police were 
seconded to 7 out of 12 CSDP civilian missions).305 Consistent with this 
vision, the CSDP main ‘deliverables’ are unmistakably perceived in London 
as contained within the soft dimension of security. Accordingly, the EU is 
seen as having an added value at the low end of the spectrum, which 
entails conflict prevention, stabilisation and those crisis management 
operations where borders between hard and soft security are blurred and a 
comprehensive approach306 is needed (e.g. in the Horn of Africa).307 Instead, 
                                                   
303 The “Petersberg tasks” (Article 42 TEU) define the range of missions that may 
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London, 24 September 2013 
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305 These missions are: EUPOL Afghanistan, EUMM Georgia, EUJUST LEX Iraq, 
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306 The UK doctrine for the implementation of the comprehensive approach is 
developed in the House of Commons Defence Committee’s Seventh Report of 
Session 2009-10 “The Comprehensive Approach: the point of war is not just to win 
but to make a better peace”, published on 18 March 2010. According to the Report, 
the UK understanding of the comprehensive approach coincides with the 
definition used by the Ministry of Defence as an approach “with commonly 
understood principles and collaborative processes that enhance the likelihood of 
favourable and enduring outcomes within a particular situation” (p. 1).  
307 The EU Comprehensive Approach (CA) is defined, instead, as Civil-Military 
Coordination (CMCO), meaning “the need for effective co-ordination of the actions 
of all relevant EU actors involved in the planning and subsequent implementation 
of EU’s response to the crisis”. Cf. Council of the European Union (2003), Civil-
Military Coordination, Doc. 14457/03, Brussels, 7 November 2003, p. 2. It is inferred, 
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there continues – and will continue – to be no appetite in London for high-
end capabilities or such things as an EU operational headquarters, as long 
as NATO provides planning structures, procedures and resources for hard 
defence. Institutions and permanent planning and conduct structures are 
clear red lines for UK interests. That being said, whereas the transatlantic 
and European partnerships are justified as a way to pursue British national 
interest “in collaboration with others”,308 the special relationship with the 
US seems more ideological than rational given the changing realities of the 
international system.309 
The 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) has left the 
approach to CSDP unchanged, despite the impact of systemic 
transformations (growing uncertainties and the changing nature of 
conflicts) on the UK’s strategic posture. The SDSR links the future role of 
CSDP to the promotion of stability, the reinforcement of conflict prevention 
tools (possibly leading to an EU conflict prevention strategy),310 the support 
to integrated missions and military ones where NATO is not willing to 
intervene and where action through the EU can provide good value for 
money (e.g. counter-piracy efforts in Somalia, Operation Atalanta). This is 
confirmed by the 2011 Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS) jointly 
drafted by Department for International Development (DFID), the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Ministry of Defence (MoD).311 
Despite the existence of clear red lines and an unambiguous 
understanding of what CSDP means to British national interest, the UK’s 
stance towards European defence has never been so uncertain, mostly 
                                                                                                                                 
and confirmed by interviews, that the support to the EU comprehensive approach 
is compatible and, in some cases, beneficial to the improvement of the UK 
comprehensive approach.  
308 P. Cradock (1997), In Pursuit of British Interests: Reflections on Foreign Policy under 
Margaret Thatcher and John Major, London: John Murray; D. Miliband (2009), A 
Strong Britain in a Strong Europe, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 
London, 26 October. 
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310Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review, 
HM Government, October 2010, p. 62.  
311Building Stability Overseas Strategy, UK Department for International 
Development, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Ministry of Defence, July 2011.  
UNITED KINGDOM: THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM| 137 
 
because of David Cameron’s coalition government euro-sceptic attitude.312 
In response to austerity hitting public defence spending, Britain has 
privileged bilateral cooperation with France (e.g. the Franco-British defence 
agreement) to the detriment of multilateral initiatives313 within the EU 
framework, for instance regarding pooling and sharing or operational 
deployments (witness Libya). Finally, uncertainty is on the rise as the UK’s 
future relationship with the EU is called into question. The possibility of an 
opt-out makes Britain not just the engine, but also the elephant in the room 
for the CSDP: is a common defence policy conceivable without the UK?314 
UK strategic culture and institutional structure 
Elements of Britain’s strategic culture 
There is no consensual view in the academic literature that the UK holds a 
clearly identifiable ‘strategic culture’. Having said that, observable 
exogenous stimuli, as well as the dynamics of domestic politics and 
institutional structures, affect the role and self-perception of the UK in the 
world. This, in turn, influences the way Britain conceives the use of force 
and behaves in the security realm. 
                                                   
312 On top of that, Sven Biscop correctly points out that Britain’s approach to the 
CSDP has been “consistent only in its orthodoxy, defending the primacy of NATO 
against the upstart CSDP which it parented”; however, “the power which that 
orthodoxy aims to please no longer cares”, as the US attitude to European defence 
is now one of benign neglect. Cf. S. Biscop (2012) “The UK and European defence: 
leading or leaving?” (http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/ 
International%20Affairs/2012/88_6/88_6Biscop.pdf). 
313 Interview, 5 December 2012. Note that according to the SDSR, the intensification 
of UK bilateral defence and security relationships on a range of security issues is a 
key priority. In particular, it is stated that in the field of capabilities, “bilateral 
equipment collaboration arrangements are potentially more straightforward and 
more fruitful than complex multilateral arrangements, which have delivered mixed 
results for us in the past” (SDSR, p. 60).  
314 See P. Worré (2013), “The consequences of a British exit from the EU and CSDP: 
an analytical timeline”, ISIS Europe Occasional Paper, January 2013. See also G. 
Faleg and M. Muniz (2013), “CSDP: views from member states”, paper presented 
at the UACES Collaborative Research Network “CSDP Strategy” Conference, 
University of Surrey, 1 February; N. Tocci and G. Faleg (2013), “Towards a More 
United and Effective Europe: A Framework for Analysis”, Imagining Europe Series 
No. 1, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome, pp. 9-10.  
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Externally, the UK is perceived as a middle power. To British 
policymakers, however, the UK is a global hub or a pivotal power 
‘punching above its weight’, meaning a country whose power and energy, 
and ability to preserve its influence on the global stage, goes beyond the 
limits imposed by geography, population and means.315 
With transformations in world politics proceeding at a fast pace all 
through the 19th century,316 Britain’s loss of power on the global stage has 
therefore created a widening gap between the country’s domestic ambition 
to act as a great power, which influences the political rhetoric, and the real 
capacities or resources to live up to this ambition, combined with external 
perceptions. This ‘ambition-capability’ gap affecting the UK’s level of 
ambition concerning the use of force is viewed by the academic literature as 
one important feature of the British strategic culture based on a self-image 
of a great and global actor, in the transition from the imperial/colonial past 
to the new shape of the international system post-1945.317 
All in all, the spectrum of the British strategic approach to security 
and defence matters is broad, with a focus on general strategies linking 
foreign policy to other security related areas such as home affairs or 
development aid, with military issues addressed in broad, security terms. 
Arguably, British strategic culture tends to be broader and more holistic 
than continental ones.318 
The UK remains a global trade power, the fifth in the world in terms 
of trade volumes. This undoubtedly influences British security policy 
orientation towards a tendency to provide a proactive contribution to 
multilateral organisations and maintain a wide network of bilateral 
partnerships. A clear example is the world-wide net of relationships with 
former colonies, now institutionalised in the Commonwealth of Nations. 
                                                   
315 Menon (2010), p. 2.  
316 National Intelligence Council (2008), Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World, 
National Intelligence Council, Washington, D.C.  
317 P. Cornish (2013), “United Kingdom”, in H. Biehl, B. Giegerich and A. Jonas 
(eds), Strategic cultures in Europe. Security and Defence Policies Across the Continent, 
Schriftenreihe des Sozialwissenschaftlichen Instituts der Bundeswehr 
(forthcoming). 
318 A. Jonas and N. von Ondarza (2010), Chancen und Hindernisse für die europäische 
Streitkräfteintegration. Grundlegende Aspekte deutscher, französischer und britischer 
Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik im Vergleich, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag.  
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Another example is the shared British understanding that membership of 
the UN, the OECD and other forms of multilateral cooperation is vital to 
protect and advance UK commercial, trade, economic – and, as a 
consequence, security – interests.  
Concerning the willingness to use the military force and the 
inclination towards interventions overseas, Britain has a long record of 
large-scale and high intensity deployments, involving a wide range and 
number of combat and non-combat operations since 1945. However, 
according to Cornish, despite such propensity and extent, the willingness 
to use force is constrained by the declining level of military spending (see 
following section), by the broadening definition of security and by the 
relationship between the armed forces, the government and society.319 
In more recent times, the development of an integrated approach to 
security provision, through the conceptualisation of the comprehensive 
approach, marked a turning point and heavily influenced the UK strategic 
culture and security posture, as both the SDSR and the BSOS make 
apparent. The commitment to identifying the root causes of conflict and 
implementing effective and sustainable peace-building and conflict 
prevention policies is a result of the country being, at the same time, a key 
global security actor and a major international donor. Preventing conflict 
and seeking long-term, durable solutions to address fragility have become 
something of a dogma in the UK’s post-Cold War foreign policy 
orientation. This attitude resulted, on the one hand, in the quest for better 
internal coordination between the Department for International 
Development (DFID, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO and the 
Ministry of Defence (MoD; and, on the other hand, it resulted in a rather 
persuasive advocacy undertaking that has produced tangible results in 
many multilateral fora – the UK has been a fierce promoter, together with 
other like-minded countries (i.e. the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland and 
Denmark), of the emerging peacebuilding and state-building agendas that 
have progressively been institutionalised within different international 
organisations.  
Concerning the behaviour of British military, a determinant of the UK 
strategic culture is that the political control over the armed forces has never 
                                                   
319 Ibid., p. 379.  
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been challenged.320 The military officer is seen and behaves ‘unpolitically’, 
loyal to the authority of the state and reluctant to intervene in domestic 
politics,321 despite the influential position military leaders occupy in British 
society.322 
A final element shaping the evolution of the strategic culture since 
the end of the Cold War is the consolidation of expeditionary forces to 
counter threats (in particular, international terrorism since 9/11) away from 
UK borders. This ‘expeditionary’ approach to warfare eventually led 
Britain to support the concept for NATO’s ‘out of areas’ interventions.323 
These key elements of the strategic puzzle are complemented by the fact 
that over the past 60 years, Britain has accumulated unmatched (if 
compared to its European partners) operational experience in a wide range 
of military and civil-military deployments.  
Control over the use of force 
Let us now turn to the institutional structures involved in decision-making 
about the use and deployment of force. As the UK constitution is a 
combination of statute, common law and unwritten convention, 
constitutional practice concerning the use and deployment of force, as with 
any other decision, is flexible and evolving.   
Under the royal prerogative powers, the government can declare war 
and deploy armed forces to conflicts abroad without the backing or consent 
of parliament. The royal prerogative dates back to a constitutional 
settlement at the time of the Bill of Rights of 1688, by which ministers 
obtained a set of rights that were previously a prerogative of the monarch. 
These rights included decisions concerning the deployment and use of the 
armed forces overseas, including involvement in armed conflict or the 
declaration of war.324 Concerning the exercise of the royal prerogative, it is 
commonly accepted that the deployment power is in the hands of the 
prime minister, who therefore has personal discretion and is not legally 
                                                   
320 E. Broadbent (1998), The Military and Government from Macmillan to Heseltine, 
London: Macmillan. 
321 G. Harries-Jenkins (1990), “The Concept of Military Professionalism”, Defense 
Analysis, 6:2, pp. 117–130. 
322 Cornish (2013).  
323 Interview, 5 December 2012.  
324 Cornish (2013).  
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bound to consult others. Parliament has no formal role in approving 
deployments, although governments usually keep parliament informed 
about a decision leading to military campaigns and certain constitutional 
constraints exist – e.g. general principle of government’s accountability to 
parliament, or budgetary arrangements to ensure financial provision for 
military deployments, for which parliament’s agreement is necessary. The 
government’s decision to call for a parliamentary vote on the Iraq war in 
2003 established an important precedent, leading to requests for a statutory 
amendment so as to require parliament’s approval whenever the use of 
military force in conflict situations is considered.325 However, the 2009 
Review of the Executive Royal Prerogative Powers Final Report326 and 
other proposals for reform of the control mechanisms concerning armed 
forces327 are still undergoing an evolutionary process, widely considered by 
experts and policymakers as a highly complex and lengthy undertaking. 
Thus far, no significant results have been produced, although the debate 
remains open and the executive is showing no sign of willingness to give 
up.328 In sum, the prerogative is mediated by the fact that several bodies are 
in the end involved in the formulation of the UK national security policy 
besides the prime minister and the Cabinet Office (e.g. the Treasury, the 
FCO, the MoD, DFID). However, the margin of manoeuvre of the executive 
remains significant, with important implications for how the UK strategic 
culture and interests are translated into practice.  
                                                   
325 On the debate on the use of the royal prerogative power after 2003 and 
Parliamentary approval for the deployment of British forces overseas, see Waging 
war: Parliament’s role and responsibility, Volume I Report, House of Lords, Select 
Committee on the Constitution, 27 July 2006.   
326The Governance of Britain. Review of the Executive Royal Prerogative Powers Final 
Report, Ministry of Justice, October 2009.  
327 Cf. The Governance of Britain. War powers and treaties: limiting Executive Powers, 
Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Defence, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 
October 2007.  
328 Debate within the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee continue in 
the wake of the deployment of British armed forces in Libya (March 2011). Cf. G.A. 
Allen (2011), The Government must be held to its promise to “enshrine in law for the 
future the necessity of consulting Parliament on military action, British Politics and 
Policy at LSE Blog, 6 December 
(http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/archives/18281).   
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It can be concluded that the UK strategic culture is characterised by 
the following factors:329 i) a high level of ambition observable in the 
declaratory level and resulting in the UK’s willingness to play a leading 
role in international security, namely by means of the use of military 
instruments to enforce the national interest; ii) a wide room for manoeuvre 
for the executive in decision-making concerning the use of force, under the 
‘royal prerogatives’ granting the government capacity to make decisions to 
deploy British troops outside of parliamentary control; iii) a greater 
emphasis, since the early-2000s, on a wide spectrum of instruments for 
intervention (from long-term conflict prevention to short-term crisis 
management; from high to low intensity operations) as well as on the 
integration of military and non-military tools to enhance the coherence and 
effectiveness of crisis response.  
UK national interests: good value for (little) money 
As Kissinger noted, perhaps the most basic feature of the UK national 
interest is British leaders’ traditional reluctance to elaborate it.330 References 
to national interest are considered rare in political discourse. Notable 
exceptions include the current coalition government, and particularly the 
vision for the FCO outlined and implemented since 2010 by Foreign 
Secretary, William Hague. According to Hague, the purpose of the UK 
diplomatic network is to “retain and build up Britain’s international 
influence in specific areas in order to shape a distinctive British foreign 
policy geared to national interest”,331 that is to “help build Britain’s 
prosperity by increasing exports and investments, opening markets, 
ensuring access to resources and promoting sustainable global growth”.332 
Going through relevant document analysis, it appears that national interest 
figures several times in the official policy documents on the UK’s national 
defence and security, delivered since the coalition government was formed: 
the National Security Strategy (2010), the Strategic Defence and Security 
Review (2010) and the Building Stability Overseas Strategy (2011). In a way, 
                                                   
329 Cf. also A. Jonas and N. von Ondarza (2010).  
330 H. Kissinger (1995), Diplomacy, New York: Touchstone, p. 96.  
331 “The Role of the FCO in UK Government”, Response of the Secretary of State for 
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Seventh Report from the Foreign Affairs 
Committee Session 2010-12, July 2011.  
332 Ibid. 
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the new government has been much more assertive in explaining to the 
public what strategic guidelines they expect in times of austerity.  
This renewed emphasis should not be overestimated, but not 
neglected either. On the one hand, notwithstanding changes in the strategic 
landscape since the early 1990s, the core elements of UK interests persisted, 
with some ‘add-ons’ such as counter-terrorist measures implemented in the 
wake of 9/11. These core elements relate to the nation’s ambition to think 
and act globally, due to the imperial heritage and in response to 
globalisation pressures. In this regard, the bedrock of the UK security 
interests remains NATO and the United States.  Since the end of World 
War II, systemic adaptation pressures have pushed UK élites to centre the 
strategic posture on the special relationship with the US. Cooperation has 
been fostered by the compatibility of the two armed forces, which have 
shared similar equipment, joint training programmes and intelligence. Last 
but not least, the US has acted as a key enabler in the development of 
Britain’s nuclear deterrent.  
On the other hand, a shift did occur in the handover from the New 
Labour era to the coalition government, affecting the roots of the UK’s 
perceived priorities for foreign and security policy as well the way the 
country thinks globally. Without entering a thorny debate on the pre-1990s 
security debates, transformation concerns the increasing relevance and 
necessity of bilateralism to the detriment of multilateral diplomacy. Tony 
Blair’s New Labour oriented its foreign and security policy according to the 
ideology that security and prosperity could be advanced through the 
institutionalisation of global values in a multilateral setting, functional to 
face common threats. The Coalition Government, instead, acknowledges 
the limitations of multilateralism vis-à-vis the rise of multipolarity, and the 
benefits resulting from bilateralism in international relations. In the words 
of Christopher Meyer, former British Ambassador to the United States, the 
new approach implies trying to create de facto alliances in the capitals, 
hence adopting a foreign policy-led understanding on national interest, 
with significant resources devoted to strengthening diplomatic missions in 
key capitals placed at the heart of the debate.333 The shift was forced, to a 
large extent, by the severe deficit in Britain’s defence budget and the need 
                                                   
333 C. Meyer (2010), “Britain’s Role in the World”, Speech at the Morehead-Cain 
Foundation, March, available on podcast 
(http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o55x7buOFKo).  
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to revise military spending. The realisation that Britain’s defence budget 
was insufficient to support the UK’s global ambition created momentum 
for members of the new government to advocate for the pursuit of selected 
and targeted bilateral cooperation,334 and drop what was seen as ineffective 
and wasteful multilateral ventures (e.g. delays in the delivery of the 
A400M). Perhaps the most dramatic example of the implications of this 
new course on UK security policy is the signature of the Franco-British 
defence agreement (cf. next section).  
In conclusion, the UK national interest features a broad spectrum of 
goals (global outreach of UK trade, commercial, security and geopolitical 
interests), limited resources (especially in times of austerity) and a wide 
scope of action for the executive to shape the security policy and strategy 
(as outlined in the previous section). On that account, a major shift has 
occurred from a values-based vision under New Labour to a value-added 
one under the coalition government, justified by the obsession to achieve 
better value for less money. In light of these elements, the tables below 
summarise the key strategic objectives outlined by the Strategic Defence 
and Security Review (2010) and by the Building Stability Overseas Strategy 
(2011).  
  
                                                   
334 O’Donnell (2011).  
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Table 2. UK strategic policy framework: elements of the “adaptable posture” 
Strategic objectives vis-
à-vis “highest priority 
risks” (next five years) 
Strategic objectives vis-
à-vis long-term risks 
and threats 
Strategic objectives vis-à-
vis low probability risks 
/ high impact risks 
Counter-terrorism 
Preventing conflicts and 
associated risks before 
they materialise in the 
UK; build local 
capacities. 
Nuclear deterrent to 
counter large-scale 
military attack by another 
state.  
Cyber-security 
Broad spectrum of 
defence capabilities to 
deter, contain, and 
engage on-the-ground 
threats. 
-- 
Natural hazards 
Develop capabilities 
with In-built flexibility 
to adjust in case of 
future changes. 
-- 
Crisis prevention and 
rapid response 
Strengthen mutual 
dependence with key 
allies and partners. 
-- 
-- 
Coordinate and 
integrate approach 
across government, 
combining defence, 
development, 
intelligence and other 
capabilities. 
-- 
Source: Strategic Defence and Security Review, 2010, pp. 9-10.  
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Table 3. Elements of the UK strategic response, Building Stability Overseas 
Strategy 
Pillars for tackling the causes of 
instability, fragility and conflict 
upstream 
Capacity-building for comprehensive 
approach 
Early Warning 
Target: anticipate instability and 
triggers for conflict 
Intelligence and assessment 
Target: underpinning political analysis 
and spot emerging risks and 
opportunities 
Rapid crisis prevention and responses 
Target: take fast, appropriate and 
effective action to prevent a crisis or 
stop it spreading or escalating 
Diplomacy 
Target: influence events in countries 
and across regions, build 
understanding of what is happening, 
generate international consensus to act 
Upstream prevention 
Target: build strong, legitimate 
institution and robust societies in 
fragile countries to manage tensions so 
as to reach a lower likelihood of 
instability and conflict 
Development 
Target: re-build critical institutions, 
support security and justice, generate 
jobs and public confidence 
 Defence engagement 
Target: support security sector reform 
and develop accountable security 
services that can win the trust of their 
people 
 Promote trade and open market 
Target: create economic opportunities 
 Stabilisation Unit 
Target: respond rapidly to conflict or 
pre-conflict situations on behalf of the 
government and in partnership with 
other key players 
Source: Building Stability Overseas Strategy, 2011, pp. 18-19.  
 
Finally, it is useful to briefly look into the ‘black hole’ and provide a 
quick overview of the UK defence budget cuts. In current financial 
circumstances, Britain’s capacity to deploy armed forces in defence of the 
national interest cannot be decoupled from the debate on military 
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spending, to address the so-called ‘black hole’. This indicates the 
identification by the coalition government of a large and unaffordable 
liability of inherited defence spending plans, amounting to an estimated 
ten-year funding gap of £74 billion. The current (2012) total defence 
spending of £39 billion is the result of the progressive 7.51% cut over a 
period of four years (2011-15). Cuts have affected the Harrier jump jet 
(retired), the Nimrod spy plane (cancelled), fewer warheads for replaced 
Trident submarines, one aircraft carrier (of two previously planned) no 
longer entering service. Cuts also heavily impacted military personnel 
(5,000 RAF personnel axed over five years, 5,000 Navy personnel cut, 7,000 
army personnel cut, 25,000 civilian MoD staff axed).335 
If one considers the defence climate characterised by overcommitted 
and unaffordable forces, and the new coalition government’s approach 
stressing the return of bilateral diplomacy as a result of the failure of 
multilateralism, it is hardly surprising that the UK has decided to gradually 
withdraw from a CSDP. Few in Europe believe CSDP can really offer good 
value for money: CSDP is in fact perceived in the UK as an intricate net of 
bureaucratic structures lacking ability or willingness to deploy capabilities, 
and underperforming as a crisis manager.  
Some questions arise in this regard: To what extent has the UK 
reduced its commitment to the CSDP beyond the political rhetoric? Would 
withdrawing from the CSDP serve the British national interest – or would it 
make its pursuit more difficult? Last, but not least, is mild or lack of 
support to multilateral cooperation within the CSDP a clearly identifiable 
trend in Britain’s strategic culture, or shall we understand current events as 
an anomaly, resulting from rising euro-scepticism and Conservatives’ 
opposition towards European initiatives, including the defence sector?  
                                                   
335 M. Chalmers (2011), “The Lean Years: Defence Consequences of the Fiscal 
Crisis”, in M. Codner (ed.), A Question of Security: The British Defence Review in an 
Age of Austerity, RUSI Defence and Security Studies Series, London: I.B. Tauris, pp. 
33-78; M. Chalmers (2010), “Unbalancing the Force? Prospects for UK Defence after 
the SDSR”, RUSI Working Paper No. 9, November; “Defence review: Cameron 
unveils armed forces cuts”, BBC News, 19 October.  
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What does CSDP mean to the UK? An absent leader of EU security 
and defence co-operation 
Contrary to commonly held views, Britain has been a very positive and 
active player since the beginning of institutionalised European security co-
operation, which we trace back to the Cologne Summit of 1999 launching 
the Common Security and Defence Policy. The UK’s significant 
contribution336 to early military operations, such as Concordia, Artemis (in 
which Britain was the second largest contributor, with 111 units)337 and, 
particularly, EUFOR Althea (the largest British contingent in CSDP 
missions, 691 units,338 the largest British contingent in CSDP missions is the 
third-largest among EU member states and the largest UK contribution to 
CSDP missions) was all-important for the launch of CSDP. Since 2008, 
much of the UK support to military CSDP has been directed towards 
counter-piracy and maritime operations off the coast of Somalia 
(EUNAVFOR). This support has been carried out through the provision of 
the operational headquarters in Northwood, the Operation Commander – 
since January 2013, Rear Admiral Bob Tarrant – and in synergy with 
NATO-led Operation Ocean Shield, to which the UK also contributes. 
Between 2004 and 2010, the UK ranked fifth among the top ten contributors 
to military CSDP, with its contribution amounting to 7.8 % (of the total EU), 
the last of the ‘big 3s’ below France (16.2%) and Germany (13.6%).339 On the 
civilian side, the UK contribution to CSDP missions is also considerable. 
The total number of personnel deployed between 2003 and 2009 amounted 
                                                   
336 This statement refers to the UK contribution to the CSDP in absolute terms. If 
compared to NATO deployments in Afghanistan or Kosovo, the importance of 
these figures decreases markedly.  
337 G. Grevi, D. Helly and D. Keohane (2009), European Security and Defence Policy: 
The First Ten Years (1999-2009), European Union Institute for Security Studies, p. 
414.  
338 Ibid.  
339 Operation conducted between 2004 and 2010: cf. K. Soder (2010), “EU military 
crisis management: an assessment of member states’ contributions and positions”, 
draft for the meeting of the COST Action IS0805 on New Challenges of 
Peacekeeping and the European Union's Role in Multilateral Crisis Management, 
May, p. 7 (http://www.peacekeeping-cost-is0805.eu/siteweb/images/ 
ACTIVITIES/Publications/100331%20-%20%20Article%20Soder.pdf).  
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to 125 units (66 seconded, 59 contracted) out of a total EU personnel of 
2,334.340 
The table below shows the current (since April 2012) UK contribution 
to CSDP missions in terms of deployed personnel.  
Table 4. UK contribution to CSDP missions (personnel) since April 2012341 
Missions UK contribution (total EU) 
EUNAVFOR SOMALIA (MIL)* 69 (1154) 
EUTM SOMALIA (MIL)* 2 (117) 
EUPOL RD CONGO (CIV) 0 (29) 
EUSEC RD CONGO (MIL) 4 (44) 
EUJUST LEX IRAQ (CIV) 5 (27) 
EUPOL AFGHANISTAN (CIV) 18 (237) 
EUBAM RAFAH (CIV) 0 (5) 
EUPOL COPS (CIV) 3 (36) 
EUFOR ALTHEA (MIL)* 4 (955) 
EUBAM MOLDOVA-UKRAINE (CIV) 0 (0) 
EUPM BiH (CIV) 2 (19) 
EULEX KOSOVO (CIV) 34 (855) 
EUMM GEORGIA (CIV) 17 (252) 
EUTM MALI (MIL)* 40 (500)342 
TOTAL 158 (3775) 
% of TOTAL MISSIONS’ PERSONNEL 
BY EU MEMBER STATES 
4.19% 
                                                   
340 Grevi et al. (2009), p. 415.  
341 Source: CSDP Map (http://www.csdpmap.eu/mission-personnel). Missions 
marked by an asterisk are from June 2011 and relevant statistics are not counted in 
the total figure at the end of the table. UK contribution to EUTM Mali is 
approximate and therefore also not counted in the total figure. 
342 Source: “EU Training of Malian Armed Forces”, House of Commons, European 
Scrutiny Committee, Thirty-second Report of Session 2012-13 
(http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmeuleg/86-
xxxii/8619.htm).  
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Reversing decades of opposition to European defence cooperation, in 
1998 Tony Blair’s government opened an unprecedented era of proactive 
UK involvement in EU security initiatives. It of course maintained a very 
clear attitude concerning the UK ‘red lines’ for CSDP, namely blocking the 
duplication of NATO structures (such as the creation of an EU OHQ), and 
the CSDP involvement in hard security operations (where, again, NATO 
was considered as the key partner).343 At the same time, however, Britain 
invested considerable resources in the emerging CSDP structures and 
contributed as a leader to shape the debate in a wide range of situations: 
the Helsinki Headline Goal (1999), the EU Battlegroup concept (2003), the 
European Security Strategy (2003), the creation of the European Defence 
Agency (2004), not forgetting the number of missions launched in 2005 
under the UK Presidency.344 
As some authors have pointed out,345 Britain’s frustration started 
rising as it became clear that such investment was not to provide any 
significant ‘value for money’, mainly due to the inability of CSDP to 
overcome the inefficiencies and sluggishness of a governance model based 
on consensus among 27 member states, combined with poor impact on the 
ground. This exacerbated divergence across UK institutions on the 
perception and assessment of the value added of CSDP cooperation. 
Whereas in the FCO the rationale for Europe remained quite clear, in the 
MoD, holding control of resources for military operations, and most 
importantly in the Parliament, scepticism started rising.346 Undoubtedly, 
                                                   
343 Interview, 10 December 2012. Cf. also T. Valasek (2008), “Defending European 
Defense”, The Wall Street Journal, 9 December.  
344 Those missions are: the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), the Border Assistance 
Mission at Rafah (EUBAM Rafah), the EU Police Mission for the Palestinian 
Territories (EUPOL COPPS), a civilian policing contribution to the African Union 
Mission (AMIS II) in South Sudan, the Border Assistance Mission on the 
Moldova/Ukraine border (EUBAM Moldova/Ukraine), and the EU integrated rule 
of law mission for Iraq (EUJUST LEX). Cf. Summary of the United Kingdom’s EU 
Presidency Report on the EU Security and Defence Policy, 16 December 2005 
(http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/es/article_5495_es.htm).  
345 N. Witney (2008), “Re-energising Europe’s security and defence policy”, 
European Council of Foreign Relations, Policy Paper, July; P. Cornish and G. 
Edwards (2005), “The strategic culture of the European Union: a progress report”, 
International Affairs, 81:4, pp. 821-833.  
346 Interview, 5 December 2012.  
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the fall of New Labour and the formation of the coalition government in 
2010, placing a new emphasis on exclusive bilateralism, did worsen the 
situation. However, the seeds for a change of attitude are ascribed to a 
long-standing sense of disappointment arising from over-emphasis on 
bureaucratic talk and the “purchase of new building in Brussels” rather 
than ways to enhance EU impact on the ground.347 Interviews with 
policymakers in London reveal that for the UK it is capital to make 
capabilities available for missions; along similar lines, mission evaluation is 
considered pivotal as a way to assess which missions provide value added 
and which ones do not. Examples of missions considered “unsatisfying” by 
the UK are EUBAM Rafah (few results despite long operational span), 
Althea (sluggish political progress in Bosnia), EUSEC/EUPOL Congo (UK 
is not against it, but is careful as to what can or must be delivered); 
virtuous examples, instead, are EULEX Kosovo (although local actors still 
value the US role on the ground through KFOR), the implementation of the 
comprehensive approach in the Horn of Africa, and planned engagement 
in the Sahel.348 The Horn of Africa is, in particular, a reality check for the 
EU’s capacity to deliver on the promise of an effective use of its crisis 
response toolbox, drawing together security, political, civilian, military and 
development tools to prevent and resolve conflict, working hand-in-glove 
with other international actors like NATO or the African Union.349 In the 
Sahel, CSDP multi-disciplinary action covering security, policing and 
border management is judged urgent to help countries secure their borders 
and manage the threat from terrorism.  
It is interesting to note that such a pragmatic attitude vis-à-vis CSDP 
initiatives is part of a cultural approach to British foreign policy based on 
money and utility, which very much characterises the country’s strategic 
posture in many other areas – e.g. the whole debate on defence spending.  
Therefore, despite some clear responsibilities, it would be misleading 
to hold the coalition government fully responsible for the UK’s progressive 
withdrawal from CSDP. Prime Minister Cameron has boosted a sea change 
in Britain’s foreign policy, switching from a global value-based, multilateral 
vision to exclusive bilateralism. However, the pragmatic aspects of British 
                                                   
347 Interview, 5 December 2012.  
348 Interview, 12 December 2012.  
349 D. Lidington (2012), “EU Common Security and Defence Policy: The UK 
Perspective”, Speech at the British Embassy in Paris, 27 June.  
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strategic culture and the complexities and inefficiencies of the CSDP system 
are also the causes of frustration perceived in London when dealing with 
its EU partners over security matters.  
Having said that, since the St Malo declaration, the UK vision for 
CSDP has been focused on the consolidation of the comprehensive 
approach, with a clear understanding that the benefits of EU security 
cooperation concern soft security, stabilisation and conflict prevention 
tasks. There is an unmistakable orientation in the UK towards a 
humanitarian, Petersberg-focused and integrated CSDP. This vision 
excludes high security dimensions or engagement in the fighting end of the 
spectrum of intervention. For those, the EU is considered too sluggish or 
ineffective due to the configuration of its decision-making and the lack of 
planning and control structures.350 An efficient division of tasks with 
NATO therefore remain a strong concern for the UK, which for instance 
affects London’s views on pooling and sharing: according to a British 
diplomat serving in the FCO, a key concern for the UK national interest is 
to avoid duplication between NATO smart defence and the EU pooling and 
sharing agendas – with the latter potentially more suitable in low-end 
spectrum assets (training facilities, communication), thus leaving aside 
high spectrum/pricey technologies. In operational terms, this logic foresees 
the development of an EU comparative advantage delivering 
comprehensive security solutions, for instance where a regional and holistic 
approach is needed (e.g. in the Sahel), whereas NATO would keep a 
flexible expeditionary capacity to counter threats beyond Article 5.351 
It can be concluded that for the UK, CSDP is a comprehensive toolbox 
whose comparative advantage vis-à-vis other institutions (e.g. NATO) is to 
tackle crises in a comprehensive and flexible manner, mixing soft and hard 
power tools for conflict prevention and crisis management, but with no 
ambition to engage in high intensity or combat operations. This vision has 
remained intact in the shift from the New Labour to the coalition 
government. What changed, instead, is the premise, or the ideology 
surrounding UK investments in CSDP and the forethought, that is, the 
implications for future UK commitment to consolidate security 
cooperation. Ideology has, as previously mentioned, shifted from the belief 
that multilateral cooperation was possible and desirable, to exclusive 
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bilateralism overshadowing cooperation with non-key EU partners and 
bypassing the Brussels-based bureaucratic machinery. Forethought has to 
do with the broader problématique of the UK’s role in post-austerity Europe: 
How would an opt-out affect the future of CSDP?  
Conclusion: Is disaster inevitable? 
It has been argued that the budgetary crisis and the US pivot to Asia could 
push the UK government to move away from a rigid US-UK partnership to 
closer and more open cooperation with European countries.352 The Obama 
administration has itself made clear that their interests lie in a strong UK 
presence in a stronger EU.353 However, the security policy intentions of 
coalition government do not seem to be moving in the right direction: quite 
the opposite; the exact trajectory of UK security policy in the next decade 
may not necessarily follow the same path as the CSDP. Let us provide three 
scenarios. 
Should Britain remain in the EU, but should exclusive bilateralism 
continue to be the mainstream approach in Whitehall, a rift may emerge 
between a continental CSDP and Britain’s refashioned ‘splendid isolation’. 
This scenario would entail a progressive UK withdrawal from the very 
common structures it crucially contributed to establishing. Growing 
hostility towards EDA-led pooling and sharing initiatives and procurement 
policies is an example. However, a disengagement from the CSDP could 
convince continental partners to move forward with cooperation even 
without the UK, which could result, in the end, in Britain having less 
political leverage to influence CSDP from within and could provoke its 
exclusion from important cost-effective multilateral projects. Negative 
implications would also affect the British defence industry and its 
competitiveness in the transatlantic defence market. Furthermore, it would 
mean that UK financial and diplomatic support to initiatives aimed at 
consolidating CSDP over the past ten years have been vain, if CSDP is left 
wasting away. Under austerity circumstances, a splendid isolation could 
easily turn into self-locking.  
                                                   
352 M. Emerson (2013), “Cameron’s big speech on Europe – No, Prime Minister!”, 
CEPS Essay, 31 January; C. Bickerton (2010), “Oh bugger, they’re in the tent: British 
responses to French reintegration into NATO”, European Security, 19:1, pp. 113-122.  
353 M. Emerson (2013), “Seven hazards in Cameron’s intended European policy”, 
CEPS Commentary, 15 January.  
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Should Britain leave the EU, its involvement in the CSDP is difficult 
to predict, although it is possible to imagine that EU partners would 
continue to cooperate, with very similar outcomes to the previous scenario. 
Logic and political good sense would suggest a third, ‘pragmatic’ scenario 
for future UK involvement. This third scenario would neither see a drastic 
disengagement from the CSDP, nor a return of New Labour’s multilateral 
enthusiasm – which seems implausible, also considering the sluggish 
progress and questionable value of EU defence cooperation in recent years, 
especially after Libya and Mali. The UK could in this sense opt for an 
approach ‘à la carte’: maintaining a passive or active attitude depending on 
the circumstances and favouring multilateral cooperation through EU 
structures over bilateral arrangements only in those cases where the 
national interest is clearly affected – joint procurement and armaments 
programmes could be an example.  
Curiously enough, should the latter scenario apply, a conclusion 
could be drawn that a strong orientation towards ‘muddling through’354 is, 
arguably, a key common denominator existing between the UK and CSDP. 
 
                                                   
354 P. Cornish (2010), “Strategy in Austerity: The Security and Defence of the 
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CONCLUSION 
FEDERICO SANTOPINTO AND MEGAN PRICE 
he relevance of the 2003 European Security Strategy has been 
frequently questioned in recent years. The debate over the adoption 
of a new grand European security strategy nevertheless remains a 
source of fundamental division among member states and scholars alike. 
Does the EU need another abstract paper in the field of security and 
defence, in such a rapidly evolving environment? Is it really a priority at 
this stage of the European integration process?  
According to some, any formal negotiation of such a grand strategy 
could risk opening the Pandora’s Box on which the CSDP is currently 
sitting. Furthermore, such an exercise could lead to a vague or inconsistent 
compromise or, alternatively, to a highly detailed but unheeded document, 
with no chance of serious implementation.355 On the other hand, several 
experts and European countries are arguing strongly that now is the time 
for such a document. In their view, the EU desperately needs to identify a 
common long-term vision in order to give guidance on its defence policy, 
which is facing serious international and financial constraints.356 
                                                   
355 Among the most critical points of view see: 
- Menon, A. (2013), “An EU Global Strategy: Unnecessary and Unhelpful”, in 
“European Global Strategy in Theory and Practice: Relevance for the EU”, UI 
Occasional Paper No. 14, Swedish Institute of International Affairs. 
- Rogers, J. (2012), “Empowering the tribe: Confidence comes before strategy”, 
in: Stocktaking of EU Strategizing, publication from the European Global 
Strategy Conference of the 11 October 2012, Warsaw, 20 December. 
- Fägersten, B. (2012), “How Grand is Global? Notes on a European Strategy”, in 
UI Brief, No. 14. 
356 See, for example: 
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To some extent, both points of view have merit: a grand European 
security strategy could indeed represent a step forward. However, any 
serious negotiation on the matter would carry risks, with no tangible 
guarantee of success. For this reason, some preconditions need to be set 
before launching such a complex debate. From the case studies presented in 
this volume, it would appear that the pursuit of such preconditions is 
especially relevant at the national level.  
The first precondition is to understand what each member state really 
wants from the CSDP. If CSDP is a means, what is the end according to the 
most prominent European capitals? This was the aim of the seven chapters 
of this book, written from seven related field missions in Paris, London, 
Berlin, Rome, Madrid, Warsaw and Stockholm. Let us compare their 
outcomes. 
At first sight, the results of this survey might appear surprising. To 
begin with, almost all member states’ officials interviewed for this study, 
except those representing the UK, shared the view that the CSDP needs 
urgent improvement to avoid strategic irrelevance357. One could even ask 
why European defence integration is not already a much stronger policy. 
More surprisingly, it appears that the member states see the CSDP as a tool 
to serve similar national interests, focused towards more or less the same 
geographic areas, in the name of comparable values and visions. The few 
divergences that do exist between them with regard to these issues, 
although important, cannot alone explain the EU’s systematic paralysis 
when facing an international crisis, such as those in Libya, Mali or Syria.  
                                                                                                                                 
- Biscop, S. (2009), “The Value of Power, the Power of Values: A Call for an EU 
Grand Strategy”, Egmont Policy Paper No. 33, Institute Egmont. 
- Grevi, G. (2012), “A progressive European Global Strategy”, in Stocktaking of 
EU Strategizing, publication from the European Global Strategy Conference of 
the 11 October 2012, Warsaw, 20 December. 
- Kehoane, D. (2013), “Strategic Priorities for EU Defence Policy”, FRIDE Policy 
brief, FRIDE. 
- Howorth, J. (2009), “What Europe Badly Needs is a Grand Strategy”, in 
Europe’s World, November. 
357 This study is based, among the others, on interviews to high level diplomats, 
militaries, civil servant and experts carried out in the seven targeted European 
capitals. 
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Beyond the rhetoric, of course, things get more complicated. When 
looking more closely at the member states’ approaches towards CSDP, the 
survey indeed highlights two fundamental disagreements. The first is 
related to their strategic cultures, characterised most forcefully by France 
and Germany. This problem is certainly not new and has already been 
analysed in other studies.358 Nevertheless, if taken alone, the divergences 
between states’ strategic cultures, as important as they are, do not explain 
everything. In fact, they are deeply related to another key element of 
opposition that emerges from this study, namely member states’ attitudes 
towards EU integration when dealing with defence policy.  
Consequently, despite all the common denominators identified, 
member states appear to be divided over how they see the role of CSDP in 
the overall integration project. Before coming back to this existential 
problem, the first section of this chapter focuses on the converging 
elements identified in the study, which deserve to be highlighted. The 
second section will then move to analyse the two main misunderstandings 
referred to above: strategic culture and attitudes toward European 
integration. The third and fourth sections present two suggestions for 
prompting progress: launching national debates prior to any new debate at 
the European level and, finally, linking the European strategic debate to the 
possible creation of a “permanent structured cooperation” in the field of 
defence, as foreseen by the Treaty of Lisbon. 
Common denominators  
From a theoretical point of view, the European countries targeted by the 
survey tend to converge on their geographical priorities. These appear to be 
North Africa and the Middle East, the Sahel region and the Horn of Africa, 
the Balkans and Eastern Europe. As seen in the related chapter, France 
identifies an ‘arc of crisis’ from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean. This 
consensus is also to be found among scholars and experts, according to 
whom the EU should focus on its neighbourhood and the most unstable 
areas related to it (the so-called “neighbourhood of neighbourhoods”).359 
The need to secure maritime routes (e.g. the Indian Ocean, South-East Asia 
maritime corridors, and the Gulf of Guinea) and access to the natural 
                                                   
358 Among the most relevant publication on this, see H. Biehl, B. Giegerich and A. 
Jonas (eds) (2013), Strategic Cultures in Europe, Springer VS Edition.  
359 G. Giovanni (2012), op. cit. 
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resources of the Artic also seems to have become a new strategic priority 
for several countries featured in this study. Around these points a 
consensus may be built.  
Of course, the geographical security interests of the member states do 
not align perfectly. For example, Poland, Germany and Sweden are 
expressly more concerned with Eastern Europe and the Balkans, while 
France and Spain have their attention more focused on Africa. In the past, 
such differences have proven problematic. Germany has shown reluctance 
to act in post-colonial Africa, thus provoking a certain irritation in Paris. 
Nevertheless, although relevant, such divergences do not appear to be 
insurmountable.  
Indeed, when looking at how the member states rank the regions 
according to importance, there is a more general coherence. Priority 
divergences, where they do exist, are not that far apart. That is, a region 
listed as the top priority for one country could be a second-tier priority for 
another. For example, if Poland and Germany look mainly to the east of 
Europe, it does not mean that they ignore Africa, as Berlin and Warsaw 
proved with their respective participation in EUFOR DR CONGO in 2006 
and EUFOR CHAD in 2008. Moreover, if France looks mainly towards 
Africa, this does not mean that it is uninterested in promoting stability in 
Eastern Europe. It is therefore reasonable to speculate that compromises 
could be reached in the negotiation of a grand strategy, if member states 
show some political good will. As a matter of fact, a quick glance at where 
the most important CSDP missions are deployed today (the Balkans, Sahel, 
the Horn of Africa) would already show this to be the case.  
The attitude to adopt towards Russia, however, appears less 
straightforward. Poland and Sweden are clearly more concerned by the 
political evolution of the Kremlin than Germany or Italy. Although 
relevant, this divergence cannot be considered a paralysing issue for CSDP. 
Room for compromise exists, as was demonstrated in the case of the 
Ossetia conflict. Moreover, despite the fact that Sweden and Poland tend to 
be more critical of Moscow they clearly recognise Russia as a central actor 
that must be engaged.  
Member states also appear to strongly converge on main thematic 
priorities. All of those reviewed for this study claim to be strong promoters 
of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Moreover, CSDP is often 
seen to be a tool for the promotion of these values. Sweden is the country 
most patently involved in spreading such values worldwide. Member 
states strongly converge again when it comes to threat perception: failed 
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states, terrorism, incursions on global trade routes, cyber security, and 
environmental degradation are iterated in each capital as primary threats. 
Such issues, moreover, were already identified in the 2003 European 
Security Strategy.  
Few differences among member states are apparent when 
considering their attitudes towards international organisations. The need 
for a UN mandate before undertaking military actions remains quite a 
sensitive issue. Germany and Sweden are very clear in that respect: any 
military action must be authorised by the UN. On the other hand, France 
and the UK appear less cut-and-dried on the matter. Nonetheless, all the 
countries covered by this study consider UN Security Council approval as 
highly desirable, if not absolutely necessary. Here again, the converging 
elements are much stronger than the opposing ones. Compromises could 
easily be found, and were also already partly identified in the 2003 
Strategy.  
Concerning the Atlantic Alliance and its relation to the CSDP, it is 
interesting to note how the member states’ positions have moved closer in 
recent years, thanks also to the recent evolution of the international context. 
The French reintegration of NATO military structures on the one side and 
the US demand for more European responsibility on the other have 
favoured closer convergence on the issue. With slight variations, the need 
for complementarity between the EU and NATO is now fully recognised by 
a core group of states (Germany, France, Italy, Spain and Poland), 
including Sweden (which is not a NATO member) and, to some extent, the 
UK. The UK position, however, remains distinct from the rest, particularly 
when it comes to issue of the creation of autonomous European structures 
for military command and control. Yet, all the other member states 
recognise the need to have an operational headquarters in Brussels.  
Misunderstandings  
Apparently, the declared national interests of the member states do not 
reveal too many glaring inconsistencies that might explain why, almost 15 
years after being launched, the CSDP remains an embryonic policy. 
Attention must be drawn to two more existential problems highlighted by 
this study: divergences on strategic culture (use of force) and differing 
attitudes towards the European integration process. 
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Strategic cultures 
The lack of a common strategic culture is frequently pinpointed by scholars 
and experts as the main obstacle to the development of a global vision and 
coherent action by the EU. Such a problem is echoed in this study, 
particularly when looking at Germany and France, ostensibly the two 
driving powers behind the European integration process. As mentioned, a 
rich body of literature exists around the topic. However, it is interesting to 
note that the disagreements on strategic culture seem to have a different 
impact when they occur within the EU rather than within NATO.  
The German reluctance to use force, indeed, did not prevent Berlin 
from supporting robust military action in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan. 
And even in the Libyan conflict, Germany refrained from imposing its veto 
in NATO. This de facto allowed the Alliance to bomb Gaddafi´s troops, 
despite Germany’s relative intransigence within the EU over the same 
issue. Why is it that, when facing large-scale international crises, strategic 
culture divergences appear so dramatic within the EU, though not so 
paralysing in NATO? 
Two reasons may explain Berlin’s different stance within the EU and 
NATO. Of course, the traditional German attachment to the transatlantic 
relationship must be cited first. But such an attitude may also be seen from 
another point of view. Despite its reluctance to use force, if Germany tends 
to accept NATO carrying out robust missions, though not the EU, this 
could also be due to the fact that Germans see themselves at the heart of the 
EU, but not necessarily at the heart of NATO. If Berlin chooses to abstain 
from using force in a given crisis, it will tend to impose this decision on the 
EU. In the end, in the case of military action, it may be easier for Germany, 
politically, to leave the floor to others in NATO than in the European 
Council, where Berlin asserts its leadership role more robustly. 
The second reason may be even more straightforward. At this stage, 
most European member states, including Germany and France, cannot 
even conceive of the idea of using CSDP to carry out large-scale combat 
missions, such as the Libyan intervention. The EU is simply not ready to 
accept it, and this is probably not just a matter of military capabilities. 
Therefore, the problem seems to be at the heart of what the EU is and what 
it represents for its member states. The EU and NATO are indeed two 
different organisations, as their name clearly states: the latter is an alliance, 
which does not challenge the national sovereignty of its members, while 
the first is supposed to be a political integration project. This brings us back 
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to the different attitude that member states have towards the European 
integration process, and how they understand CSDP fitting in that process. 
European integration 
The link between the CSDP and the integration process has been less 
emphasised by recent literature than the debate over strategic cultures. Yet, 
the disagreements on this matter illustrate the existence of crucial 
misunderstandings over the essence of the CSDP, which strongly influence 
the national attitudes towards and expectations of EU defence policy. As a 
matter of fact, the interviews carried out in the European capitals and the 
national documents analysed only implicitly suggest that member states 
have different opinions over the role of CSDP in the larger framework of 
the integration process. However, what is not made explicit can sometimes 
be more instructive than what is clearly claimed. 
Firstly, in this regard it is interesting to note that Germany, Italy and 
Spain consider CSDP integration as a strategic goal in itself. By contrast, 
Sweden, Poland, France and the UK tend to perceive European defence 
policy more as an instrument to pursue well-defined national interests. So, 
again, while the two supposed driving powers of European integration, 
France and Germany, appear most visibly divided on this existential 
matter, their split may simply be anchoring a deeper divide among 
member states. 
As seen in the related chapter, France has always presented itself as a 
strong supporter of EU integration in the field of defence, even if, in recent 
years, and perhaps since the 2008 Chad mission, the country has lost faith 
in the project due to the passivity of its European partners. Overall, what 
France really wants now from the European integration process in the field 
of defence remains unclear.  
From a general point of view, indeed, supporting CSDP does not 
automatically imply supporting the EU integration process, if this process 
is understood as a qualitative step-by-step integration towards a political 
union. On this last point France has always maintained a certain ambiguity, 
which, in the end, can be retraced to 1953, when the French Parliament 
scuttled the European Defence Community project. If in the past France has 
frequently called for more political unification, at the same time it has 
always remained deeply attached to what in Paris is considered as a sacred 
‘souveraineté nationale’. Ultimately, when it comes to defence matters, France 
never really abandoned the old Gaullist vision of a ‘concert of nations’, 
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based on the principle of unanimity and on the marginalisation of the EU 
supranational institutions.  
Consequently, for France the so-called ‘Europe de la défense’ appears to 
be, first and foremost, a tool to coordinate European nations’ collective 
military power outside the continent, before being a tool for European 
integration. This vision is confirmed by the last French White Paper 
published in May 2013, specifying that the country must maintain its 
capacity to enter first in a military crisis, as it did in Mali and Libya. ‘To 
enter first’, that is, before others, including of course the European Union. 
As seen previously and analysed in the chapter on France, such a 
declaration has to be seen as the fruit of the growing French 
disenchantment with the CSDP since 2008. Yet, it also should be read as the 
product of a historical ambiguity never really resolved, harking back to the 
failed European Defence Community in 1953.  
As demonstrated in the respective chapters, Spain, Italy and, in 
particular Germany, among other EU countries, do not necessarily share 
the same vision. Indeed, the Germans historically see CSDP as a step 
forward in the European integration process, and secondarily as a tool to 
exert military power outside Europe. The same appears true for Italy and 
Spain. This vision has not always been supported coherently, as opposition 
to the BAE-EADS (British Aerospace System and European Aeronautic 
Defence and Space Company) merger has demonstrated. However, the link 
between the European defence policy and the integration project still 
appears strong in Berlin’s discourse today, even in the current context of 
crisis.  
Consequently, German scepticism about robust military actions 
abroad should not be seen as synonymous with disengagement from 
CSDP, as frequently lamented in Paris. Put simply, when they think of the 
CSDP, the two driving forces of the EU integration process tend to look in 
two different directions: France looks outside Europe, while Germany 
looks to Brussels. 
What about the other member states targeted by this study? Where 
do they look? As elaborated in their respective chapters, Spain and Italy are 
definitively closer to the German point of view. They both clearly support a 
more qualitative EU integration in the field of defence, while remaining 
reluctant (though less so than Germany) over the use of force. The chapter 
on Spain is enlightening on this matter, especially as it demonstrates how 
Spanish participation in certain EU military missions, for example EUFOR 
DRC or EUFOR Althea, was not driven by any particular national interest. 
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Rather the ‘milieu’ goal was to strengthen the CSDP and support European 
partners. Similar conclusions can be drawn for Italy, which shares with 
Spain the status of a ‘middle power’, characterised by relevant global 
economic interests but limited military and political assets. Rome’s support 
for EU integration is traditionally strong, even if Italy has shown more 
attention for pursuing compromises between CSDP’s and NATO’s roles in 
the European security architecture (this attitude is identified in the related 
chapter as the Italian ‘third way’). 
Sweden and Poland, for their part, appear to have more specific and 
clear strategic goals identified in their doctrines and official documents. 
And in such frameworks, the CSDP is presented as a tool to follow these 
guiding goals. Sweden, which claims to pursue, in particular, the 
promotion of democracy, international law and a viable global economy, is 
more willing to undertake military action under certain conditions (which 
may differ from French provisos). In such a context, the EU is seen by 
Sweden as a useful power multiplier. The country nevertheless remains 
vague over its position on the integration process as an end in itself. The US 
pivot toward Asia and the Russian domestic evolution may have an impact 
on the matter. Nevertheless, as of today, Stockholm remains opposed to 
any CSDP role in collective and territorial defence. This could be seen as 
proof of a certain coldness toward the integration process. Concerning 
Poland, the CSDP is presented as an important forum, alongside NATO, to 
protect the country’s independence. Here too, European defence policy 
thus appears as a means to achieve a concrete and well-established 
strategic goal, rather than as an end in itself. The Polish position has 
nevertheless evolved in recent years, as spelled out in the related chapter. 
Warsaw has shown a growing interest in strengthening the CSDP, mainly 
through the Weimar initiative alongside Germany and France. According 
to Warsaw’s viewpoint, NATO should maintain its primacy over territorial 
defence, while the EU should concentrate its action on crisis management 
missions, mainly in the European neighbourhood, in order to stabilise the 
Old Continent.  
As stated above, the UK stands apart. French and British positions 
have drawn closer to one another in recent years. Both countries have 
proven willing and able to use force, and they are both deeply attached to 
their national sovereignty. However, it is also fair to recall that France is 
not opposed to the CSDP in principle, while the UK remains steadfast in its 
more narrow, soft-power vision for potential EU action. Indeed, the 
country (cited in the related chapter of this book as the “Elephant in the 
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room”) sees the European defence policy essentially as a complementary 
tool for stability promotion and conflict prevention, with limited, though 
relevant, value added. Yet, London’s intransigent opposition to the creation 
of an EU operational headquarter speaks volumes about its attitude 
towards EU integration. Ultimately, regarding CSDP, if France and 
Germany look in different directions, the UK’s gaze remains on 
Washington. 
Between integration and strategic culture 
The French frustration over Germany’s unwillingness to exert military 
power has provoked a feeling in Paris that Berlin is not a serious partner 
for defence matters. This in turn appears to have generated a loss of 
confidence in the overall CSDP project. But given the nuances outlined 
above, and in the chapters of this book, this perception is incomplete. The 
recent German reluctance to use force does not imply that the country is 
averse to CSDP in itself. The problem is that Berlin and Paris simply do not 
share the same idea about what the CSDP should be. And the same can be 
said also for the other countries targeted in this study.  
In closing, it may be interesting to sketch two axes, one representing 
the member states’ willingness to use force and the other representing their 
attitude towards the EU integration process, as these appear to be two 
primary factors of difference arising from the case studies. The image that 
emerges in the chart below certainly should not be considered as a scientific 
metric. Rather, it is provided to help illustrate a tension within European 
defence policy, existing since its creation: the apparent distance between 
the ‘Big 3’ over these two existential issues of the CSDP.  
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National debates before a European debate 
The fact that the most prominent member states do not share the same idea 
over the CSDP does not mean that they have a clear idea about what they 
really want from it, or that their stance is fixed. In fact, with the possible 
exception of the UK, almost all the member states have, at one point or 
another, changed or contradicted their stance toward European defence 
policy. On one side they claim to support EU integration in this area, but 
simultaneously they do not seem ready to accept what this implies in real 
terms. They thus remain torn between aspirations towards a stronger 
Europe in the world, and the desire to keep their national sovereignty 
intact.  
Hence, before launching into a huge debate at the European level 
about what the EU should collectively do, member states should clarify at 
the national level what they really want from the CSDP. Stemming from 
this, several points should be elucidated: 
- Is the CSDP primarily a tool to improve the European integration 
from a political point of view, or is it fundamentally a tool to improve 
European national capabilities? 
- Is it a tool for post-conflict stabilisation missions or should it also be 
built and relied upon for high intensity combat missions? 
- To what extent are member states ready to transfer part of their 
national sovereignty to Brussels and in what form? To what extent is 
this necessary, given the declared purposes of the CSDP? 
- Should the EU itself act as an international actor or should it remain a 
coordination forum for its member states? 
- Is a two-speed EU in the field of defence an option? How could the 
historical reluctance of the UK be dealt with on the matter?  
 
These questions must be answered, and priorities must be balanced, 
first and foremost at the national level. Only then can a fruitful debate be 
pursued at European level. Reversing this sequence would likely condemn 
the debate to stagnate at the point reached in the 2003 European Security 
Strategy.  
So far, the country with the clearest and most coherent position on 
the CSDP is also the most euro-sceptical state, the UK. London, at least, 
says what it thinks and does what it says. Before launching such a complex 
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and delicate negotiation over a European grand security strategy, the other 
member states should strive to do the same. 
Linking the strategic debate to permanent structured cooperation 
(PESCO) 
On 3 July 2013 the French Senate adopted a rather curious report entitled 
“Pour en finir avec l’Europe de la défense. Vers une défense européenne” [Ending 
the Europe of defence. Towards European defence].360 As usual, the report 
does little to clarify what French decision-makers want from the CSDP. 
Indeed, after having published the 2013 White Paper stating that France 
must keep its capacity to enter first in a crisis, the Senate report, which has 
been adopted by all the main political forces represented, bemoans the fact 
that the CSDP is not guided by a ‘European brain’. It goes so far as to 
mention the need to jump towards a more federal model.  
However, the document contains a new and interesting idea that 
deserves highlighting. The French Senate calls for the creation of a 
‘Eurogroupe de la défense’ which would gather the most willing and 
capable member states, including the UK. The idea of a two-speed Europe 
is certainly not new. However, the report goes further in establishing a link 
between such an idea and the debate over the redaction of a European 
white paper, suggesting that such a strategic document could be adopted 
only at the ‘Eurogroup of defence’ level.  
The permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) foreseen in the 
Lisbon Treaty could provide the legal background necessary to create a 
core group of states willing to deepen their defence cooperation in the EU 
framework. Nevertheless, it should also be noted that the timid debate over 
the PESCO has remained, so far, based purely on technical matters, without 
displaying any political ambition. As a matter of fact, during the last few 
years the overall debate around the CSDP appears to be completely 
detached from the broader issue of EU political integration and limited to 
merely a technical discussion on how to pool and share military capabilities 
in order to save money.  
Yet, the euro saga and the debt crisis have proven that the creation of 
common tools inevitably require the establishment of shared policies for 
their management. The CSDP will not escape this common sense rule. In 
other words, after having launched a single currency without a joint 
                                                   
360 French Senate (http://www.senat.fr/notice-rapport/2012/r12-713-notice.html).  
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economic policy, the EU should now avoid creating common military 
capabilities without common ‘political capabilities’. The example of the 
BattleGroups constitutes a sharp lesson on this. Operational since 2007, the 
EU BattleGroups have, to date, never been used, arguably because the EU 
does not have a shared policy on how to use them.  
The missing link between the European defence policy and the 
European foreign policy (the CSDP and the CFSP) has been stressed by 
several scholars and experts.361 Nick Witney, for example, notes that 
according to the European treaties, the CSDP should be an integral part of 
the CSFP, not disconnected from it as it seems in reality. Calling for a 
stronger EU common foreign policy, however, is another way of 
identifying the lack of progress in the European integration process.  
Linking a strategic debate to the PESCO initiative could therefore 
represent an opportunity to restore the link between the CSDP and the 
integration process, or between the debate on capabilities and the need to 
strengthen the EU common foreign policy. In order to do so, however, the 
PESCO would require at least two conditions. First of all, it should gather 
the most willing states, not simply the most capable ones. In other words, 
the PESCO should not be sterilised as an exclusively technical cooperation 
project. It should have a political soul, embodied precisely by a collective 
strategic ambition and clear shared vision outlined in an official document, 
adopted by all its members.  
Another condition would be to clarify where the UK stands in such a 
scenario. Each time the EU has progressed on matters affecting national 
sovereignty (the euro, Schengen visas), it has always done so through a 
pioneering coalition… and without the participation of the UK. It is most 
likely that the same will be true in the area of defence. Although London is 
an essential partner in any project addressing military capabilities, at some 
point a different type of cooperation between the EU and the UK will have 
to be considered at the institutional level.  
The common path between the Old Continent and its main island 
will never be in doubt, but its form should be rethought. London and 
Brussels can work and act closely together as security providers in the 
world, without necessarily sitting in the same EU structures. In the end, 
                                                   
361 See for example N. Witney (2013), “Where Does CSDP Fit in the EU Foreign 
Policy?”, Policy Paper No. 64, European Council on Foreign Relations.  
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this was the desire of Winston Churchill, one of the greatest visionary 
minds of the 20th century. 
In this regard, it is interesting to remind ourselves that one of the 
most striking characteristics of the PESCO is the option to create it through 
a qualified majority vote by the EU Council even if, once created, the new 
core group will have to work on the basis of unanimity among its 
participants.362 Such a characteristic should be seen as an opportunity for 
those member states willing to go forward, should any exist. 
Frequently evoked, the two-speed Europe scenario is also feared, 
particularly in the military field. It would risk dividing the Old Continent, 
more than unifying it. This may be partially true in the short term. 
Nevertheless, generally the most relevant reforms that have marked history 
have rarely been adopted unanimously. The idea that the EU should evolve 
only through perfect consensus, always working hand in hand, 
systematically avoiding any decision that may be temporarily divisive, will 
condemn Europe to eternal stagnation.  
 
                                                   
362 Art. 46 TFEU. 
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